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ASSESSING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: Threat, Proliferation, and Countermeasures

by Skyler Cranmer

One of the largest security threats facing the United States and the rest of the developed world is the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of unscrupulous world actors. Weapons of mass destruction usually consist of three types, nuclear, chemical, and biological. Nuclear weapons require a great deal of technology and resources in order for successful development to occur. Chemical weapons are relatively easy to develop, but in general, are not nearly as destructive as nuclear or biological weapons. Biological weapons are of particular concern to this author. They are relatively easy to develop and deploy when compared with nuclear weapons. Further, they have the potential to cause as many or more human casualties than a nuclear weapon. Compared to nuclear weapons, the threat and danger of a biological weapon attack is largely unexplored and is does not receive due examination in the literature. It is for this reason that this author feels discussion of biological weapons and the threat of biological warfare is of paramount importance.

Perhaps the greatest worry when examining biological weapons is their proliferation to unscrupulous world actors such as hostile states and terrorist groups. States that develop biological weapons wield great power, both in retaliatory and offensive strike capability. The animosity of some proliferating states towards the United States makes the chance that they would be used against this nation greater. It also increases the likelihood that the hostile state might supply biological weaponry to terrorist organizations so that they may carry out an attack on the United States that would not be (at least immediately) traced back to the proliferating country. While it is not the intention of this writing to examine in depth the threat posed by specific states, it is the intention of this article to address the mechanics of biological weapons proliferation, defined as the spread of biological weapon and biological weapons technology counter to international treaty, with discussion geared toward state proliferators. States are assumed to pose the greatest proliferation threat because, in general, they are able to bring more resources to bear for development and deployment than nonstate actors. Further, states that are pursuing biological weapons tend to have higher levels of enmity with the United States. In this author's view, states represent a greater proliferation threat than nonstate actors. As such, it is the belief of this author that the proliferation of biological weapons, particularly by states, represents a clear and present danger to the national security of the United States and must be addressed.

This essay will examine the proliferation of biological weapons with a focus on the mechanisms of proliferation and what can be done to curb such proliferation. The analysis of the biological threat will include a brief history of biological warfare and weaponry, discussion of the danger to the United States, and the mechanics of proliferation: the theft of

existing weapons, dual-use technology, biological arms control failure, the phenomena of "brain drain" and the spread of delivery systems. The discussion will proceed to cover preventative grand strategies as well as issue-specific solutions. It should be acknowledged at the outset that this writing does not intend to probe in great depth into the specific issues discussed, rather its purpose is to give the reader and a working understanding of the wider issue of biological weapons proliferation. As such, this author aims to give the reader an informative view of the situation as a whole that will provide a basis for discussion and issue-specific study.

THE NATURE OF THE BIOLOGICAL THREAT

A Brief History of Biological Warfare: 6th Century BC - 2001

Before one can discuss the central issues pertaining to the assessment of the biological threat, one must first have an understanding of the history related to biological weapons and their military applications.

The use of biological weapons dates back to ancient times. The first recorded biological attacks occurred in the 6th century BC: Assyrians poisoned the wells of their enemies with rye ergot, and Solon of Athens poisoned the Krissian water supply with hellebore (Skunk Cabbage) during the siege of Krissa.¹ Biological warfare was taken further in 184 BC when Hannibal's forces, during a naval battle against King Eumenes of Pargamon, hurled earthen pots filled with poisonous serpents upon the enemy's decks. Consequently Eumenes was defeated.² In 1346, during the siege of Kaffa, the Tartar army hurled its plague-ridden dead over the walls of the city and the defenders were forced to surrender. This technique was replicated often and as late as 1710 when the Russians used it in their war with Sweden.³ In the 15th century AD, Pizarro engaged in biological warfare when he presented the natives with "gifts" of clothing laden with the variola virus (more commonly known as Smallpox). This same technique was also used against the Native Americans by Captain Ecuver of the Royal Americas in 1763. This attack was subsequently delivered to the Native Americans repeatedly during the United States' interactions with them well into the 1800's.⁴ The first known incident of biological warfare directed against the United States happened during the Civil War between 1860 and 1865 when the Confederacy poisoned ponds (the major source of Union drinking water) with the carcasses of dead animals.⁵

The modern age of biological warfare began in 1914, when the Germans, during World War I, attempted to spread cholera in Italy, plague in St. Petersburg, and dropped biological bombs over Britain. This was the first example of modern techniques of biological warfare being used on the field of battle much as it would be today. The German use

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of biological weapons in World War I contributed greatly to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which banned biological weapons.⁶ Between 1931 and 1941, the Japanese undertook a major effort to develop offensive biological weapons. This effort was led by a physician and army officer named Shiro Ishii. Ishii conducted research, including human experiments, in Manchuria (which the Japanese invaded in 1932) on the Chinese population. Ishii's research eventually led to the deaths of tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers and civilians. After 1940, the Japanese used biological weapons offensively in Chuhsien, Ninpo, Chinhua, and Suiyan.⁷ These are the last confirmed incidences of biological weapons being used offensively by a state during time of war.

Much of the modern history of biological warfare is shadowed in controversy. The true nature of modern biological weapons use is difficult to assess because of confounding factors such as difficulties in verification of alleged or attempted attacks, the allegations of biological attacks for propaganda purposes, the paucity of pertinent microbiological or epidemiological data, and the incidence of naturally occurring endemic or epidemic diseases during hostilities.⁸ In 1941, the U.S. Army launched its biological weapons program. With its main research center in Camp Detrick, Maryland, and testing facilities in Mississippi and Utah, the Army conducted research into offensive biological weapons as well as defense against biological attack.⁹ In 1946, the U.S. announced its involvement in biological weaponry research to the world; the USSR did the same in 1956. In December of 1951, the then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett ordered early readiness for an offensive use of biological weapons against Chinese and North Korean Troops during the Korean conflict. Soon afterwards, the North Koreans and the Chinese accused the U.S. of deploying biological weapons. To date the U.S. denies any such attack.¹⁰ This alleged usage is debated to this day, though there seems to be a growing consensus that the accusations are contrived and fraudulent.¹¹

On November 25, 1969, President Nixon renounced biological weapons and limited future research to defensive measures only. Despite this declaration, many believe that offensive research has yet to stop. From 1971 to 1973, all U.S. biological weapons stockpiles were allegedly destroyed. 1972 witnessed the first confirmed attempt at bioterrorism. Members of the right-wing "Order of the Rising Sun" were arrested in possession of 30-40 kg of typhoid cultures that they intended to use to contaminate the water supplies in Chicago, St. Louis, and other Midwestern cities.¹² The arrival of biological terrorism on the international security scene represents a major shift in historical trends. Throughout most of history, only states could effectively muster the capacity to kill an enemy in significant numbers. The relative ease of availability of biological weapons (to be discussed later) gives weak states and nonstate actors the potential to inflict massive casualties on perceived enemies.¹³ Also in 1972, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) met

and condemned the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons. The BWC was eventually signed by 103 nations. Despite the BWC, some countries are widely suspected of retaining varying levels of biological weapons programs: Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and South Africa (until the apartheid government fell).¹⁴ London witnessed the first confirmed case of state-sponsored bio-terrorism when in 1978, Bulgarian exile Georgi Markov was assassinated via an injection of Ricin (a highly lethal biological toxin which was shot out of a modified umbrella) carried out by an operative of the communist Bulgarian government with technology supplied by the Soviet Union.¹⁵

In April of 1979, an apparently accidental explosion in Military Compound 19 outside the city of Sverdlovsk, USSR, spread a cloud of anthrax¹⁶ killing an estimated 1000 people in Sverdlovsk.¹⁷ The USSR denied the incident until 1992. During Operation Desert Storm, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein threatened U.S. forces with biological agents. Subsequently, it was verified that Iraq possessed advanced and offensive biological weapons capabilities, most of which was believed to be destroyed in the conflict.¹⁸ In 1993, the Aum Shinrikyo terrorist cult is believed to have obtained samples of the Ebola virus' Zaire strain (the most lethal strain of the virus). The Aum Shinrikyo struck biologically in 1995 when in at least 10 incidences; they attempted to disperse anthrax, Botulinum toxin, Q fever, and Ebola Zaire strain against the population in Japan. These attacks generally involved introduction of the agent via automobile, rooftop dispersal, or briefcase bio-bombs. Despite their many efforts in bioterrorism, their most infamous attack was a chemical attack that year in the Tokyo subway when they released the agent Sarin killing 12 people.¹⁹

In 1999, Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaida terrorist network is believed to have acquired biological weapons in Sudan and Afghanistan. In 2001, it was verified that Al Qaida possessed a sophisticated biological weapons research program when U.S. Marines in Afghanistan discovered a bio-weapons lab.²⁰ Between 9/18 and 11/2 of 2001, military grade anthrax was distributed to American public officials and figureheads through the U.S. postal system: 16 cases of anthrax infection were confirmed and 5 suspected.²¹ To date, the source of the anthrax mailings has not been confirmed. Lastly, while the incidents are too many to mention individually, the period between 1970 and 2002 is sprinkled with mostly failed attempts at bioterrorism. The history of biological warfare and biological terrorism clearly shows an increasing frequency of usage. It is for this reason, in part, that the proliferation of biological weapons is of issue today. As such, it is prudent of the government, the private sector, and academia, to examine the issue of biological weapons proliferation in greater depth so as to make our country and its citizenry less vulnerable to biological attack.

THE DANGER TO THE UNITED STATES:

The nature of a biological attack is drastically different from any other form of weaponry known to man. A biological weapon, for the most part, can be introduced into a target area or population without an overt action.²² Unlike the overt acts that accompany other weapons of mass destruction, a biological attack would not necessitate an explosion or any damage to infrastructure. The release of a biological agent could be as simple as opening a culture vile in a crowded place for people to inhale or sending infected "suicide attackers" into the target population to spread the contagion. A biological attack could very easily be a covert one; where the authorities would not be able to recognize that an attack had occurred until significant numbers of people became ill.²³

The potentially covert nature of a biological attack complicates the problem of response. If a biological weapon has an incubation period of several days to weeks and the disease is contagious person to person, by the time the first few victims become ill and the authorities recognize a biological attack has occurred, dozens if not hundreds or thousands of people could already be infected.²⁴ Further, the movement of infected people who are contagious, but asymptomatic could have spread the disease throughout the region, state, nation, or globe, thus making effective reactive containment very difficult if not impossible. Today, Americans move about freely and quickly, this would facilitate the spread of the disease to every region of the United States, possibly before the attack has even been positively identified.²⁵ The spread of disease in this fashion would not be dependent on weather and geography like an initial aerosolized agent attack would be, rather it would depend on human contact to spread. Depending on the specific properties of the agent released, by the time authorities are able to identify an attack has taken place, the disease may already have reached epidemic proportions.

In June of 2001, the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense and the Center for Strategic and International Studies held an exercise named "Dark Winter." This exercised was a simulated smallpox attack. The results of this exercise indicate that with a covert introduction of a contagion such as small pox, there could be as many as 300,000 casualties in the first five weeks following the attack.²⁶ At this point, the health care infrastructure of the United States would have been completely over-run.²⁷ By the Centers for Disease Control's own admission, "the nation's public health infrastructure is not currently adequate to detect and respond to a bioterrorist event."²⁸ Unfortunately the number of casualties would not stop at 300,000. Once it has overwhelmed the medical infrastructure, the disease would only spread more easily, and casualties would only become more numerous.

With the density of urban populations and the speed and frequency with which Americans travel, it is possible for casualties to number in the millions if a deadly contagion were introduced in an urban center,

casualties could number in the millions, it is for this reason that biological weapons are often described as the "poor man's atomic bomb."²⁹ Biological weapons can indeed be more deadly than atomic bombs. For example, Jessica Stern estimates that 100 Kilograms of Anthrax, dispersed under optimum conditions, could kill as many as three million people whereas a hydrogen bomb with a yield equivalent to one million tones of TNT would most likely only kill from 600,000 to 2 million people.³⁰ Most terrifying about this scenario is that Anthrax is not contagious, if the same three million people were infected with a highly contagious biological agent such as Pneumonic Plague, Ebola, or Smallpox, the deadly aftermath would be almost too horrible to contemplate given the projection that infection can multiply as much as 15,000 times in five weeks, in metropolitan areas.³¹ By this author's calculation, at the rate suggested by the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense, five or six weeks after an initial attack infecting 3 million, such as that proposed by Stern, 45,000 million people could be dead. While the actual death toll from such the spread of such an attack would be considerably lower than this figure due to reactive vaccinations (if available) and the restriction of travel, the calculations suffice to make the point that considerable damage could be done by a well planned biological attack.

While the loss of human life is of paramount concern, it should also be noted, due to the nature of an epidemic, people would not want to expose themselves to others for fear of being infected. As such, a biological attack would have a catastrophic impact on the economy.³² The Centers for Disease Control estimates the introduction of a biological agent would have economic impacts ranging from \$477.8 million to \$26.2 billion per 100,000 people infected depending on the contagion.³³ When this author bases his calculations on the findings of the Dark Winter³⁴ exercise³⁵, five weeks after the biological event, an impact of \$1.4 billion to \$78.6 billion could be felt. If one million people were exposed³⁶, damages could be expected to range from \$4.5 billion to \$262 billion. Based on Stern's 1999 estimate, when three million people are exposed in an initial attack³⁷, the cost of the initial attack could range from \$13.5 billion to \$786 billion without even taking into account the spread of the disease. Needless to say, if the biological agent spread across the country in urban centers as fast as the Dark Winter exercise predicts it may, the result could collapse our nation's economy in a matter of weeks if not days. In the event of an attack, the rapid implementation of an economic prophylaxis program would be extremely urgent.³⁸ However, given the staggering logistical challenges of responding to a massive biological attack to save human life, it is unlikely that the resources for an economic prophylaxis program would be available in the time immediately following the attack.

Pertaining to both human and economic loss, the damage caused by a major biological attack would be devastating, at best. Most necessary

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among the measures to reduce the damage caused by a biological attack is the early recognition that a biological weapon has been used, so the disease may be contained.³⁹ At this point in time, a quick and effective response to a biological attack is highly unlikely due to the lack of preparedness within the United States to respond in the ways necessary to recognize and contain a biological attack.⁴⁰ At present, our national response system is underdeveloped and under-coordinated. The bulk of preparation for a biological attack has been focused on the municipal level and has lacked federal coordination.⁴¹ The state of U.S. response preparedness does not foster optimism with regards to our domestic ability to counter an outbreak. However, the vitalization of concern for this matter following the October 2001 Anthrax mailings has produced a great deal of response analysis and provides hope for implementing a response plan that would mitigate the damage of an attack in the near future. Still, we must look outside our borders and address the root of the biological threat: proliferation.

The Proliferation of Biological Weapons

There is wide agreement within the international security community that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents one of the greatest threats to peace and security in the 21st century.⁴² Further, the United States views “rogue states” as the chief state-based security threat, it follows to reason that the proliferation of biological weapons by states represents a major security concern to the defense and security communities. The proliferation of biological weapons by states has the potential to profoundly alter the terms of warfare and international interaction with these nations.⁴³ Strategically, a loss of leverage over these states would constitute a weakening of U.S. power overseas and should be prevented if possible. Indeed, the U.S. government is most concerned about biological weapons proliferation programs in rogue nations such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea.⁴⁴ The general mechanics of proliferation are basically the same for all nations pursuing biological weapons. An accurate understanding of these mechanics of proliferation is essential to providing biological security for the United States.

Motivations for Proliferators

Intrinsic to the understanding of biological weapons proliferation is understanding the motivations of those who seek such weapons. Biological weapons offer their possessor three primary advantages: deterrence of foreign aggression on the strategic level, effectively countering an acute security threat, and providing the nation with “prestige weaponry”. These advantages of biological weapons motivate nations to pursue biological weapons capabilities and therefore represent



the root of the proliferation problem.

With respect to the deterrent ability of biological weapons, the system of deterrence works much like the system of nuclear deterrence.⁴⁵ As discussed above, biological weapons, provided their user has appropriate delivery capabilities, can inflict massive damage on the population on which they are deployed. As such, biological weapons are applicable to the strategic level of security.⁴⁶ A nation possessing the ability to retaliate if attacked, provided the nation could inflict unacceptable damage to the aggressing nation, would be able to deter aggression.⁴⁷ If weapons of mass destruction were abundant in a nation, numerous enough that a first strike would not eliminate that nation's biological retaliatory capability, the nation would deter aggression to the extent that it would be almost impervious to military attack for fear of retaliation, much the way the U.S. and Russia are.⁴⁸ The possession of biological weapons, by no means, eliminates the possibility of war with another nation; rather it would mollify conflicts much as the possession of nuclear weapons does. As long as all out war means mutual destruction



to both nations, it cannot be seen as a path to security and will thus be avoided.⁴⁹ In light of the deterrent capabilities of biological weapons, nations are inclined to pursue them in order to gain security and recognition as a major power.

Biological weapons also hold appeal for states seeking the ability to counter a perceived security threat. Most often, the decision to pursue biological weapons comes from the perception of a major security threat to the nation, and that nation's inability to counter the threat by other means.⁵⁰ This specific application of biological weapons can serve to make a state a regional hegemon, act as a force-multiplier against nations possessing superior conventional forces, give it a tactical advantage on the field of battle, and give it capabilities of covert warfare against enemy states.⁵¹ Still, the acquisition of biological weapons, for many states, is likely

A U.S. Army soldier participates in bio/chem warfare training in preparation for deployment to Iraq at U.S. Army Camp Santiago in Puerto Rico on January 20, 2003.

(photo by Tomas van Houtryve)

perceived as a path to international respect and ascendance to a position as a world power. States which feel slighted, diminished, encroached upon, or abused by the predominant international powers may be drawn to the acquisition of biological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in order to secure respect and sovereignty in the international arena.⁵² For these reasons, acquiring biological weapons is quite an attractive proposition for the nations that do not enjoy good relations with other states.

Mechanics of Proliferation

Before one can discuss remedies for the proliferation of biological weaponry, one must first understand the means by which biological weapons spread. Biological weapons represent the greatest proliferation risk of all weapons of mass destruction due to their particular properties. Biological weapons require relatively little infrastructure, capital investment, and scientific knowledge to develop, placing them at the forefront of proliferation risk. There are several points of major concern with regard to biological weapons and their accoutrements. First, the weapons or their raw materials can be removed from a facility developing them, either by cooperation with a government or through theft. Second, dual-use technology facilitates the proliferation of the equipment necessary to develop biological weapons. Third, compliance with international biological arms control agreements is difficult to verify. Fourth, the scientific knowledge to develop the weapons can be transferred through the hiring of scientists by a proliferating country or group or other knowledgeable scientists may be hired from the vast biotech industry. Fifth, biological weapons and delivery systems can be sold to proliferating nations by other nations.

Agent Theft

The nature of biological weapons makes it easy for them to be smuggled or stolen out of a biological weapons facility. Of particular concern is the removal of such weapons from government research facilities in Russia. The fall of the Soviet Union has made conditions at now Russian biological weapons facilities ripe for proliferation.⁵³ A sample of a biological weapon can be carried in a coat pocket. It could even be disguised as a pen or a pack of cigarettes.⁵⁴ While a military strain of a biological weapon is not necessary for weapon development given that strains may be found in nature, many biological weapons specialists (particularly in the former Soviet Union) have modified biological agents in order to make them more deadly.⁵⁵ Alarming, the smuggling of militarily-enhanced biological weapons from secure facilities in Russia has already been reported. A Russian scientist by the name of

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"Anisimov" is believed to have stolen an antibiotic-resistant strain of tularemia from the military microbiological facility in Sverdlovsk.⁵⁶ Given that Russian facilities such as the Vector virology institute are believed to house over 15,000 viral strains, many of which are highly contagious and lethal such as the Smallpox, Ebola, and Marburg viruses, the lack of sufficient security at these facilities is a major concern.⁵⁷ Theft of a "ready made" biological agent from an existing research facility represents the most expedient means of obtaining highly potent biological weapons. Once a seed sample has been obtained, production of the agent is relatively easy.⁵⁸ As such, simple theft represents the largest risk of agent proliferation.

Dual-Use Technology

The next mechanism of proliferation comes in the form of dual-use technology. Dual-use technology is technology with legitimate and peaceful civilian applications, but may also be used to develop or deploy biological weapons. The pharmaceutical industry, for example, has unmonitored access to all the equipment necessary to develop and produce biological weapons. Further, dual-use technology can be found to a more limited degree in such industries as brewing, industrial fuel manufacturing, cheese and yogurt production, baking, and academic research laboratories.⁵⁹ All of the necessary components to develop and produce biological weapons are available for purchase on the civilian market.⁶⁰ At present there is not an effective monitoring regime in place to ensure dual-use technology and equipment is used for solely peaceful purposes.

Dual-use technology presents an interesting challenge to anti-bioweapon efforts: stopping the spread of the requisite equipment, and verification of compliance with biological arms control agreements.⁶¹ The two aspects of this conundrum are tied closely together. First, an essential component of a non-proliferation effort is control over the means to produce such weapons. In fact, the primary task of non-proliferation is to make such equipment unavailable to those who would use it to make biological weapons. As such, the regulation and inspection of dual-use technology is central to biological non-proliferation efforts.⁶² Second, dual-use technology makes the verification of compliance with biological arms control agreements very difficult, and verification of compliance is likely the most important aspect of biological weapons control. Further, industry would object strenuously to having their purchases, activities, and research monitored by a regulatory agency out of concern for trade secrets.⁶³

Biological Arms Control

While confidence in other nations and their good will can go a long way diplomatically, its viability in terms of security is extremely limited as it does nothing to provide reassurance of compliance with non-proliferation agreements.⁶⁴ It is the very lack of compliance verification which weakens treaties such as the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, and likely represents the greatest challenge of biological weapons control.⁶⁵ The Biological Weapons Convention, while it brings nations together and bans the production, stockpile, use and development of biological weapons, makes no provisions for verification of compliance whatsoever.⁶⁶ Many have tried to apply the verification measures of the Chemical Weapons Convention to the Biological Weapons convention, but this is not an entirely viable option given the radically different properties of chemical and biological agents.⁶⁷ The experience of the United Nations Special Commission's (UNSCOM) in Iraq demonstrate the difficulty of verifying compliance. As UNSCOM's experience demonstrates, for truly effective inspection of weapons facilities to take place, the full cooperation of the host nation is necessary.⁶⁸ Needless to say, the lack of compliance verification mechanisms poses a serious problem to nonproliferation efforts.

"Brain Drain"

Another point of major concern is the availability of large numbers of well-qualified biotechnology scientists. Some experts feel there is a danger in the large and growing number of biotechnology scientists in the world, given that most of the material and technology needed to develop and produce biological weapons is available on the civilian market.⁶⁹ However, the development of biological weapons requires some weapons-specific training and would be difficult for the average bioscientist to do.⁷⁰

The menacing specter exists currently in the large number of biological weapons specialists out of work, or "dangerously" underpaid (so much so that they cannot afford to buy food for their families) in the remnants of the Soviet Union. Many feel that former Soviet biological weapons experts cannot be trusted to give up their specialty and undertake peace-oriented research.⁷¹ Many security analysts worry that Russian scientists, with the collapse of the Russian economy, might accept lucrative offers from parties interested in developing biological weapons since their government is no longer able to pay their salaries. This problem is referred to as "brain drain". By 1993, "tens of thousands of chemical and biological weaponeers... found themselves without a source of income."⁷² At present, the U.S. government conservatively estimates there are 10,500 biological and chemical weapons experts who pose a proliferation risk in addition to specialized facilities and equipment.⁷³ This is particularly alarming given that former

Soviet biological weapons experts could accelerate rudimentary biological warfare programs of rogue states to “lethal maturity” in a relatively short period of time.⁷⁴ The process of brain drain is well under way, countries such as Iran have been caught red handed attempting to recruit biological weaponeers and there are currently over 300 such experts who have emigrated from Russia with their whereabouts unknown.⁷⁵

Jonathan Tucker has commented on several “novel” forms of brain drain that pose a proliferation risk.⁷⁶ First, proliferating governments are not merely hiring Russian scientists to develop biological weapons in their country, but hiring them to develop weapons for them in Russia. Second, scientists could be “moonlighting by modem” that is, the clandestine support of foreign biological weapons programs via telephone, fax, email and other internet technology. Third, biological weaponeers in Russia might be selling classified documents that could act as “cookbooks” for biological weapons to proliferating nations.

Delivery Systems Proliferation

The last topic of major concern with regard to the proliferation of biological weapons is the proliferation of delivery systems. The majority of biological agents are most effective when delivered by aerosol spray, explosive propellant, or contamination of food and water.⁷⁷ Each of these delivery methods is important in different respects and each warrants discussion. Aerosol sprays can be delivered from a variety of vehicles ranging from helicopters and planes to ground vehicles of all sorts.⁷⁸ In this aspect of dissemination, the problem of dual use technology arises again; aerosol delivery systems are widely available on the civilian market for applications such as crop dusting.⁷⁹ Such relatively crude spray technology is less likely to be employed by a state actor and more likely to be employed by terrorist groups or other sub-state actors. Decimation into water and food systems would not be difficult at all. Like crude aerosol deployment, contamination of food and water supplies is more likely to come from sub-national groups as opposed to an enemy military force. The need to better secure and monitor food and water supplies in order to avert tragedy cannot be overstated. Our water, and to a lesser extent, our food supply is incredibly vulnerable to a covert contamination.⁸⁰

Explosive decimation also poses a significant threat, particularly from foreign states. Explosives can be used to propel a biological agent into an aerosol, thus agents can be dispersed by biological equipped artillery shells, bombs and missiles launched from aircraft, or, of most concern, long range missiles.⁸¹ The explosive delivery of biological munitions is called “point source” delivery. The blast point is the center of an agent cloud that contaminates the immediate area and can be blown onto other

targets by wind if placed properly. Point source delivery is most common on the battlefield.⁸²

Ballistic missiles, and their proliferation, pose a serious threat to future U.S. security. The ability of an enemy, particularly a rogue state that does not respond to deterrence, to target and attack a nation with long range missiles can compromise internal security, and change the nature of war and interaction with that nation.⁸³ Indeed, the possession of ballistic missiles can be pursued by states for a variety of reasons: deterrence, coercion of their opponents, the military advantage of long range strikes, internal political pressures, and the importation of international respect.⁸⁴ While missile technology is not as necessary for biological warfare as it is for chemical warfare, the proliferation of ballistic missiles is often seen as an adjunct to WMD technology.⁸⁵ What is most troubling about ballistic missile proliferation is the fact that the missiles are being purchased and developed largely by nations the U.S. would classify as rogue states; extended delivery capability could potentially have an adverse effect on world stability.⁸⁶ The past decades have seen the increase in sales of ballistic missile systems to the third world and rogue states. Russia, China, and North Korea are today the largest sellers of missile technology around the world.⁸⁷ One example of this type of missile proliferation is the marketing and sale of missile technology from China to Iran as China attempts to further its own ballistic missile program.⁸⁸ The missile proliferation problem is exacerbated by the intrinsic problems with ballistic missile control: the propensity towards discrimination against lesser developed states, dual-use technology between ballistic missiles and space programs, and the ever-present problem of compliance verification.⁸⁹ So long as the proliferation of missile technology persists, the U.S. and the world will face an extended reach of the biological weapons threat.

PREVENTING BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

The discussion of the prevention of biological attacks and biological warfare is of paramount importance to a greater understanding of the biological weapons situation. The issue of prevention must be discussed in two parts. First, grand strategy must be examined and a foundation for issue-specific action must be laid. Second, the specific actions to counter the concerns discussed above must be studied. When applied together, grand strategy and issue-specific strategy will provide a comprehensive plan to prevent the potential holocaust of biological weapons.

Grand Strategy for Biological Strike Prevention

It should be acknowledged at the outset that no one counter-biological

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strategy will be effective in and of itself. Rather, a combination of many or all of the strategies discussed below could increase the effectiveness of United States' counter-biological efforts. Further, if pursued simultaneously, the counter-biological strategies will reinforce each other. The many actions the United States may take to prevent biological attacks are classified into four types of prevention strategies: deterrence, nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and preemption. The following four-area approach to prevention of biological attacks is based primarily on the 2001 report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies Homeland Defense Project.⁹⁰

Deterrence

Deterrence can be defined as the act of convincing terrorists and states that a biological attack on the United States will result in massive retaliation, thereby dissuading these actors from launching attacks or first strikes.⁹¹ In theory, the same system of mutually assured destruction that is effective in nuclear deterrence is effective with biological deterrence, though it has never been tested.⁹² A robust response capability could also serve to deter biological attacks by reducing the possibility the attacker's objectives will be met. Effective deterrence requires a credible U.S. commitment to respond forcefully in political, economic, and/or military terms in the event of a biological terrorist attack.⁹³ This commitment must be broad based so as to deter the wide variety of groups that might launch a biological attack against the United States. As holds true for war strategy, the primary method of deterrence is the threat of retribution; that the U.S. would inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker via a second strike.⁹⁴

The major limitation of deterrence is that it requires a convincing ability to attribute an attack to its perpetrator, which may be difficult to do or prove given the likelihood of a biological attack being covert. A further limitation is that suicidal and apocalyptic sub-national groups may not be deterred by mutually assured destruction. Also, rogue actors such as Iraq, who have little regard for the safety of their populace, may be willing to accept severe retaliatory punishment.⁹⁵ Deterrence of a biological attack against groups or nations that harbor a deep-seeded hatred against the U.S. and its allies would most likely be ineffective in and of itself, thus leaving the U.S. vulnerable to attack.⁹⁶ Many suggest a "web of deterrence" could provide deterrence against rational actors, and a more effective defense mechanism to limit the usefulness of biological arms as well as limit the availability of dual-use technology.⁹⁷ Despite its limited effects on irrational actors, deterrence should function as the first line of defense against biological attack.

Nonproliferation

Nonproliferation can be defined as employing arms control and other international diplomatic or regulatory regimes to prevent the spread of biological weapons, agents, technology, and know-how.⁹⁸ The main components of a nonproliferation strategy would be biological arms control, disarmament programs, export controls, and domestic controls. Nonproliferation may be the most comprehensive, broad based, and necessary strategy to prevent a biological attack.⁹⁹

The major draw back to nonproliferation is that it is difficult if not impossible to properly maintain.¹⁰⁰ Arms control regimes such as the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 are often not reliable because of a lack of confidence in compliance, and the lack of verification procedures.¹⁰¹ This is especially true with regard to the Biological Weapons Convention, as it includes no provisions for compliance verification and essentially requires the cooperation of the state under suspicion.¹⁰² Further, the medical and pharmaceutical industries of various nations are likely to resist nonproliferation measures in order to protect trade secrets.¹⁰³ Despite the problems with nonproliferation regimes, they have been the subjects of extensive international cooperation. This cooperation has reached beyond the Biological Weapons Convention and recently leaders of the U.S. and Russia agreed to further nonproliferation efforts with the expansion of various other nonproliferation treaties.¹⁰⁴ The U.S. should continue and further nonproliferation efforts as they represent the widest sweeping sanction against biological weapons.

Counterproliferation

In response to the shortcomings of nonproliferation comes counterproliferation. Counterproliferation is defined as acting aggressively to stop the spread of biological weapons, agent, technology, and know-how.¹⁰⁵ Counterproliferation calls for the use of diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, counterforce action¹⁰⁶, defensive action or any combination of these measures to actively stop the proliferation of biological arms. The Department of Defense is currently attempting to develop four separate counterproliferation capabilities with regard to biological defense: counterforce, active defense, biological sensors, and medical treatments.¹⁰⁷

Limitations of counterproliferation are three fold. First, effective counterproliferation requires good intelligence. Without good intelligence, authorities would not be aware of the proliferation they intend to stop. Further, bad intelligence could lead to aggression against an innocent party. This is a problem because history has shown that good intelligence is hard to come by. Second, counterproliferation may involve unilateral U.S. action. This could raise political dissent despite the fact that the action is to safeguard the citizenry of the United States and the world.¹⁰⁸ Third, counterproliferation efforts are considerably more difficult to implement with regards to biological weapons than

with nuclear or chemical weapons because less technology and single-use material are necessary than for nuclear weapons, and biological weapons do not require the substantial infrastructure that chemical weapons development does.¹⁰⁹

Preemption

Preemption is defined as the blocking of an actual biological attack, whether by disrupting the perpetrators' financial and logistical support on a long-term basis, or by intervening decisively during the advent or staging of an attack.¹¹⁰ If the first three methods of prevention fail, the U.S. could still learn of a planned attack in time to mount a preemptive strike and neutralize the threat. As mentioned in the definition, the financial and logistical support of a terrorist agency or state may be disrupted through the use of sanctions or asset seizure/forfeiture. Also, direct force could be used by either the military Special Forces or law enforcement. Military Special Forces have training and equipment that would ready them to interdict and recover biological weapons.¹¹¹ In the event the staging location of a biological weapon is discovered, and an attempt at forceful seizure of the device is deemed too risky, an air strike of Napalm would most likely be an effective countermeasure.¹¹²

The major limitations of preemption are that it requires excellent intelligence and investigation by military and law enforcement agencies.¹¹³ The investigation of recent Anthrax attacks have cast serious doubt on federal law enforcement's ability to provide such intelligence.¹¹⁴ Further, the CIA's failure to detect major anti-United States plots such as the September 11, 2001 attacks has cast serious doubt on the agency's ability to provide critical intelligence.¹¹⁵ Preemption may also necessitate the use of force domestically and/or internationally which could lead to war. However, despite the political flack easily attracted by preemption strategies, preemption continues to an option. On November 14, 1994, then President Clinton issued Executive Order No. 12938 allowing the executive to take decisive action with respect to nuclear, chemical, and biological threats.¹¹⁶ Because of its heavy reliance on intelligence, preemption must remain a last defensive option or an internationally proactive option, depending on the immediacy of the detected threat. In either scenario, it is vital that the military and domestic law enforcement agencies maintain their ability to react quickly and forcefully in preemptive operations.

ISSUE SPECIFIC REMEDIES TO PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS

This section will examine specific remedies to the five major proliferation problems outlined in the "mechanics of proliferation" section of this text: agent theft, dual-use technology, compliance concerns associated with biological arms control, the phenomena of "brain drain", and the proliferation of delivery systems.

Security Augmentation

As discussed above, the possibility of theft of biological agents from laboratory facilities is cause for major concern. It follows to reason that security at sites, in which biological agents exist, must be augmented to a more satisfactory level. It is necessary to keep very close track of agent seed samples, and ready-made agents so that these potentially apocalyptic weapons do not fall into the wrong hands. While it is true that samples of biological agents can be found and collected in nature, it is also true that genetically enhanced biological agents pose a greater menace to humanity and should be secured with much diligence.¹¹⁷ Further, theft or other illegal procurement would make the job of recovering cultivatable agents much easier for a proliferator to gain access to a highly lethal substance than sending scientists into the field to recover samples.¹¹⁸ While agent theft poses a major security concern in every country possessing laboratory facilities that work with biological or potential biological agents, physical security is of particular concern in nations such as Russia, where laboratories are ill-secured and laboratory personnel pose a high proliferation risk.

While the need for security is obvious, the mechanisms of such security are not. Due to the fact that a cultivatable seed strain of a biological agent can be carried in quite a small package, security needs are complicated.¹¹⁹ Further, pathogens cannot be detected using X-ray machines and other such security tools.¹²⁰ First, an exhaustive inventory of agents in stock must be taken. Second, monitoring mechanisms must be put in place to ensure that these seed strains remain accounted for in their entirety at all times. Third, scientists and other personnel entering and exiting laboratory facilities must be searched thoroughly and limited background checks may be in order.¹²¹ Fourth, such laboratory facilities must be well secured by competent personnel so as to reduce the possibility of burglary, robbery, and other incursions in which agent strains could be removed. Fifth, it is necessary to monitor the activities of all laboratory personnel when they are within the laboratory at all times. Sixth, when performing procedures in which agents could be removed, protocol should demand that at least two authorized persons be present so as to lessen the chance of theft.¹²² Finally, security personnel should be trained in recognition of biological agents so as to be able to counter smuggling.¹²³ Such steps will greatly reduce the likelihood that theft of

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an agent seed strain will be possible in the future. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. has already begun to increase security at key lab and industry facilities.¹²⁴ The U.S. has further taken steps towards restricting access to texts that could aid proliferators in creating biological weapons.¹²⁵

Dual-Use Technology Control

While a daunting task by any measure, the control of dual-use technology is quite necessary. Inventory control could be used for such technology, much in the way it is used for firearms in the United States. Such a system would require the purchaser of dual-use equipment to register the equipment with an international organization such as the UN and demonstrate a legitimate reason why they need the equipment. While this may be an attractive idea, it is by no means practical. A more plausible solution is already beginning to be implemented. This is an embargo on the export of dual-use technology to countries that pose a proliferation risk such as Iraq.¹²⁶ While so far, the regime has only been applied fully to Iraq, it seems to be somewhat effective and should be pursued with other proliferating nations. One danger that has been identified is that dual-use facilities can produce biological weapons along with legitimate production, thus undermining inventory control and verification efforts.¹²⁷

Dual-use export control is not as easy as it might sound. There are several different ways of pursuing dual-use export control. The EU's system for dual-use export control is founded in law whereas the activities of other organizations such as the Australia Group are primarily guided by international disarmament treaties: the Biological Weapons Convention.¹²⁸ Both methods have seen some success. The legislative strategy has been moderately effective in Russia, where it aims to deny possible access to weapons of mass destruction to terrorist states and groups.¹²⁹ Likewise the treaty-based approach seems to be somewhat effective in cases such as that of Iraq. Some would argue that regulating dual-use technology is impracticable in most cases, the example of dual-use toxins is given. The argument proposes that international efforts to achieve greater transparency offer the most realistic basis for recognizing illegal and legitimate use of dual-use technology.¹³⁰ This author feels that a lack of effort, however effective an effort might be, would only exacerbate the problem.

Enforcing Compliance with Biological Arms Control

The enforcement of biological arms control will not be an easy task for the world. The major biological arms agreements: the Biological

Weapons Convention, lack procedures for verification of compliance.¹³¹ The ability of the international community to summon the political will to re-enforce the Biological Weapons Convention with effective compliance monitoring and enforcement regulations will have a major impact on the future of biological weapons proliferation.¹³² So far, the process has been slow and relatively unproductive as negotiations have been embroiled in controversy over the entire spectrum of issues.¹³³ The problem of verification is exacerbated by the fact that biological weapons development does not require the large facilities or the obvious infrastructure nuclear and chemical weapons development facilities do. It may well be the case that total compliance is not enforceable.

Compliance could be greatly strengthened through a variety of means. Confidence building may prove key, at least diplomatically, in the enforcement of biological arms control. Confidence-building measures are activities that are designed to ensure that states are better aware of each other actions and intentions.¹³⁴ While these measures are plagued with a lack of verification or compliance mechanisms, and while they cannot be substituted for legally binding framework, they may do much for diplomatic security ties.¹³⁵ Facility declaration and inspection will likely prove to be the critical issue in biological arms control. "One of the most important controversies is whether to allow on-site visits to biological facilities without previous allegations that a treaty violation has occurred".¹³⁶ While inspections would most likely have a positive effect on stemming the development and production of biological weapon, they would likely have an adverse effect on biotechnology companies.¹³⁷ Most companies are strongly opposed to inspections because they feel it represents an opportunity for industrial espionage and would hamper their research and development progress.¹³⁸ This author believes biological weapons constitute such a high risk to humanity, biological facilities throughout the globe should be monitored regardless of any perceived effect on industry.

Halting "Brain Drain"

Efforts to halt this problem are already well underway. Several nations, particularly the United States, are quite concerned about the problem. Initiatives have been developed through a variety of non-governmental organizations who fund former biological weaponeers to conduct research projects of mutual and peaceful interest.¹³⁹ From 1994 through 1999, the U.S. government dedicated roughly \$8.5 million to such programs through the International Science and Technology Center. This money funded 61 different biotechnology projects in the former Soviet Union¹⁴⁰. This system of funded alternative research may be the simplest and most effective way to stem the phenomena of "brain drain".¹⁴¹

Despite the brilliance of these programs, they have problems. To date,

efforts in these programs have concentrated on controlling nuclear brain drain, leaving the problem of biological brain drain under-addressed given its magnitude.¹⁴² The problem of over-focused attention on nuclear scientists has been acknowledged and is in the process of being corrected by increased investment in the funding of biological scientists.¹⁴³ The last remaining major problem in efforts to stem "brain drain" is the fact that levels of funding are still not commensurate with the gravity of the biological weapons threat.¹⁴⁴ In order to be effective in achieving their goals, these anti-brain-drain programs require additional funding.¹⁴⁵ It is quite likely that through continued investment in these initiatives, biological weaponeers will be put to good use and be much less likely to emigrate and spread their knowledge of these insidious weapons. This author believes the United States should continue and increase its funding of anti-brain-drain programs such as the International Science and Technology Center.

SUMMARY

Biological weapons proliferation is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, security risk to the United States at present. The history of biological warfare dates back to ancient times, dashing optimism about the cessation of its use. The specter of human devastation cast by the thought of biological weapons being introduced into modern urban environments with modern transportation systems to facilitate the spread of disease, causes the threat of a nuclear attack to pale in comparison. Their possession immediately confers on their possessor the ability to deter attack, the ability to impose a certain degree of regional hegemony, and the international prestige of a WMD power. The insidious weapons, by their very nature, proliferate easily. They may be stolen or smuggled from laboratory or military facilities with relative ease, and may find their way into the hands of rogue states. The proliferation problem is confounded by dual-use technology, making most all of the equipment needed to develop and produce the weapons available on the civilian market. The proliferation problem is also complicated by the near utter failure of international biological arms control agreements to include any sort of compliance verification systems. The phenomena of brain drain further exacerbates the problem, putting the scientific knowledge to use dual-use technology to successfully make biological weapons readily available for purchase on the black market. Lastly, the reach of these horrific weapons is continuously being extended by the rapid proliferation of delivery systems, particularly medium and long-range ballistic missiles.

The United States and its allies must rely on a combination of grand and issue-specific strategies to counter the awesome threat of biological weaponry. Deterrence, nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and preemption should be used in concert to create a broad sweeping

paradigm for stemming the proliferation of these weapons. The U.S. must also address the specific problems of proliferation. This can be done by increasing security at laboratory and military facilities, closely monitoring or embargoing dual-use equipment and technology in countries that pose a proliferation risk, spearheading the effort to add and enforce compliance verification mechanisms to the Biological Weapons Convention, continuing and increasing investment in anti-brain-drain programs, and taking steps to halt the proliferation of missile technology.

One can only hope the thought of biological warfare is so repulsive to anyone's sense of human dignity, that such an effort would never be undertaken. We know from history however, that this is not the case. There are people in the world whose desire to do harm is not bound by morality. The malevolent intentions of a few could spell doom for a significant percentage of the American and world populations. At this point in time, it is difficult to predict what the development of biotechnology may bring, but for now we are left with no alternative but to plan for the worst, and hope for the best. ■

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From Slavery to Indentured Servitude

by Rainia Noble

"I don't know what is meant by 'structural adjustment,' but it sounds to me like even less for poor people. How could we possibly live on less? If privatization goes forward, they might as well just dig a big pit and shove us all into it."

-Peasant farmer from Kay, June 1996¹

ABSTRACT

I will provide evidence to support that the United States strategically implemented racially-motivated economic policies upon the Haitian government to impede the country's sovereignty as a result of the Haitian revolution. I will explore why Haiti has acquired an enormous amount of debt since its independence in 1804, while posing the question: Will Haiti ever govern itself without the implementation of external aid? Haiti's inconstant relationship with the United States dates back to 1915 when the United States sent its military to intervene in the country's economic crisis. However, U.S. intervention in Haiti has not been successful: "United States foreign policy against Haiti infringes on the government's right to govern its people."²

The U.S. is illegally withholding over \$500 million in humanitarian aid that has been granted to the Haitian government, due to allegations of dishonesty during its parliamentary elections in 2000.³ Is the U.S. illegally withholding humanitarian aid to Haiti, which would be the United States' way of spreading "democracy" and support to an unstable political and economic society? Or is it denying the Haitian government the right to self-determination and governance through its democratic process? Haiti will continue to endure economic and political instability as long the U.S. continues to pursue these types of policies.

When the Haitian government complies with policies implemented to insure

economic stability beneficial to the U.S., the governments maintain successful bilateral relations. However, if the Haitian government is in disagreement with the U.S., then Haiti faces negative repercussions that affect the social and economic well-being of Haitians. This article closely



A Haitian woman outside

her shack in the

Port-au-Prince shack on

November 4, 2001.

(photo by Tomas van Houtryve)

examines why the United States is blocking humanitarian aid to Haiti, through an analysis of the inconsistent relationship pattern amongst the two countries. The recent political and economic crisis is a direct correlation to the debt imposed by the United States after the Haitian Revolution, as well as political instability during the Duvalier dictatorship. I will also examine the harsh immigration and migration policies of the Bush and Clinton administrations, outlining how they were racially-motivated and adverse to Haitian refugees.

Haiti's Quest for Independence

Columbus arrived at the island of Hispaniola in 1492⁴. The Spaniards ignored the western mountainous region later known as Haiti by focusing on the eastern region of the island known as the Dominican Republic. "Gradually French colonists, importing African slaves, developed sugar plantations on the northern coast. Unable to support its claim to the region, Spain ceded Haiti to France in 1697".⁵ Haiti was a French colony. In 1791, the United States was in its first year of independence as a republic in the Western Hemisphere. During this era Europe was trying to recover from the destruction of the French Revolution while the French heavily maintained its presence in Haiti. The French colonizer presented some of the most horrific conditions to their African slaves, who worked on the plantations.⁶ The Haitian slaves then staged a revolt against their French colonizers.

"On August 22, 1791, the Haitian war of independence began in flames under the leadership of a religious leader named Boukman; over one hundred thousand slaves rose up against the vastly outnumbered and infinitely hated French. Unlike the French Revolution and the American Revolution, the Haitian Revolution was entirely driven by the passions of men and women who had been enslaved most if not all of their lives. They didn't simply desire liberty, they wanted vengeance. Over the next three weeks, the Haitian slaves burned every plantation throughout the fertile regions of Haiti and executed all Frenchmen they could find. The French fled to the seacoast towns and pleaded with France to help them out while the island burned."

The revolution carried on into the 18th century with Haiti's nearly half million slaves revolting under leader Toussaint L' Overture. Finally, on November 28, 1803 the French surrendered to Jean-Jacques Dessalines who then carried out Toussaint L' Overture's desire for Haiti to become a free republic. "Dessalines used "France's flag as a model to create Haiti's bi-colored flag while leaving out the white to produce the bi-colored flag of Haiti."⁸ Haiti gained independence in 1804 from France. Haiti became the second nation in the Western Hemisphere to gain complete independence, following the United States.⁹ Haiti's revolution then became a threatening example to all countries throughout the Americas, in particular the United States who economically depended on the exploitation of African slaves to achieve hegemony.

As a result, other countries became leery of the idea that their slaves too would lead successful revolts, because of the demonizing and horrific conditions that they too had experienced on the plantations. For example, the economies in countries such as the U.S. and Haiti could not

have successfully thrived without the exploitation of African people subjected to slavery. American plantation owners became fearful that if news of the Haitian revolution spread to their plantations, it would ignite a slave revolt in their states. It took the United States nearly 60 years to recognize Haiti as a "new republic," as this would strike fear in the slave owners of the Confederate south.¹⁰

The European slave trading countries, (France in particular) did not want to make Haiti a successful model for other enslaved populations, or a successful model as an economically developed sovereignty. "Haiti then became unable to develop diplomacy amongst European countries and the U.S.... Haiti had been France's most valuable possession, and by 1789 was producing more wealth than all 13 North American colonies combined."¹¹

The Haiti Action Committee reported that "in 1825 the Haitian people were forced to assume a debt to France of 150 million gold francs as 'reparations' to their former 'owners,' in return for diplomatic recognition and trade. To make the first payment Haiti closed all its public schools in what has been called the hemisphere's first case of structural adjustment policy."¹² Haiti acquired debt from financial institutions—not only in France, but also in Germany and the U.S.—furthering its economic instability. "France had underwritten all external loans between 1825 and 1896 and owned the National Bank. The Germans held the trading sector. Most imports came from the United States."¹³

First US Intervention

During the 1900's, Haiti experienced economic and political instability largely due to the amount of debt it compiled. Political leaders found it hard to maintain the reigns of government for longer than a few years because of the social instability amongst Haitians. As a result the U.S. intervened in 1915 with intentions to stabilize the country by opening Haiti's market to foreign investment:

"It was during the U.S. occupation that Haiti's constitution was rewritten to abolish one of its most famous articles: the prohibition of foreign ownership of land in Haiti. This change lent a legal façade to the rapid growth of U.S. owned agribusiness, which was even then treated as a form of development assistance to a "backward" peasant society."¹⁴

During this period, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's administration was concerned that Germany may find an interest in stationing coal in Haiti. The fear of World War I added a sense of urgency by the U.S. to the drive Germany's special interests away from Haiti.¹⁵ Through the

Caribbean

United States' ability to ratify Haiti's constitution the US achieved dominant control over the country's finance, government functions, public health and public works: "except for local social and governmental institutions, U. S. control over Haiti was complete."¹⁵

Haiti's Economy During the Duvalier Era

Even after the U.S. withdrew, Haiti remained in a state of crisis. Haitians were faced with a destabilized infrastructure, inadequate health care, and an unstable economy. The U.S. military occupation in Haiti was supposed to instill peace, stability, and prosperity to the country's political and economical instability. However, the exit of the military in 1934 left Haiti's centralized national structure based more on political repression. "In 1957 {...} fraudulent elections Dr. Francois Duvalier to power in 1957 {...} Haiti remained inextricably tied to the world economy through its assembly plants for U.S corporations and consumers."¹⁶

Duvalier was known as the U.S. friendly dictator. He offered the United States generous tax holidays, granting tariff exemptions while Haiti still remained the poorest country in the hemisphere. By 1978 products produced by assembly surpassed coffee as the number one export. Haiti was the world's ninth largest assembler of goods for the U.S. consumer; they were the largest producer of baseballs, stuffed toys, dolls, and apparel- especially brassiers.¹⁷ This form of industrialization did little to improve Haiti's economy which shrank deeper into debt. One Haitian economist reported that "in just seven years, Haiti's external public debt increased sevenfold: from \$53 million in 1973 to \$366 million in 1980. This represents almost twice the rate growth of external indebtedness in Latin America, as a whole, over same period of time."¹⁸

The country's debt severely affected the social conditions of the Haitian people. In 1980, "the Departement de Sante Publique et Population estimated that only 1.8 percent of rural Haitians had access to pure drinking water."¹⁹ Haiti then gained international empathy for its deplorable social and economic conditions. Duvalier turned to Canada, France, West Germany, World Bank, IMF, UNICEF, WHO, and the UN Development Programme to gain financial assistance. Haiti then became one of the world's leading recipients of development assistance. However, the aid wasn't used to improve the livelihood of Haitians.²⁰

Duvalier fraudulently placed the aid into his personal accounts, while international organizations continued sending aid to Haiti to improve the livelihood of Haitians. "The U.S. Department of Commerce produced figures to show that no less than 63 percent of all recorded government revenue in Haiti was being 'misappropriated' each year. Haiti's Finance Minister, Marc Bazin revealed that a monthly average of \$15 million was being diverted from public funds to meet 'extra-budgetary expenses' that included regular deposits into the President's private

Swiss bank account. Most of public funds had, of course, arrived in Haiti in the form of 'development assistance.'²¹

It was not coincidental that international organizations continued to send aid to Haiti. As the money was being misappropriated, and not used towards improving the social conditions for Haitians, it benefited the Haitian bourgeoisie. For example, the United States Agency for International Development Food for Peace donated a large supply of cereal to Haiti. The government allowed for the donated cereal to be "sold in virtually every Haitian marketplace, undermining local farmers' ability to sell their own grains."²² The U.S cereal company were then able to monopolize the economy. USAID's Food for Peace program along with the Haitian government enabled the U.S. to maximize its production of good and services by eliminating Haitian farmers' ability to compete in the market. In 1971 President Duvalier passed away. The United States "turned a blind-eye" while his son "Baby" Doc Duvalier succeeded his father without holding democratic elections.²³ In exchange, the U.S. continued to receive economic incentives that had been agreed upon by his father. The agreements included, establishing assemblies of industrial zones to guarantee cheap labor, and lowering tariffs on imports. These policies later became part of the structural adjustment programs of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Rebirth of Haiti's Democracy

Haiti endured over 29 years of Duvalier family dictatorship, and the Haitians wanted to democratically elect a new official. During the 1980's Haiti saw a rise of grassroots movements supported by Haitians and international non-governmental organizations fighting for liberation against the dictatorship. By the close of 1985, popular protest attacked foreign assistance, and Duvalier, who was seen as a U.S.-friendly dictator. Frustrated Haitians then grew bitter of international committees accusing them of funding Haiti's dictator regime, while the citizens continued to suffer.²⁴ During the 1990 presidential race many candidates ran for office. The two most popular runners during this race were Jean-Bertrand Aristide and Marc Bazin.

According to Lovinsky Pierre-Antonie, co-founder and national coordinator for Haiti's September 30th Foundation, "Jean- Bertrand Aristide was a priest influenced by liberation theology. Aristide became the candidate of a coalition of leftist parties of the Lavelas family in the 1990 presidential elections."²⁵ "Aristide favored enforcement of taxation on Haiti's wealth, a crackdown on corruption, and land reform to increase agricultural production—leery of rapid privatization of state-owned industries, which he felt could be profitable enough, in the absence of graft, to subvention social services for the poor."²⁶ During his

campaign he promised “every Haitian is a person and every Haitian has a right to live” according to Haitian activist Pierre-Antonie.²⁷ “Aristide preached tirelessly against the Duvalierism of the earlier decades.”²⁸ Whereas his opponent Marc Bazin, former Duvalier Minister of Finance, cabinet member, and World Bank official who is known locally as “the American candidate,” favored the ideals of international financial institutions increasing aid to Haiti to improve the countries economic, and social crisis. The ideal of increasing external institutions to mend the financial and political instability in Haiti would increase the country’s debt and dependence towards these institutions. “Bazin advocated a World Bank-endorsed structural adjustment program (SAP) and continued reliance on U.S. aid; this plan was universally termed the American Plan.”²⁹ Jean Bertrand Aristide won the elections by a landslide.

Challenges Facing Aristide

When democratically elected President Jean Bertrand Aristide entered office in 1991, he was faced with initiating reforms in the health sector, and deplorable social conditions in the country. The majority of Haitians had inadequate access to social and health care services. Anthropologist Jean Weise reiterated that “life for the Haitian peasant of today is abject misery and a rank familiarity with death.”³⁰

“Haiti was among the worst health indices in the Western Hemisphere. According to the UNICEF’s ‘The State of the World’s Children’ [report], in Haiti that year the under-five mortality rate was 137 per thousand; 27 percent of rural population had access to safe drinking water; 50 percent of the population had access to even rudimentary health services, and only 31 percent of children had been vaccinated for measles.”³¹

During his first term, Aristide pushed for a number of reforms that were directly contrary to the primary goals of SAPs instituted elsewhere. “He pushed for an increase in the minimum wage, and also for bolstering the fragile health and social service safety net. Instead of selling off state-owned enterprises—one of the central tenets of neo-liberal reform—Aristide cracked down on the corruption and mismanagement within Haiti. In seven months, most of them went from large deficits to profitability—Aristide’s 1991 plan to raise the minimum daily factory wage from about \$2 to \$4.”³²

“Aristide was able to turn a profit from state-owned industries during his brief tenure in 1991, and he had promised to make the Haitian poor ‘shareholders’ (actionnaires) in these enterprises.”³³ In the eyes of

A Haitian boy lifts a sack filled with cow horns and hooves in Port-au-Prince on November 19, 2001. Children live with grinding poverty, poor sanitation, and child labor. (photo by Tomas van Houtryve)



many Haitians, privatization in the interests of private profit undermines the possibility of more equitable distribution of goods and services. To cure the social and economic challenges facing Haiti, Aristide “imposed a high tariff on all imports to reduce foreign competition with products produced at home, and he attempted to ‘repatriate’ funds from businessmen.”³⁴ Aristide’s policies to drive out foreign competition lured suspension amongst the Haitian bourgeois of his intentions. “His critics came from the right, left, and center of the political spectrum and even



Dignitaries line up to pay their respects to Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide on Vertiers Day, Sunday, Nov. 18, 2001 in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The battle of Vertieres in 1803 was the decisive victory of the Haitian insurgent army over the colonial French army that lead to Haiti's independence on Jan.1, 1804. (photo by Tomas van Houtryve)

included elements of his own electoral coalition. Suspicions increased when he refused to submit the new Haitian Armed Forces (FAD'H) commanders."³⁵

Was Aristide positioning himself towards becoming Haiti's next dictator, or was he trying to eliminate the marginalized equality placed on Haiti's poor from the previous Duvalier's era? Various anti-Aristide politicians accused the government of failing to live up to its democratic promise. Aristide was accused of seeking dictatorial powers and crushing democracy.³⁶ Aristide wanted to improve the social conditions of all Haitians by equally distributing the country's wealth generally given to the bourgeoisie.

Ousting Democratic President Aristide

"On September 30, 1991, the Aristide government was overthrown by a military coup d'etat, which led to several thousand deaths. The vast majority of those killed were civilians shot by military and paramilitary forces."³⁷ The violence took the lives of thousands of pro-Lavalas supporters, which, led to mass migration to the U.S. for opposing to the coup.³⁸ The Haitians democratically elected president Aristide and pro-Lavalas supporters condemned the bourgeois Haitians for ousting the president with support from the U.S. After the coup overthrew Aristide "Haitian soldiers {...} increased {...} murders abductions, tortures, and politically motivated arrests—this systematic violence and abuse of human rights caused a massive exodus of Haitian refugees, most of them supporters of Aristide."³⁹ Numbers of political refugees fleeing to the United States from Haiti traveled "in small often-unsafe boats intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guards, while many more sank."⁴⁰ The

1994 "Road to U.S. Intervention in Haiti" Center of Defense states:

*"President George Bush reacted to the influx of refugees with a policy of repatriation. This sent many Haitians back to Haiti and an uncertain future. Then candidate Bill Clinton vowed to change the Haitian refugee policy when he got into office, but once in office waited until public pressure forced the issue. In May of 1994, the US changed its policy of arbitrarily returning Haitians and began sending refugees to a "safe haven" at the US Naval Base in Guantanamo, Cuba. Up to 15,000 Haitians were detained at the base, awaiting processing at an estimated cost of \$300 million. The use of economic sanctions was thought to be an effective tool for crippling Haiti's military government. But the embargo also came under criticism for making life harder for the poor people of Haiti, but not being strong enough to bother Haiti's rulers."*⁴¹

In March 1994, the Congressional Black Caucus voiced its criticism to what they considered inhumane and racially discriminatory policies towards the Haitians by launching a campaign to change U.S. policy. "The group denounced President Clinton's policy and asked for the removal of Lawrence Pezzullo, the State Department's Special Advisor on the Haitian crisis, for his perceived lack of leadership and commitment in ending the crisis in Haiti and among the Haitian immigrant community."⁴² With pressure from the CBC and the active Haitian community in Florida Clinton then changed his policies towards Haitian refugees. On "May 8 President Clinton {...} officially announced the end of the policy of summary and forced repatriation {...} whereby refugees could establish their political refugee status."⁴³

Aristide Back In Office

President Clinton, along with various organizations such as the OAS and the UN, wanted to restore political stability in Haiti through monitoring the country's elections. According to BBC News, "Jean-Bertrand Aristide has been sworn in for a second term as president of Haiti amid an ongoing power struggle in the country. Mr. Aristide faces challenges on all fronts: Haiti is the poorest in the Western hemisphere, international observers were critical of the election that brought him to power the opposition refuses to recognize him as president."⁴⁴ There was some debate over the legitimacy over the elections "main opposition parties boycotted the election, accusing the ruling party, Family Lavalas, of using electoral fraud, violence and intimidation to hold on to power. Of the three other relatively unknown candidates, none even bothered to campaign."⁴⁵ Aristide returned to office in 2000 still promising that every person in Haiti counts. However, the United States blocked humanitarian aid granted to Haiti, because they too questioned the democratic validity of the recent elections.

United States Blocks Humanitarian Aid

Haiti's infrastructure continues to deteriorate after years of political and economic instability. Yet, the United States government is illegally blocking humanitarian aid into the country. According to the Maryland based Haiti Reborn/Quixote Center, "In addition to blocking much needed aid, the U.S. government had both covertly and overtly...supported opposition to the Haitian government, giving them the boldness necessary to call for the overthrow of Haiti's young democracy. Every day that the U.S. fails to reconsider it's disastrous policies towards Haiti, the situation takes more Haitian lives."⁴⁶ Keeping in mind that Haiti is a short distance from Miami, one would assume that the United States would welcome the idea of providing and supporting humanitarian aid to Haiti out of its own self-interest. By blocking humanitarian aid, the U.S. will continue to see the rise of more Haitian refugees fleeing their country to come to the U.S.

Breakdown of Withheld Humanitarian Aid:

(This document was created by the Government of Haiti and reprinted by Haiti Reborn/Quixote Center.)

"I. Inter-American Development Bank:

Loans fully approved by the IDB, conditions met by the Government of Haiti, agreements ratified by the Haitian Parliament (GOH)

- Rural road and rehabilitation program
\$50 million
- Reorganized of health sector
\$22.5 million
- Portable water and sanitation
\$54 million
- Basic education program
\$19.4 million
- Subtotal
\$145.9 million
- Investment sector loan
(under discussion)
- Budget supported partially to fund arrears
\$50 million

New money earmarked for Haiti for 2002-2004 that must be disbursed or else will be lost.

- Vocational training/education
- Basic infrastructure/roads
- Economic and Social Assistance Fund (FAES)

Caribbean

Health

Agriculture

\$317 million

Total IDB

\$512.9 million

2. European Union

Non-reimbursable aid provided for under the 8th and 9th “Fonds de development European” that has been suspended. Sectors of concentration:

Education and Infrastructure

\$300 million

An annual structural adjustment facility fund of \$30 million for the education and health sectors has been suspended since 1999-2000.

Some European Union money is being disbursed in:

The education section

\$28 million

Food security

\$5 million

Discussions are underway on the release of some money for infrastructure rehabilitation.

\$15 million

3. International Monetary Fund

As a measure of economic stabilization and a condition for future cooperation, the IMF has asked the government to increase the price of gasoline. The proposed increase would raise prices by 50-60% and would cause a significant increase in the cost of living.

4. The World Bank

The World Bank is contemplating a donor’s meeting on Haiti in early December. Currently, there are no major funds in the World Bank pipeline; they are in a “wait and see” mode. The only funding under consideration is \$2 to \$3 million for technical assistance to the OAS Special Mission and some assistance for AIDS, funded through the Pan-American Health Organization.”⁴⁷

The Haiti Reborn/Quixote Center states: The United States is actively impeding the flow of \$500 million worth of foreign aid, which is a rough sum of the Haiti’s annual budget. In 2000, the Inter-American Development Bank approved a series of four loans amounting over \$140 million designated to improve portable water, rural road rehabilitation, basic health care, and the education system in Haiti. The United States government is illegally blocking these loans as well. Between January and March 2001, the aid that was approved by the Inter-American Development Bank could have been released to the Haitian government. It was not, and the Haitian people continue to suffer. Thousands of children are out of school, and clean drinking water remains impossible to find in most communities.

The Inter-American Development Bank is a multilateral institution

with 40 member countries; the most powerful of which is the United States. U.S. Representative Lawrence Harrington, wrote a letter to the board of directors of the organization stating that “we do not believe that these loans can or should be treated in a routine manner and strongly urge you to not authorize any disbursements at this time.”⁴⁸

“The Bush administration’s foreign policy bureaucrats have spun webs of pretexts to justify this shunning of a democratically elected government—“irregularities in vote-counting” in a legislative election is only the most ridiculous of these. The plain fact is that our foreign policy establishment despises Haiti’s very popular president, Jean Bertrand Aristide, and wants to make sure his popularity wanes.”⁴⁹ Members of the Oakland, California-based Haiti Action Committee states; “The United States government has enforced an economic embargo against Haiti since the election of President Aristide in 2002, and spends huge amounts of money to fund ‘convergence’ opposition groups that oppose Aristide.”⁵⁰

Liberals Opposed to U.S. Sanctions

The neo-liberal policies implemented by the U.S. adversely impact the social and economic conditions of Haitian citizens. Congressional Black Caucus Haiti Task Force member and California Representative Barbara Lee sponsors legislation to support Haiti through humanitarian relief. She recently wrote a letter to President Bush stating “to change the current policy toward Haitian refugees and to immediately release all Haitians seeking asylum who are currently being detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The desperation of the Haitians seeking asylum is apparent: they are risking their lives, and the futures of their families to have a chance at a better life ... Lee also demanded that Bush immigration policies avoid any suggestion of racial discrimination ... United States policies on immigration must be color-blind.”⁵¹

Non-Color-Blind Immigration Policies

U.S. immigration policies are politically-motivated and racially discriminatory. According to the Congressional Report Status, Nicaraguans, other Central Americans and Cubans who fled civil conflict in their countries throughout the 1980’s were granted Legal Permanent Residence. LPR was granted to Central Americans and Cubans through the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act.⁵² Why weren’t Haitians included in this act? They too were fleeing civil conflict in their country as a result of U.S.-friendly dictators, and failed U.S. military intervention. Congress did enact the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (HRIFA) of 1998, which allowed “certain



specified Haitians to adjust to LPR status as part of FY 1999 omnibus appropriated act.”⁵³ The difference between the NACARA and the HRIFA is that the NACARA doesn’t have regulations on which refugees are granted LPR, whereas, HRIFA only allows certain Haitians.

For example, journalist Dana Canedy of the New York Times states: on “Oct. 29, 2002 about 200 Haitian refugees jumped off a stranded wooden boat [and] arrived off the Rickenbacker Causeway which links Miami to Key Biscayne.”⁵⁴ These refugees are being held in detention centers and are unlikely to receive asylum. Canedy also states that “Under a Bush administrative directive {...} Haitians seeking political asylum are held in detention centers pending the dispositions of their cases. All others are returned to Haiti {...} Civil rights advocates and a growing number of lawmakers from both policies have criticized the policy as discriminatory {...} by U.S. law, Cubans picked up at sea are returned to their country, but those who make it ashore are permitted to remain.”⁵⁵

Bush’s policies towards Haitian asylum seekers policy’s are racially discriminatory. “Although Bush has said he opposes broad legalization for unauthorized migrants, there have been reports that the president will recommend legislation to legalize an estimated 3 million Mexicans living

in the U.S. without legal authorization.”⁵⁶

The Bush administration continues to provide Cubans with a ‘safe haven’ of legalization upon reaching the U.S., to spite the Cuban government as a result of the failed U.S. military intervention at Playa Giron (the Bay of Pigs). This policy also pleases the politically influential right-wing ex-Cuban patriot communities in Florida.

San Francisco Chronicle journalist Coralie Carlson states: “many are driven to risk their lives because of the crushing poverty in their homeland—where two-thirds of the population is unemployed or underemployed and survive on less than \$1 a day.”⁵⁷ Haiti’s

Haitian boat people are transported away from the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Legare to be repatriated to Haiti on Saturday, Nov. 17, 2001 in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. 350 Haitian boat people risked their lives on the high seas this past week, braving high winds, burning sun, seasickness, hunger, and thirst to attain their dream, a better life in Florida only to be returned to Haiti.

(photo by Tomas van Houtryve)

Caribbean

current economic crisis is a result of neo-liberal policies imposed on the country by the U.S. since 1804.

PRESENTATION:

'LET HAITI LIVE' SPONSORED BY THE HAITI ACTION COMMITTEE AT NEW COLLEGE IN SAN FRANCISCO. BRIEF SUMMARY BELOW ON REASONS WHY THE HAC BELIEVES HAITI IS A THREAT

(information also taken from: "Haiti Hidden from the Headlines")

Six main reasons why the United State's considers Haiti a threat:

- *"Haiti has a vibrant and well-organized popular movement that supports its government.*
- *The Haitian people are resisting corporate globalization, which they call 'plan limo' or 'death plan'. Haitians have borne intense pressure to adopt neo-liberal economic policies.*
- *Aristide's government has made literacy, healthcare, AIDS treatment, and agricultural production its top priorities, rather than privatization and the transnational corporate agenda*
- *Haiti is the only country in the world, aside from Costa Rica, with no military. Catching the U.S. by surprise, President Aristide disbanded the Haitian military in 1995.*
- *Haiti has built close, cooperative ties with Cuba.*
- *The Haiti realizes that the U.S. government wants to exploit the country's natural resources and a market for subsidized US products and Aristide is against privatization."*⁵⁸

Currently Haiti has thousands of urban and rural neighborhood associations, women's and human rights groups who lead movements during the Duvalier regime to overthrow the dictatorship. Although President Aristide was ousted from power in 1990, the groups heroically resisted the coup d'etat of 1991 and re-elected Aristide into power. The Haitian government is extremely against neo-liberal policies allowing public enterprises such as airports, banks, telephone and electric companies to be sold to U.S. multinational corporations.

President Aristide disbanded the Haitian military in 1995. It was created during the U.S. occupation of Haiti from 1915-1934. The Haitian military has historically served as a conduit for covert and overt U.S. intervention in Haitian affairs. Today Haiti spends zero on the military, making it a model in devoting resources to human development

instead of militarism. The United States is fearful Haiti will model Cuba, a neighboring island nation which has thrived in the areas of health care, education and sustainable development through agriculture since the U.S. placed an embargo on Cuba. The U.S. wants Haiti to be economically dependent on the U.S., rather than making alliances with its enemy, Cuba. President Aristide reestablished diplomatic relations with Cuba, which has provided critical assistance in agriculture, literacy, communications, and fisheries.

Conclusion

After analyzing U.S. relations with Haiti, the evidence supports that the forced debt imposed upon the Haitian government was strategically implemented in order to prevent the country from governing itself without external dependency. During the 1915 U.S. invasion, Haiti's constitution was rewritten to attract foreign investors to open markets and exploit the country's poor. The U.S. involvement in Haiti has only benefited the bourgeoisie, while the Haitians have continued to suffer. Currently, Haiti still rates the worst among all nations in its hemisphere in terms of its health indicators. According to the CIA World Fact Book "For every 10,000 Haitian patients there is only one physician. Only half the population has access to drinking water. Illiteracy remains greater than 45 percent; infant mortality rate stands at more than 74 out of every 1,000 live births. The AIDS epidemic continues to increase in the island [and] the number of AIDS orphans. In 1999, 5.17% of adults acquired AIDS, 210,000 of the population lived with AIDS, and there were 23,000 AIDS-related deaths."⁵⁹ The purpose for the U.S. intervention was to instill social and economic stability in Haiti. However, the social and economic crisis has not improved.

President Aristide is opposed to foreign investors monopolizing Haiti, and as a result, the U.S. is illegally blocking humanitarian aid to Haiti. Haiti's social and economic crises will never improve until the U.S. ceases to impose neoliberal policies on the Haitian government. Spokesman for President Aristide, Jean-Claude Martineau stated "that it's impossible for Haiti to independently govern itself because it's almost completely dependent economically to the United States."⁶⁰ Haiti's dependency on the U.S. is no longer considered slavery, but indentured servitude, since Haiti is not allowed sovereignty. ■

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Notes:

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- 47 Haiti Reborn/ Quixote Center, *Let Haiti Live! Research Study 'International Campaign to Release Humanitarian Aid to Haiti'*
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60 Road to U.S. Intervention in Haiti) (C) Copyright 1994. Center for Defense Information <http://www.cdi.org/adm/Transcripts/802/>



Children watch as cows are put

down in a slaughterhouse in

Port-au-Prince Haiti on

November 19, 2001.

(photo by Tomas van Houtryve)

Prisoners of America

By Tomas van Houtryve

Miles of rusting razor wire divide one of the last fault lines of the Cold War. On one side Cuban soldiers of Fidel Castro's Frontier Brigade stare through binoculars across a mine field. On the other side are young U.S. Marines posted in wooden guard towers as they have been for decades, staring back at the enemy.

But behind the Marines are new coils of razor wire and a bustle of activity. A camp of cages and prefabricated metal sheets sprawls across a field surprisingly dry for the Caribbean. Behind multiple chain link fences soldiers can be seen escorting a man dressed in orange coveralls, shackled at his wrists and ankles.

Welcome to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the site of the America's oldest military base on foreign soil, and its main prison complex for suspected terrorists.

Most of the prisoners were captured in Afghanistan, and they continue to arrive at irregular intervals. Many were captured and handed over by the Northern Alliance or warlords temporarily aligned with the United States. Some were cornered on raids conducted by U.S. Special Forces and intelligence agencies. Regular U.S. soldiers flying in on combat missions rounded up the other men.

In July of 2002, I accompanied one of these missions in Eastern Afghanistan. The operation included Special Forces working with Afghan soldiers and over 200 Army Airborne troops, flown to a suspect area near the Pakistan border. Before the mission, the commanding officer gave soldiers a briefing on how the prisoners should be treated. He instructed them against beating captured Afghans.

For many of the soldiers, it was their first time on the foreign battlefield. The fear and



nervousness was clear on their faces. They searched caves and village houses, pulling people out at gunpoint. Most houses were empty, but in a few the soldiers uncovered hidden weapons stashes.

A Green Beret told me how prisoners are often captured and then traded for others at tense meetings with hostile tribes and militias. Loyalties shift quickly, and negotiation is as much a part of the process as the use of force. The Special Forces soldiers also offer medical help and construction work in villages to gain the trust of rural villagers. The work builds alliances and opens channels for information.

Captured men are questioned on site by Special Forces. "We tell them they can either cooperate or go to Camp Slappy," a Special Forces soldier told me.

When men are detained, their wrists are secured with zip ties. Usually they are hooded. In several cases prisoners have been taken by mistake. Upon release, western reporters interviewed them, and they complained about being beaten. Many had black eyes and broken ribs.

The most consistent reports of harsh treatment have emanated from the prisons of the two main U.S. bases in Afghanistan, Bagram and Kandahar air base. Journalists are not allowed access to the prisons. However, reporters have drawn a picture by interviewing released inmates and intelligence officials. According to a December 2002 Washington Post¹ story and a March 2003 New York Times story,² the prisoners are subjected to "stress and duress" techniques. These include chaining the prisoners in uncomfortable positions for long periods and depriving them of sleep by kicking them and shining strong lights on them 24 hours per day.

US Army soldiers search an Afghan house for weapons and documents in the village of Malaksay, Afghanistan in August 2002.

(photo by Tomas van Houtryve)

US Army soldiers detain

Afghans suspected of trans-

porting weapons near the

village of Malaksay, Afghanistan

in August 2002.

(photo by Tomas van Houtryve)



Caribbean

Although officials freely admit that sleep deprivation is a technique they use, the U.S. government officially denounces torture. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, the authority on the International Convention Against Torture, sleep deprivation to break a prisoner's will is considered to be torture in some cases.

Additionally, the U.S. State Department regularly denounces the use of sleep deprivation as an interrogation technique in their annual human rights report.

More troubling are the reports that two prisoners have died in captivity in Bagram. On their death certificates "homicide" was listed as the cause of death. Military officials have not issued a full explanation and say they are investigating further.³

According to the Post article, the CIA also transfers prisoners for questioning to foreign intelligence services that have a reputation for torture and brutality. The prisoner is handed over with a list of questions. U.S. officials are not present during the interrogation, to absolve themselves of knowledge and responsibility for the treatment.⁴

According to U.S. officials, about 3,000 suspects have been detained around the world since the "War on Terrorism" started. U.S. officials decide to send certain prisoners on to the Guantanamo Bay facility, although there is no public information on what criteria or methods are used. There are currently over 600 prisoners on the U.S. Navy Base in Cuba.

Prisoners arrive in Guantanamo on Air Force cargo planes. The press is allowed strictly limited access to the base. Journalists are not allowed to record or photograph the prisoners as they arrive, but they can watch from a distance as they come off the planes hooded and shackled. Photographs taken by U.S. soldiers on the

planes show the suspects wearing the hoods and shackles and bound to the floor of the aircraft with cargo straps.

I spent 21 days, spread over several trips, covering the detention facility in Guantanamo. During my stay, military minders escorted me at all times, blocking access and forbidding reporting on most subjects. At times the restrictions appeared to be paranoid and trivial, such as the ban on photographing the base church and McDonald's restaurant. Generally journalists were herded to staged photo ops and press conferences.

Coverage of the prison was allowed from a distance with restrictions placed on the cameras and lenses allowed. No photos were allowed that showed the face of a prisoner. Eventually I was kicked off the base by the Department of Defense for violating this "ground rule."

In a letter ordering my removal from the base, the military justified my expulsion and the prohibition on photographing prisoner's faces through an article of the Third Geneva Convention stating that prisoners of war must be shielded from public curiosity and humiliation.

It is odd that the Geneva Convention was quoted in demanding my ejection from the base, because President Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld decreed that the men captured during the war in Afghanistan are "unlawful combatants" and therefore are not eligible for prisoner of war status under the Geneva Convention.

Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention states that if there is any doubt about status, an impartial independent tribunal is to decide their status on an individual basis.⁵ This is the position taken by the International Committee of the Red Cross in public statements. The ICRC is the most authoritative interpreter of the Geneva Convention.

Common criminals captured by

Afghan officials in July 2002

receive vastly different treatment

at the Kandahar prison than those

captured by US forces.

(photo by Tomas van Houtryve)

Asadullah, age 23, is a guard

patrolling the walls of the

Kandahar prison in July 2002.

(photo by Tomas van Houtryve)





The men in Guantanamo were classed as “unlawful combatants” by the U.S. government’s executive branch without the participation of courts or tribunals.⁶

Because the Guantanamo Bay Naval base is under the control of the United States, some family members of the detained men have gone to court to demand that they receive the protection of U.S. Federal law.

The first judge and two subsequent appeals courts have ruled that Guantanamo is outside of U.S. jurisdiction. Despite the fact that the American flag has flown over Guantanamo for over 100 years, and that the U.S. government is solely in control of the land, base personnel, and the prison, it is considered outside the reach of U.S. courts. In short, the constitution does not necessarily follow the flag. Lawyers for the families are expected to take the final appeal to the Supreme Court.

The fact that prisoners have ended up outside of both international law and U.S. Federal law has drawn strong criticism from human rights organizations.

Sergio Vieira de Mello, the U.N. high commissioner for human rights, said, “I cannot accept that there’s a legal black hole in Guantanamo. How can we even conceive that on this planet there exist square kilometers of

land where no law applies?”⁷

In a letter to the U.S. government, Amnesty International has said the United States should either release or charge the detainees and allow them access to lawyers. Amnesty International had also made repeated appeals to be allowed access to the prison, saying it is worried about conditions that “may amount to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment.”⁸

U.S. officials insist that their treatment of the prisoners is humane. Despite the official message, the military designed a strange logo for the detention mission, which isn’t exactly a public relations coup. The logo shows a large squatting rat, dressed in an orange prison jumpsuit. Circling the illustration are the words “Operation Enduring Freedom - Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”

What is daily life like for a prisoner enduring the incarceration? The conditions are spartan, isolated and monotonous. The first prison was called Camp X-Ray. Each man was put in an 8 foot by 8-foot individual metal cage. The sides of the cell were open to the elements. A corrugated metal sheet provided the roof. The floor was concrete, and each prisoner was given a foam mat and a sheet. Two buckets were assigned to each cell: one for fresh water and the other to be used as a toilet.

Caribbean




*Prisoners share a Kandahar cell
in July 2002.*

(photo by Tomas van Houtryve)

*Prisoners gather in the
Kandahar prison yard
in July 2002.*

(photo by Tomas van Houtryve)



*Lalai Agha, age 28, a prisoner in
Kandahar, pours himself tea in his
cell in July 2002. Prisoners here are
allowed personal items and social
visits, unlike those in US custody.*

(photo by Tomas van Houtryve)

After six months, the prisoners were moved to Camp Delta. Journalists have not been allowed to see inside the facility. The military claims which the new cells are slightly smaller, but each cell has a sink and a Turkish-style toilet.

Prisoners are let out of their solitary cells twice per week: once for exercise and once to shower. Exercise consists of walking in a circle for 15 minutes wearing shackles. Prisoners are also taken out of their cells for interrogation in nearby buildings. Bright lights are kept on in the prison 24 hours per day. The detainees are given three meals a day, and the Muslim call to prayer is played over loudspeakers five times a day. The men are not allowed to have any of their own personal items, but they are given a Koran to read.

Psychologically, the prisoners do not seem to be doing well. There have been multiple hunger strikes. As of April 1, 2003, there were 24 suicide attempts.⁹

When I questioned U.S. military public affairs officers about the low standard of treatment for prisoners in Guantanamo, they argued that the men were being treated better in U.S. hands than they would be in an Afghan-run prison. On the surface, the direct comparison between conditions established by the wealthiest democracy on earth, and an impoverished war-torn tribal society, seems unfair. It would seem more natural for the U.S. to hold itself to standards based on national laws or international treaties.

For the actual lives of the men in the cages, the comparison is still worth considering. How they react to their surroundings would depend on their expectations. In the city of Kandahar, I visited an Afghan prison. Surprisingly, the conditions are much looser than in Guantanamo. Prisoners are allowed to congregate freely and exercise without supervision. They may have personal items

like teapots, drawings, carpets and their own clothing. To pass time, the inmates play cards or do gardening. The main complaint, brought up by both the prison officials and the inmates, was a shortage of food.

“The situation is poor. We don’t have enough food for ourselves, much less the prisoners,” the prison warden, Saleh Jan told me.

When I interviewed him in July of 2002, food woes were widespread throughout the country, not just in prisons. The new government was shaky and short of money. Aid groups had their hands full tending to 1.3 million refugees.

I also visited a court proceeding where a judge heard cases against criminal suspects. The defendant and the prosecutor were both allowed to present their side. Sentences were handed down based on secular and Islamic laws.

The International Committee of the Red Cross monitors prisons around the world. Laurent Gisel, Head of its Sub-Delegation in Kandahar told me that food and sanitation are not the only issues which are scrutinized. The psychological factors imposed by the captors are also crucial.

The International Committee of the Red Cross has made several visits to Guantanamo. They have been allowed access to the prison, and they have interviewed prisoners. They have no access to the interrogations. The ICRC privately makes recommendations to U.S. officials, but their policy is to steer clear of public criticism. They also give the prisoners a chance to fill out a postcard that the Red Cross sends to their families. The military censors the letters for sensitive information.

In Kandahar, I accompanied Red Cross field officers when they delivered the letters to families. One particular family that I visited left me particularly troubled about the alleged guilt of some of the U.S. held prisoners.

Sardar Mohammed is a prisoner in Guantanamo Bay. In May 2002, Afghan and American soldiers wielding assault rifles came into Mohammed’s home and arrested him. His family members were scared and shocked, because they claim he was not affiliated with the ousted Taliban government or al-Qaida. In fact, Sardar Mohammed had been imprisoned by the Taliban regime, and he later had been chosen to represent the local area at the loya jirga, the new government’s assembly.

According to his family, the ordeal started in April 2002, when Mohammed got into a dispute with a local police officer who had wrongly confiscated his motorbike. The officer promised to reimburse Mohammed \$670 for the bike. When weeks past without the money, there was a confrontation. The family claims that the police officer threatened Mohammed and then gave the Americans a false tip to have him arrested. Other Afghan civilians have complained that corrupt officials are manipulating U.S. forces to settle personal scores.

Both Afghan and U.S. officials admit there have been cases where innocent people were rounded up because of bad intelligence. In some



U.S. Marine Cptn. Mark Roy of Denton, TX stands near the North East gate that separates the Republic of Cuba from the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Navy Base on Monday, Feb. 18, 2002.


(photo by Tomas van Houtryve)



The standard issue of clothing and personal items of a Guantanamo inmate were displayed by US officials for this photograph in February 2002.

(photo by Tomas van Houtryve)

Caribbean



A Guantanamo inmate is escorted in to an

interrogation room in April 2002.

(photo by Tomas van Houtryve)

cases the error was discovered before the men were shipped out of Afghanistan, and they were released. Sardar Mohammed has been in Guantanamo since the summer of 2002. He has no access to lawyers and no other way to state his case.

Three men were released from Guantanamo in October 2002, and another 18 were released in March 2003. U.S. officials said they were sent back to Afghanistan because they were no longer considered a threat.¹⁰

The U.S. government has defended its behavior regarding the prisoners, saying the process has provided valuable intelligence for tracking down potential terrorists.

The U.S. methods certainly are a huge deviation from past policy. In many ways they are historically unprecedented. Critics wonder if these steps are justified. The U.S. has had many enemies and many wars in the past. Is al-Qaida massively more dangerous than previous terrorists like Timothy McVeigh, who was convicted and punished under U.S. Federal law? Is al-Qaida more dangerous than the war and genocide machine of Nazi Germany, whose soldiers were treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention when captured by Americans? If the United States triumphed against those enemies without skirting their principles, one must wonder what is the case for abandoning them today.

Perhaps the greatest damage done to the United States by the change of policy regarding captured prisoners is in the battle of ideas. One need only look across the razor wire fences from Guantanamo to the other side of Cuba, to remember that the Cold War was not so much a fight of bullets and missiles. It was a fight of principles. Most authoritarian communist regimes maintained security with secret police, torture, and arbitrary detentions. Political prisoners and asylum seekers fled these regimes, arriving by rafts and inner tubes in Miami or climbing across the

Berlin Wall. The message was clear; people were willing to risk their lives to live in countries with principles of freedom and justice. In the political debate, America could claim the moral high ground.

Now, for the first time in history, if a person had to choose between being imprisoned in a sovereign Cuban jail or on the side where the American flag flies, he would have a hard time deciding.

Another troubling issue is the capture of prisoners of war in present and future U.S. conflicts. The White House and the Pentagon were enraged when Iraqi television showed captured American forces during the first week of the U.S. and British invasion of Iraq. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said that the Iraqis had violated the Geneva Convention by filming the prisoners.¹¹ Critics quickly point out the hypocrisy of this selective insistence on the Convention depending on how it suits U.S. needs.



A Red Cross field officer holds a letter informing a prisoner's sister, Shareen Gul, that her brother, Haji Mohammed Omar, has been sent to Guantanamo in August 2002. Relatives had no word from him in three months.

(photo by Tomas van Houtryve)



An inmate of Camp X-Ray is escorted by two guards while other inmates are seen in their cells in Guantanamo Bay U.S. Navy Base, Cuba on Friday, March 15, 2002. Prisoners are indefinitely locked in individual steel cage cells and have all their personal items confiscated. To date they have been given no access to legal representation.

(photo by Tomas van Houtryve)

The consequences of skirting domestic and international laws for the "War on Terrorism" are becoming obvious and immediate. Poor treatment by the U.S. of Muslim and Arab fighters does not encourage them to treat Americans well when the shoe is on the other foot. Coalitions and alliances with other nations are much more difficult to build when U.S. intentions are viewed with suspicion.

The United States has dealt with threatening enemies at home and abroad throughout its history. Captured fighters are not just information assets. They are human beings. It serves the long-term interests of the United States deal with them in just, transparent and accountable manner. ■

Malika, the wife of Haji Mohammed Omar, an Afghan prisoner in Guantanamo, breaks down crying when learning of her husband's situation from the Red Cross in August 2002.

(photo by

Tomas van Houtryve)



Caribbean

Notes:

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2 The New York Times, "Questioning Terror Suspects In a Dark and Surreal World," reported by Raymond Bonner, Don Van Natta Jr. and Amy Waldman and written by Mr. Van Natta, March 9, 2003.

3 The New York Times, "U.S. Military Investigating Death of Afghan in Custody," by Carlotta Gall, March 4, 2003.

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5 Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. August 12, 1949.

6 Daily Telegraph (UK), "Opinion divided over status of 'unlawful combatants'," by Joshua Rozenberg, January 17, 2002.

7 The Associated Press, "U.N. human rights chief condemns denial of hearings to Guantanamo prisoners," by Jonathan Fowler, December 4, 2002.

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10 The Associated Press, "Nearly 20 Afghans Return From Guantanamo," Kabul, AP byline, March 23, 2003.

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Bibi Gul, sister of Guantanamo prisoner Sardar Mohammed holds his portrait while Mohammed's 18-month-old son looks on in August 2002. The family claims he is innocent and that US forces were tricked by corrupt Afghan officials.

(photo by Tomas van Houtryve)

Labeling State Deviance: Patterns and Dynamics in the U.S.-North Korea Security Relationship

By Ted Everts

There is general agreement in the field of international relations that the United States emerged from the Cold War as the most powerful state in a unipolar world. However, while the U.S. has since adopted a doctrine of "enlargement"¹ in a drive to expand the domain of Western liberal capitalist values, some states outside the sphere of U.S. influence have exhibited a reluctance to inculcate the political, economic and cultural norms the U.S. purports to cherish. The U.S. security elite has cast this resistance in a negative light. In a seminal article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1994, Clinton's national security advisor Anthony Lake wrote that "...Our policy must face the reality of recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family but also assault its basic values...These nations exhibit a chronic inability to engage constructively with the outside world...They are coming to realize that there is a price to pay for their recalcitrant commitment to remain on the wrong side of history."² Secretary of State Madeleine Albright subsequently propounded the formulation that countries in the world could be divided into four basic groups: advanced industrial states, emerging democracies, failed states and rogue states.³ Of the four, none has as negatively value-laden and intrinsically ominous sounding a designation as "rogue," which has enjoyed continued usage by members of the present administration.

Why the label? Michael Klare has traced the origins of the rogue categorization to the Pentagon's search for new enemies after being advised in March 1990 by Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, that its proposed spending plans were "rendered worthless by a 'threat blank' — an unrealistic and unconvincing analysis of future adversaries."⁴ Drawing on analyses from a variety of sources, Pentagon planners formulated a new definition of enemy: "aggressively-minded Third World powers armed with nuclear and/or chemical weapons and the means of delivering them to distant lands."⁵ The rogue classification emerged, Klare suggests, when this type of state power also exhibited an "anti-Western orientation" and "illicit proliferation activities."⁶ Four of today's alleged "rogue" states—Cuba, Iran, Libya and North Korea—had found a place on the list of "states that support and sponsor terrorist actions" articulated by President Ronald Reagan in a speech in 1985.⁷ Robert Litwak emphasizes the importance of this historical connection: "In terms of the evolution of the rogue state concept and policy, the 1980s were a crucial formative period in that those years witnessed the emergence of the core criteria, rooted in external behavior, that would later come to define what the Clinton administration characterized as a category of states."⁸ The U.S.

had taken to applying labels, notably "rogue," to those states whose external behavior it viewed as deviant: in

Lake's words, "outside the family," exhibiting an "inability to engage constructively," and "on the wrong side of history."

This article explores the security ramifications of the application by the United States of labels of deviancy to the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (hereafter, D.P.R.K. or North Korea). The U.S., it shall be posited, acts in the manner of a social control agent, committed to the maintenance of certain forms of normative behavior in global "society." North Korea, by contrast, has been the recipient of several labels of deviancy applied by the U.S., in essence declared a social outcast "beyond the pale."⁹ The two countries are producing, reproducing and operating within and in terms of an intersubjective structure that defines the contours and delineates the parameters of possibility in their relationship, most notably its security dimension.¹⁰ This structure, I will argue, may be usefully represented using a social control agent/labeled deviant model which provides explanatory power and renders improved intelligibility to some of the identifiable patterns of behavior that constitute and overall dynamics that characterize the U.S.-D.P.R.K. relationship. The model elaborated herein shall be shown to offer instructive insights and hold substantive implications for makers and observers of contemporary U.S. security policy.

The first section sets forth the theoretical foundation for treating states as actor-subjects that collectively form a society to which the analytical methods of sociology may usefully be applied. Then, after a brief freeze-frame snapshot of the continuing U.S.-D.P.R.K. storyline at Cold War's end, I examine key patterns of behavior and overall dynamics in these countries' bilateral interaction. In each case, these patterns and dynamics shall be analyzed within the so called "labeling" theoretic paradigm, both to shed revealing ontological light and provide fresh explanatory insight. The final section discusses the prospects for North Korea's "resocialization." In the conclusion I shall summarize the implications this analysis holds for American security policymakers as they seek to manage U.S.-D.P.R.K. relations in the future.

The theoretical framework used in this exercise begins with a debt to the realist school of international politics. Realism takes states to be the primary "actors" in the system, fundamentally unitary by nature, acting "rationally" according to cost-benefit calculations to maximize power

and relative gains in a “self-help” anarchic system.¹¹ States are thus deemed “actors,” and appear to “act” in a system of multiple actors. While sharing the state-as-actor view, constructivist scholars of international relations in turn downplay the rational-choice approach to analyzing state behavior. They suggest instead that identities and norms determine the interests that govern states’ actions. An actor’s subjective or intersubjective construction of who it is and who it is in relation to others is endogenous as both an independent and dependent variable when analyzing the workings of the international system.¹² This treatment and understanding of the state as subject-actor opens the door for sociological analysis to serve the study of international relations, as sociology itself is the study of the “social” behavior of subjects. I thus work from the premise that the states of the world make up a “society” of subjects, analogous to the more widely recognized phenomenon that is “human society.” Barry Buzan, building on theoretical formulations originating in the “English School,” suggests that the international system has indeed taken on societal characteristics: “The bottom line of this international society is the mutual recognition by nearly all states of each other as legally equal sovereign entities.”¹³ I do not assume here that all or most social laws, principles and dynamics that might apply to human society must also apply to state society. Rather, I am suggesting that human society, given the theoretical subjectivity of states, serves as a powerful analogical model and center of reference for perceiving patterns and understanding trends in state-as-subject behavior.

In the scholarship devoted to the study of social-subject-actors operating within societal structures, the symbolic interactionist school, pioneered in the 20th century by George Herbert Mead, stands out as particularly appropriate to an examination of American-North Korean relations.¹⁴ According to Barry Glassner, “symbolic interactionism explains particular phenomena and events in social life as produced primarily by the participants themselves, through the symbols people use in interactions with one another.”¹⁵ U.S.-D.P.R.K. interaction is openly and heavily symbol-laden, as the emotionally charged and oft-used phrases “rogue,” “outlaw,” “renegade” and most recently “evil” demonstrate. Within the symbolic interactionist school, the study of social-societal processes associated with the affixing of labels by society’s most powerful members onto those among its less powerful members whom the former sees as “deviating” from the behavioral norms it would prescribe is known as “labeling theory.” Labeling theory is symbolic interactionism applied to the study of social deviance. The methodology employed in this paper will be to reconstruct certain state behavioral patterns and dynamics from the last ten years of the U.S.-D.P.R.K. relationship using a range of conceptual, analytical and terminological tools offered by labeling theory. Its value to the study of the U.S.-D.P.R.K. security relationship shall, it is hoped, herein be made clear.

The U.S. and North Korea at the End of the Cold War

In December 1991, as part of an effort to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the Bush administration completed the removal of its nuclear weapons from South Korea (R.O.K.) and in the following month canceled the annual joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises known as “Team Spirit.” In this same time frame, North Korea concluded two major agreements with the R.O.K.: the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The D.P.R.K. also signed a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.), an action sought by the U.S.. The denuclearization agreement contained provisions that the signatories neither reprocess nor enrich spent nuclear fuel from their nuclear reactors in order to produce plutonium, a requisite material for nuclear bomb making; it also called for inspections of nuclear facilities to be “worked out by the Joint Nuclear Control Commission.” North Korea stopped reprocessing and delayed further defueling. As part of these agreements, the U.S. promised to conduct future high level talks with North Korea.¹⁶ At Cold War’s end, the outlook for progress in the U.S.-D.P.R.K. bilateral relationship appeared good. It soon became clear, however, that rather than actually conduct high level talks in good faith, the U.S. had instead decided to use the prospect of such talks as a bargaining chip with the North to get it to agree to I.A.E.A. inspections as well as to North-South inspections.¹⁷ The promise of a broader dialogue that could lead to mutual confidence-building measures had been broken. In this atmosphere of U.S. pressure and limited communication, mutual suspicions increased. Hopes for constructive engagement began to unravel.

Patterns of Behavior in the U.S.-D.P.R.K. Relationship

Since the end of the Cold War, the policies of the U.S. security elite with regard to North Korea have been inextricably enmeshed in a politico-discursive framework in which labels of deviance such as “rogue,” “outlaw,” “pariah,” and most recently “evil” are regularly, publicly, and categorically applied to the D.P.R.K.. According to labeling theorists, the practice of labeling deviant behavior by powerful social actors is manifested in a variety of behaviors that vary (and on occasion overlap) in form and function. Four of the more salient behaviors identified in the labeling theory literature are 1) the assertion of control by socially powerful actors; 2) the engagement in moral entrepreneurship by self-appointed societal norms guardians; 3) the application of sanctions by agents of social control; and 4) the secondary deviational responses by labeled social actors to the constraints arising from societal reactions to their

initial nonconformity. It is my contention that each of these behavioral patterns is demonstrably present in the U.S.-D.P.R.K. relationship, and that by examining and analyzing these patterns in their social-interactive dimension, greater insight into their causes and effects is rendered. It shall be shown that the persistent U.S. practice of applying "rogue" and other labels to characterize North Korea serves to shape, rationalize and constrain the conception and execution of America's security policy toward its perceived Northeast Asian nemesis.

Asserting Control

Labeling theorists have identified several causes and practices of social control. The need "to control," a process, and the need "for control," a condition, is, I would assert, the principal motivating factor in U.S. policy toward North Korea, if not the world. When states that vociferously reject U.S. hegemony appear to acquire military capabilities within the theoretical targeting range of U.S. "interests," the U.S. security elite reacts to these new capabilities as if they represent a "threat" to be contained, offset, or otherwise controlled. As Raymond Tanter puts it, "Washington considers these states as rogues, wandering out of control, meriting isolation, and deserving punishment."¹⁸ Labeling theory addresses some of the motivations driving control practices: "...The problem of who gets to be defined as deviant sometimes depends on perceived threats to political domination and social stability. Concerns about not wanting to appear weak, or a fear of subversion, can induce campaigns that cast persons, often with little evidence, into deviant roles...."¹⁹ Viewed in this light, U.S. apprehension with regard to North Korea may, in part, be explained in terms of its need to ward off perceived challenges to its global hegemonic role.

In their work on social deviance, Arnold Birenbaum and Henry Lesieur examine some of the strategies used by socially powerful groups in their efforts to marginalize the deviant. One strategy is the employment of communications resources. "...Command over the means of communication enhances the capacity of groups in society to impose their version of reality and their definitions of deviance upon the social expectations of an entire society."²⁰ The U.S. use of its world diplomatic network in its effort to solidify its view of and coordinate a response to North Korea may be seen in this light. In Senate testimony in February 1992, Arnold Kanter, Under Secretary of Political Affairs at the U.S. State Department, indicated that "...We have pursued an activist diplomacy worldwide. We have sought to build consensus and raise consciousness of the danger of proliferation on the Korean Peninsula...We have shared our assessment of the North Korean program and the implications on both regional and global security."²¹ As a socially powerful actor in international society, the U.S. employs its

agencies and channels of communication to disseminate the meanings it ascribes to North Korea's actions.

Such communications strategies represent wholesale attempts to manipulate society's understandings of norms and appropriate behavior. According to Kai Erikson, "in censuring acts of behavior as deviant, the agencies of social control refine and concretize the meanings and applications of norms and also clarify the boundary contours of acceptable and nonacceptable behavior."²² Such was the strategy employed in the March 1993 Senate testimony of Kanter's successor Lynn Davis. "...We have made it clear to the North that it must choose between two paths. If it rejects our requirements for a continuing dialogue and resolution of the nuclear issue, the international community will have no choice but to take steps to punish and isolate the D.P.R.K. On the other hand, if the North accepts our requirements, we and the international community are willing to take steps to address the North's stated security concerns and to move towards a more normal political and economic relationship."²³ In the manner of a social control agent, the Clinton administration proffered to society its understandings of acceptable and unacceptable behavior, offering the deviant D.P.R.K. a "choice" between the two.

Among the rhetorical strategies of social control is "categorical labeling." Tanter speaks of a "gallery of rogues." "Because of American ideals, interests and prior commitments, a large conventional force, terrorism and proliferation are unacceptable and hence deserving of punishment. In effect, these criteria justify inclusion of states into the gallery of rogues."²⁴ Glassner explains the strategic use of categorical labeling in a societal context: "This labeling of categories of people as potentially deviant forms the stage on which attempts to label particular individuals are played out...An analysis of the processes underlying categorical labeling and its relationship to the labeling of specific individuals is necessary for a full understanding of deviance and social control... Categorical, rather than individual labeling, would logically prove more useful to powerful groups in preventing or obstructing major social and political change."²⁵ The U.S. use of what Klare calls the "Rogue Doctrine"²⁶ is an example of the categorical labeling strategy. Certain states are labeled as belonging to a particular deviant group. The effects of such a categorical doctrine are not, however, limited to the discursive domain. Litwak identifies the risks of such a blanket approach. "...The artificial lumping together and demonizing of this disparate group of states significantly distorts policy. The rogue state approach has been used as a political instrument to mobilize support for hard line policies...But in so doing, it sharply circumscribes policy-makers' ability to switch gears and adjust policy to meet the changing circumstances of the target state."²⁷ Klare also sees cause for concern: "Continuing adherence to the Rogue Doctrine will entail significant risk of precipitous intervention in future regional conflicts."²⁸ As a component of U.S. control strategy, the practice of categorical labeling

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constitutes a substantive constraint on nuanced U.S. management of the security situation in Northeast Asia.

A final control strategy under consideration is the manipulation of public feelings to maintain a certain social order. Edward Sagarin and Robert Kelley have found that "Powerful political forces sometimes seek to shift public hostility toward an entire group of people, racial or ethnic particularly but not exclusively. Deviance appears through the reation of scapegoats, in order to bring about social cohesion among others in the population and place the blame for the ills of the country not on national leaders, their policies, or the social system, but on some elements within the nation deemed undesirable."²⁹ The authors' point with regard to social cohesion is critical. A key purpose of the U.S. Rogue Doctrine is to rally international society's coalescence around America's global agenda. As Litwak puts it, referring to the work of Alexander George, "rogue state" is "a political category employed by...powers with a stake in the maintenance and orderly workings of the international system...The rogue state designation reflects...the policy preferences of the United States as the post-Cold War era's preeminent power."³⁰ The U.S. labels bothersome or threatening social elements deviant as a mobilizational means to maintaining its preferred international order, which, being a status quo power, it sees as a primary source of security.

The U.S. view of North Korea as an out-of-control rogue and the hegemon's concomitant need to assert control over the situation have resulted in the initiation of some controversial, viability-uncertain and potentially very expensive countermeasures. In August 1998, North Korea launched its three-stage Taepodong I missile over the northern Japanese island of Honshu. The first two stages performed successfully, but the third stage disintegrated and the rocket fell into the Pacific Ocean 1,200 miles from its

launch site. Staging technology, which involves the sequential firing, boosting and timed separation of multiple rocket sections, is a requirement for delivery of intercontinental ballistic missiles. If the Taepodong's third stage can be made to function properly, the missile would theoretically (given resolution of targeting and reentry issues) be able to deliver a chemical or biological weapon payload to Alaska or Hawaii. Part of the U.S. response to this episode was the initiation of a review of U.S.-D.P.R.K. relations overseen by former Secretary of Defense William Perry (the "Perry Review") that paved the way for a deal whereby Pyongyang made a September 1999 verbal commitment in Berlin not to test additional missiles, in return for a U.S. pledge to lift economic sanctions against North Korea.³¹ This did not occur, however, before a second, more ominous and more expensive response: the U.S. Congress's January 1999 passage of the National Missile Defense (NMD) Act.

Selig Harrison associates America's jump-starting of the NMD project with the conception of North Korea as a "rogue" that the U.S. has both axiomatically assumed and persistently proffered. "The current campaign for missile defense depicts North Korean leaders as irrational xenophobes harboring a mindless anti-American hatred that explains why they want

nuclear weapons and why they might well use them to attack the United States, even if it were to mean national suicide."³² Gordon Mitchell points to the construction of linkages between "rogue" and "threat." "NMD advocates point to the possibility of 'rogue state blackmail' as an emerging threat justifying rapid pursuit of missile defense...It is suggested that NMD would preserve U.S. 'freedom of movement' by giving U.S. leaders room to call the 'rogue state's' bluff."³³ In U.S. domestic political discourse, the rogue threat and NMD have been made two sides of the same coin. Litwak recalls that "The rogue state



Two South Korean soldiers patrol at the southern side near the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea, at Imjingak, north of Seoul, South Korea, Thursday, April 3, 2003. North Korea condemned South Korea's decision to send non-combat troops to help the U.S.-led war in Iraq, calling it a "criminal act" which will heighten tension on the Korean Peninsula. (AP Photo/Greg Baker)

policy regained prominence in 1998-99 when the Clinton administration cited the incipient long-range missile threat from Iran and North Korea...as the rationale for accelerated research on ballistic missile defense. Some have argued that such a defensive system is necessary because rogue states may be 'undeterrable.'³⁴ As Tim Savage suggests, the Rogue Doctrine "allows politicians to exaggerate threat to justify their policies, and to avoid public debate."³⁵ William Possel concludes that "The realization that rogue states armed with ballistic missiles could strike American cities with nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction is moving the United States toward missile defense."³⁶ The assignment of roles and the prolonged adhesion of labels of deviance helps generate an intersubjective construction of "threat," opening the door to discursive and political practices designed to rationalize what many consider to be an 'irrational' response to that 'threat.'

Close examination of U.S. security policy and discourse regarding North Korea in the conceptual framework of labeling theory reveals that in multiple visible and significant ways, the U.S. is performing the function of an agent of social control in international society. U.S. labeling of North Korea as a deviant constitutes a central component in a grand strategy designed to maintain the international order. The practice of labeling is expected to advance the U.S. conception of what constitutes "appropriate" behavior in the international system, and, as Savage says, "to justify its own military dominance."³⁷ This strategy lies at the heart of U.S. conceptions of how to maintain its security in the world. The labeling of "deviant" societal actors for the purpose of achieving or maintaining an order of control, however, provides a rationale for policies and strategies which, when implemented, have the potential to lead to the destabilization or even the undermining of that very order. Later, in my discussion of "secondary deviation," I address how "deviants" might undertake adaptive countermeasures as a response to hegemonic practices associated with labeling.

Engaging in Moral Entrepreneurialism

A second pattern in the U.S.-D.P.R.K. security relationship has been the U.S. casting of its dispute with the North Korean regime in absolutist moral terms. Howard Becker, a labeling theory pioneer, first described the "moral entrepreneur" phenomenon. "The existing rules do not satisfy him because there is some evil which profoundly disturbs him. He feels that nothing can be right in the world until rules are made to correct it. He operates with an absolute ethic; what he sees is truly and totally evil with no qualification. Any means is justified to do away with it."³⁸

This moral-absolutist strategy was employed by President George W. Bush in his 2002 State of the Union address. "...North Korea is a

regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens...States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world."³⁹ Secretary of State Colin Powell used the same phraseology a month later. "It is evil—not the people of North Korea, but the regime itself and the way it has conducted its business for the last 50 years."⁴⁰ By identifying an "axis of evil," the existence of which constitutes a moral rationale for security policy, Bush as president has positioned the U.S. as a Beckerian moral entrepreneur. Litwak places this Manichean discursive strategy in cultural, historical and political context: "...This demonization strategy can be viewed as the latest manifestation of the traditional impulse in U.S. foreign policy to depict international relations as a moral struggle between forces of good and evil."⁴¹ As such, he later continues, this strategy "has been an effective political tactic..."⁴² Bush's moralistic discourse is to a significant degree a by-product of historical tendencies in the culture of American security policymaking and raw political considerations. Moral enterprise is a natural and logical manifestation of U.S. strategy.

As Becker suggests, the moral entrepreneur does not simply identify the evil; he feels the need for "rules," and "any means" to eliminate it. On June 6, 2001, Bush prescribed just such a set of rules for North Korea. "I have directed my national security team to undertake serious discussions with North Korea on a broad agenda to include: improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea's nuclear activities; verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile programs and a ban on its missile exports; and a less threatening conventional military posture."⁴³ The more ominous need of the moral entrepreneur is to employ "any means" to eliminate the evil. U.S. subscription to such an approach was made evident on March 9, 2002 when it was reported that "the Bush Administration has directed the military to prepare contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against at least seven countries" including North Korea.⁴⁴ The administration has sought to embed and justify the prospective use of traditionally normatively unacceptable means (nuclear attack) in a morally defined environment in which evil must be contained.

Becker makes note of the "class nature" of moral crusades that moral entrepreneurs undertake: "...That moral crusades are typically dominated by those in the upper levels of the social structure...means that they add to the power they derive from the legitimacy of their moral position, the power they derive from their superior position in society."⁴⁵ In other words, the power he derives from his class position enhances the ability of the moral entrepreneur to make his case effectively to society. Money talks. States in international society with a stake in the international economy as led by the United States are understandably well-advised, in order to stay on good trading terms with the economic superpower, to follow its lead on international issues that while for them

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may seem peripheral or irrelevant, constitute central issues for the U.S. security elite. Particularly relevant here is the demonstrated ability of the United States to co-create international institutions and then prevail upon them to undertake certain enforcement actions that advance its perceived "interests." A case in point is the I.A.E.A. As Sigal puts it, "The (first Bush) administration used the International Atomic Energy Agency to police the North's nuclear program and tried to use the U.N. Security Council to enforce compliance with the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. North Korea was told to live up to its obligations under the treaty, or else."⁴⁶ In this way the U.S. leverages its position in the international community and its institutions in attempts to impose its will on those it deems moral misfits.

Another social process that inheres in moral crusades is that of hypocritical self-aggrandizement. According to David Matza, "By pursuing evil and producing the appearance of good, the state reveals its abiding method of perpetuation of its good name in the face of its own propensities for violence, conquest and destruction. Guarded by a collective representation in which theft and violence reside in a dangerous class, morally elevated by its correctional quest, the state achieves the legitimacy of pacific intention and the appearance of legality even if it goes to war and massively perpetrates activities it has allegedly banned from the world."⁴⁷ In other words, a powerful social actor may often exhibit a tendency, when cracking down on deviant behavior, to promote images of itself as good and of deviants as evil, images which serve as smokescreens to mask, or perhaps rationalize, instances of its own behavior of the kind the actor purports to be seeking to eradicate. A recent example of this is the U.S. decision to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that it signed with the Soviet Union banning development and deployment of strategically destabilizing nationwide missile defense systems. The stated reason for this decision was the U.S. interest in developing and deploying a National Missile Defense system. Announcing the withdrawal on December 13, 2001, Bush said: "I have concluded the ABM Treaty hinders our government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue-state missile attacks."⁴⁸ A played-up threat from "rogue states" served as a public justification for the U.S. to abandon a regime that it and many observers had touted as a cornerstone of world peace for thirty years. The U.S. wrapped its departure from a successful security structure of its own making in a crusade against deviants' threats.

Another characteristic of moral crusades is that they often occur in contexts of crisis, manufactured or otherwise. Stan Cohen writes that "Societies appear to be subject, now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests."⁴⁹ In the view of U.S. policymakers, North Korea's behavior indeed places America's very

values at risk. Testifying before the Senate on September 10, 1998, several weeks after the D.P.R.K.'s Taepodong I launch, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell stated that "In deterring aggression from an often unpredictable and highly militarized North Korea, the U.S. has helped create an environment in which Asian states could pursue a development course compatible with American values and beliefs. . . . The security alliance between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea. . . is built on a shared stake in democracy and free markets. The need for a combined U.S.-R.O.K. military command and force structure to protect our common values is more compelling than ever."⁵⁰ As moral entrepreneur, the U.S. uses the specter of threats to a set of morally constructed values to justify policies, plans and budgets designed to counteract those threats.

Among the most revealing insights into moral entrepreneurialism offered by the labeling theorists is that it is often linked to the assertion or promotion of the interests of certain powerful social groups. Ian Taylor notes that "... it is sometimes the case that a popular moral crusade will receive support from people whose motives (quoting Becker) 'are less pure than those of the crusader'...In some instances...the moral crusade...is appropriated, or taken up, for other instrumental purposes, especially those of influential social and economic interests, like those of large industrial enterprise."⁵¹ Lawrence Wieder and Charles Wright see this phenomenon as even more basic and universal: "...Labeling theory holds that behavior is not intrinsically deviant and is made so only in the process of being reacted to as deviant. Further, it is held that this reaction occurs in the context of someone's interests. In the situation of reaction, rules are formulated and/or elaborated upon and applied to the behavior of the purported deviant...For labeling theorists, the crucial questions concerning rules include...whose interests are represented in the formulation of a rule."⁵² In this same vein, Pat Lauderdale and James Inverarity acknowledge hegemony as "essential to an understanding of the role of structural factors that affect stigmatizing...Although hegemonic processes account for some public perceptions of harm, perceptions may in certain circumstances be directly manipulated by interests..."⁵³ For labeling theorists, the promulgation of behavioral rules and perceptions of what is deviant undertaken in the context of a moral crusade ipso facto calls into question whose interests are being served.

The list of leaders and supporters of Washington's top missile defense lobby, the Center for Security Policy (CSP), reveals who benefits from the designation of North Korea as a rogue state. William Hartung and Michelle Ciarocca report that "Unlike most think tanks that work on national security issues, the Center for Security Policy receives roughly 25% of its annual revenue from corporate sponsors, many of which are weapons manufacturing firms. Top missile defense contractors Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and TRW have all contributed generously..." The missile lobby's reach extends directly into the halls of

government power. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, chairman of the Congressionally mandated "Rumsfeld Commission," which produced the missile threat report that now serves as operating code for the Bush administration's missile defense policy and asserts that "rogue states like...North Korea" represent a ballistic missile threat, is a "trusted advisor' and financial supporter" of the CSP and received its "Keeper of the Flame" award the year his panel's report was issued. Hartung and Ciarroca detail an extensive and "tangled web" of relationships between missile contractors, conservative "think tanks" and members of Congress, and sitting policymakers.⁵⁴

Another example of "less than pure motives" at work was evident during the 1994 "crisis" when North Korea resisted the testing of spent fuel rods by the I.A.E.A.. The U.S. responded by emplacing Patriot missiles in South Korea and embarking on a three-year campaign to convince South Korea to buy some for themselves. Mitchell suggests that "such a tactic represents a major threat to the security of the United States and its allies, because allied perception that U.S. defense policy has become captive to defense contractors such as Raytheon makes allies feel as if U.S. officials are more interested in exploiting their military weakness for profit than working with them to protect their people in a serious and cost-effective way."⁵⁵ Here the interests of a missile defense contractor are seen to come in direct conflict with those of a country whom the U.S. claims to be an "indispensable ally," even the ally assumed to be at greatest immediate risk of falling victim to the feared violent behavior of the presumed deviant. As Chalmers Johnson summarizes it, "North Korea is a useful whipping boy for any number of interests in Washington. If the military needs a post-Cold War opponent to justify its existence, North Korea is less risky than China. Politicians seek partisan advantage by claiming that others are 'soft' on defending the country from 'rogue regimes.' And the arms lobby had a direct interest in selling its products to each and every nation in East Asia, regardless of its political orientation."⁵⁶ The demonization of North Korea serves the interests of missile defense contractors and their political boosters, though whether these interests are coterminous with U.S. national security is far from clear. When a state takes on the social role of moral entrepreneur, it paradoxically and perhaps unwittingly exposes itself to the machinations of opportunist social elements.

Applying Sanctions

A third behavioral pattern constitutive of the U.S.-D.P.R.K. relationship has been the U.S. imposition, or threat to impose, economic sanctions on North Korea. Sanction rituals are a recurring tactic in societies' responses to deviance. Erikson describes the sanctioning process and its implications. "The community's decision to bring deviant sanctions

against the individual...is a sharp rite of transition at once moving him out of his normal position in society and transferring him into a distinctive deviant role. The ceremonies which accomplish this change of status, ordinarily, have three related phases. They provide a formal confrontation between the deviant suspect and representatives of his community; they announce some judgment about the nature of his deviancy; and they perform an act of social placement assigning him to a special role which redefines his position in society...An important feature of these ceremonies in our culture is that they are almost irreversible."⁵⁷

The pattern of confrontation, judgment and social placement represents a rich and longstanding tradition in the U.S.-D.P.R.K. relationship. Sigal notes that "In addition to the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1950, other legal impediments to commerce with the D.P.R.K. include the Export Administration Act, the Trade Act of 1974 on Most Favored Nation, the Arms Export Control Act setting sanctions on missile proliferators, and the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989 barring certain transactions for any state designated a 'terrorist country.' The Foreign Assistance Act bars aid to 'any communist country' and 'any country which engages in gross violations of internationally recognized human rights,' and obliges U.S. officials to oppose World Bank or IMF loans."⁵⁸ While Presidents Reagan and Bush eased some of these restrictions, the Clinton administration, responding in June 1994 to North Korea's decision to remove spent fuel from its Yongbyon reactor, "mounted a diplomatic offensive to win multilateral support for sanctions against North Korea."⁵⁹ For domestic political reasons, these sanctions have not yet been fully lifted in spite of a U.S. promise to do so as part of the Agreed Framework that resulted from negotiations to resolve the fuel issue.⁶⁰ The continued U.S. commitment to and imposition of economic sanctions on North Korea supports, and is supported by, the tagging of the D.P.R.K. with a succession of labels assigning it to specified deviant roles.

Erikson's point on irreversibility is especially material, and is echoed by Tanter's observations. "Consider sanctions imposed on North Korea ostensibly on the grounds of its participation in terrorism. Although the sanctions are a response to a particular provocation, they derive from a retributive justice motivation. Despite the fact that North Korea has not engaged in any act of terrorism for nearly a decade and has recently indicated its opposition to such activity, the United States still categorizes the regime as a sponsor of terrorism. As such, the sanctions may seek to punish North Korea, focusing on the U.S. government's broad opposition to the Communist regime, instead of on what remains of a former terrorist policy."⁶¹ U.S. sanctions against North Korea have taken on a life and political momentum of their own. As reversal is made increasingly difficult, possible future changes in the sanctions policy which could serve U.S. security interests become problematical. In this

way, sanctions constitute a self-imposed structure of constraint on the exercise of America's options in the region.

Societal Reaction Spawning Secondary Deviation

A fourth identifiable pattern of behavior in the U.S.-D.P.R.K. relationship is the latter's recurring tendency to engage in activities, which, in fact, constitute responses to conditions the U.S. and its adherents generate in reaction to the D.P.R.K.'s initial displays of nonconforming behavior. Edwin Lemert, an early exponent of the concept, provides a description. "Secondary deviation is deviant behavior, or social rules based upon it, which becomes a means of defense, attack, or adaptation to the overt and covert problems created by the societal reaction to primary deviation. In effect, the original 'causes' of the deviation recede and give way to the central importance of the disapproving, degradational, and isolating reactions of society."⁶² As viewed by Glassner, "Secondary deviance is that stage...in which much of what the person or group does is a response to having been labeled...The type of labeling largely determines the kind of treatment they will receive."⁶³ This includes punishment. As Jack Gibbs summarizes it, "If a deviant act is reacted to punitively, the actor will engage in further deviant acts as a consequence."⁶⁴

The international reaction to North Korea's "unconventional" behavior has, in this same manner, compounded that behavior. As international society led by the U.S. has condemned and sanctioned the D.P.R.K.'s go-it-alone approach, the latter has engaged in adaptive behaviors designed to ensure its survival which, depending on one's point of view, may be construed as either defensive or offensive. Kyung-ae Park writes that "North Korea believes that the U.S...is...determined to overthrow its own government, in collusion with South Korea. Washington's uncompromising position on keeping its troops in South Korea further bolsters North Korea's perceived threat...Survival under security threats and economic difficulties is given first priority...Avoiding transparency in missile and nuclear issues is a desperate need, as it could contribute to building a militarily powerful state or at least to being perceived as a militarily powerful state. In this sense, North Korea has a compelling reason to resist U.S. demands for inspection..."⁶⁵ In the pattern of socially-induced secondary deviation, external pressures brought to bear by the U.S. have instigated adaptive defensive responses by North Korea. These pressures constitute structural constraints which prompt the D.P.R.K. to reproduce its original nonconforming behavior, a process which reinforces both perceptions and realities of "deviancy."

Labeling theorists suggest that societal reaction circumscribes certain choices available to "deviant" actors. Chief among these are their

choices of relationships, their interpretations of and responses to opportunities, and their increased inclination to conceal certain activities. Allen Liska tells us that "Labeling may...alter interpersonal relationships. Conventionals may not wish to associate with publicly known deviants, fearing that the social stigma may rub off; thus, labeled deviants may seek out each other for assistance or companionship...As to structured opportunities, it seems reasonable to argue that being labeled a deviant (criminal) reduces legitimate economic opportunities. On the other hand...being labeled a criminal...may increase illegitimate opportunities...If labeling decreases economic opportunities...(and) conventional associations,...then it follows that labeling should increase the level of future deviance."⁶⁶

As a state actor, North Korea has found its options limited both by politico-diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions. In terms of its relationships and opportunities, North Korea has chosen to pursue the well-reported option of marketing its missiles to other countries. The D.P.R.K. tops the CIA's list of missile exporters.⁶⁷ As Scott Snyder reports, "North Korea's missile development and export efforts, when seen from Pyongyang's perspective, have been a primary source of hard-won foreign currency through exports to Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Libya."⁶⁸ Ironically, not only is it this very missile marketing program to which Washington objects so strenuously; in addition, the buyers of the D.P.R.K.'s missiles are the very "rogues" whose existence and potential strength Washington finds so troubling. North Korea has seen itself as having little choice but to do business with other labeled deviants. By constraining its relationships and opportunities, the U.S. has forced the D.P.R.K. into a classic mode of secondary deviation—again reinforcing perceptions and realities of deviancy.

A third manifestation of secondary deviation is the concealment of certain types of practices. Glassner believes that "...the perception of the possibility of being labeled influences people's choices. This perception leads to a common characteristic of deviance, where actors build attempts to conceal their activities."⁶⁹ Matza agrees. "By making secrecy and security sensible, ban maneuvers the subject into a compounding of deviation."⁷⁰ Concealment has been a recurring characteristic of North Korea's behavior. We return to the well-publicized example of the D.P.R.K.'s initiative to extract spent fuel rods from its Yongbyon reactor in May 1994. This action prevented the I.A.E.A. from determining whether similar actions had been performed on previous occasions and kept the agency guessing as to how much weapons grade plutonium may have already been processed. As Litwak sees it, "For the Pyongyang regime, maximizing its leverage from this 'bargaining chip' (nuclear program) meant perpetuating the ambiguity surrounding its nuclear program."⁷¹ This strategy of nuclear ambiguity had developed its own momentum. Don Oberdorfer suggests that "The more the world feared it, the more its nuclear program was a valuable asset to North

Korea... There is no evidence that Pyongyang saw the nuclear program as a bargaining chip, but the record is clear that by the 1990s it had learned the program's value in relations with the outside world."⁷² Many of North Korea's strategic choices have been the likely unintended result of "disciplinary" and "defensive" efforts on the part of the U.S. associated with its typecasting and conception of North Korea as a "rogue." Sagarin and Kelly summarize this dynamic. "The initial formal reactions of society to rule violators activate processes that are organized to control and eradicate deviance but that, paradoxically, promote, sustain, and encourage it."⁷³ In other words, international social response leads to the reproduction of individual states' roles and behaviors.

GENERAL DYNAMICS IN THE U.S.-D.P.R.K. RELATIONSHIP

In contrast to the patterns of interaction explored in the previous section, the discussion that ensues focuses instead on the U.S.-D.P.R.K. relationship's "dynamics." Patterns of behavior may be defined as recurring practices of discourse or policy implementation that fall within a given typology. Dynamics refer to an overarching set of essential characteristics that inhere in the relationship over time. Patterns of behavior are constituted by actions; dynamics are observed overall attributes or qualities of a relationship. As shall be seen, the three sets of dynamics discussed below, articulated by labeling theorists in examining social deviance, describe and explain many discernible features on the U.S.-D.P.R.K. bilateral landscape.

The Dynamics of Master Status

Labeling theorists have identified what they call the "master status" accorded a deviant by society, a concept introduced by Becker. "Treating a person as though he were generally rather than specifically deviant produces a self-fulfilling prophecy. It sets in motion several mechanisms which conspire to shape the person in the image people have of him."⁷⁴ In Walter Gove's words, "...The status of deviant is a master status which overrides all other statuses in determining how others will react toward one. Once a person is stigmatized by being labeled a deviant, a self-fulfilling prophecy is initiated, with others perceiving and responding to the person as a deviant."⁷⁵

The D.P.R.K.'s master status as "rogue" and other deviant denominations has for years colored the way the U.S. has dealt with it. Sigal writes of a set of "shared images" within the U.S. foreign policy establishment that have affected America's nuclear diplomacy—its core area of concern—with North Korea. One such image is "that North Korea was a 'rogue' state, the last redoubt of Stalinist-style communism, motivated to build bombs by hostility to the outside world... That image inspired

officials to fill in the blanks about North Korea. They treated it as an outcast, implacable and inimical, with a master plan to deceive the world and acquire nuclear arms. That made it an easy target for demonization. Belief in this image blinded observers...to contrary evidence of Pyongyang's efforts to accommodate Washington"⁷⁶ Sigal is describing a dynamic whereby North Korea's status as rogue "overrides" alternative possible statuses that a state might possess, such as "trading partner," "ally," or "irrelevant basket case."

This master status dynamic may have particularly dangerous security ramifications. According to Klare, "Once U.S. policymakers adopt fixed assumptions regarding the identity of future adversaries, they may be disposed to view any seemingly hostile behavior by those countries as a vital and immediate threat to U.S. security... Washington's current demonization of Third World 'rogues' puts U.S. policymakers at risk of...overreaction to future crises, increasing the likelihood of military intervention that might otherwise be resolved through diplomatic action."⁷⁷ Another way of understanding the consequences of the master status dynamic is in terms of threat misperception. Tanter speaks to this in his examination of the implications of the bias that is apt to result from Sigal's "blinding images" and Klare's "fixed identity assumptions." "Threat misperception derives from the misleading influences of biases on perception. Biases come in two types—motivated and unmotivated. If you see what you want to see, that is a motivated bias. If you see what you expect to see, that is an unmotivated bias. These two cause threat misperception."⁷⁸ The misperception of threat associated with North Korea's "master status" as a rogue has resulted in the evolution of such controversial, costly, potentially destabilizing and likely dangerous U.S. defense strategies as National Missile Defense and nuclear first-use options on the Korean Peninsula.

Becker's "self-fulfilling prophecy" is a particularly relevant aspect of the master status dynamic at work in U.S.-D.P.R.K. relations. Related to but analytically distinct from secondary deviation, its impact can be felt in how it constrains consideration of a full range of policy options. Litwak cites "strategic inflexibility" as a case in point, writing that "The domestic political debate over the North Korean nuclear agreement highlights the strategic inflexibility that stems from the designation of a country as a rogue state. Having effectively demonized the regime, how does an American administration then justify having relations with it? In such a politically charged context, any concession, even a reciprocated one, can be cast as an act of appeasement to a regime that is 'beyond the pale.' That is why the labeling of a state as a rogue pushes the U.S. administration toward a default strategy of isolation and containment..."⁷⁹ He later recalls the instance when "The revived designation of North Korea as a rogue state by the Clinton administration in the context of ballistic missile defense was politically at odds with its efforts to maintain an engagement track with the P'yongyang regime that was already under

heavy political attack in Congress.”⁸⁰ North Korea’s master status as rogue directly constrained the ability of a U.S. administration to follow a preferred security track.

As mentioned earlier, social actors labeled as deviants employ adaptive coping strategies when isolated or “cornered” by the powerful. This is evidenced by “rogue” states’ responses to the U.S. Rogue Doctrine, responses which reflect Becker’s self-fulfilling prophecy. As Klare points out, “The adoption of the Rogue Doctrine has prompted American policymakers to invest considerable time and effort in the development of strategies for containing, weakening, and fighting rogue nations....(This) has put these countries on notice that they may be future targets of U.S. military action, and this may have spurred them to bolster their defenses or accelerated their quest for weapons of mass destruction...At the same time, the Pentagon’s policy of identifying certain Third World states as possible enemies may have inspired a certain bravado of the ‘David and Goliath’ variety on the part of these nations’ leaders, leading them to eschew compromise and engage in high risk behavior....So long as the rogue regimes are described in Washington as dangerous outlaws that must be countered with the full weight of American power, they will be seen by at least some constituencies as worthy of respect for standing up to the imperial West.”⁸¹ Klare is describing a self-fulfilling prophecy dynamic set in motion by Washington’s vocal and imperious declarations and condemnations of “rogue” threats.

Discursive evidence suggests that self-fulfilling prophecies are currently underway. In response to recent U.S. claims of a successful test of an NMD interceptor, the D.P.R.K.’s Korean Central News Agency stated that “The U.S. ruling quarters make no scruple of listing other countries as “rogue states,” “sponsors of terrorism” and members of the “axis of evil,” deliberately sparking regional crisis and aggravating the international situation. The U.S. is now persistently floating the fiction about the “missile threat” from the D.P.R.K....It is quite natural that the D.P.R.K. is making sustained big efforts to increase the capacity for self-defense.”⁸² Likewise, in response to U.S. preparation of contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against it, the agency stated that “The D.P.R.K. will not remain a passive onlooker to the Bush administration’s inclusion of the D.P.R.K. in the seven countries, targets of U.S. nuclear attack, but take strong countermeasures against it. The present political and military situation where the U.S. is openly threatening the D.P.R.K. with nuclear weapons proves once again how just it was when it exerted tremendous efforts to increase its capacity for self-defense.”⁸³ By labeling North Korea a “rogue state,” the United States is attempting to create an environment receptive to the punitive and defensive measures it may call for, implement and seek to justify. These measures constitute threats, in North Korea’s eyes, to its security and sovereignty. As the D.P.R.K. leadership takes defensive countermeasures, the prophecy is fulfilled.

The Dynamics of Social Definition

A fundamental premise among labeling theorists is that deviance is socially defined by nature; hence its definitions are subject both to change and to inconsistency of application. Erikson explains that “Deviance is not a property inherent in certain forms of behavior; it is a property conferred upon those forms by the audiences which directly or indirectly witness them. The critical variable in the study of deviance...is the social audience rather than the individual actor, since it is the audience which eventually determines whether or not any episode of behavior or any class of episodes is labeled deviant.”⁸⁴ Don Gibbons and Joseph Jones point up the relativistic nature of social definition. “(The labeling view) stresses that deviance is problematic as a matter of social definition, because the standards or norms which are violated are not universal or unchanging in character...Then too, deviance is the result of social judgments imposed on persons by a social audience.”⁸⁵ Lauderdale and Inverarity place this understanding of deviance in a political context. “...Deviance is socially defined and as such is created, maintained, and changed through political processes. It is essential to recognize this political character of deviance in order to understand and explain the definitional transformations that are a recurrent feature of deviance.”⁸⁶

Understanding deviance as socially defined helps explain the evolution of the U.S. application of labels to the D.P.R.K. Since 1950, in Washington’s eyes, North Korea has moved from “war enemy” to “Communist” country to “terrorist state” to “rogue state” to “state of concern” to a point along an “axis of evil.” As world conditions and U.S. administrations have changed, so have the labels applied to North Korea. Each new label is chosen by its exponents on the basis of how effectively it serves to define North Korea for domestic and international consumption. These new labels appear to have been selected and applied by successive U.S. security elites both to marginalize North Korea and challenge its legitimacy. The ongoing process of defining and redefining deviance by societal “authorities” raises questions about the accuracy, appropriateness and motivations of labeling.

A social-definitional understanding of deviance also invites examination of why labels are applied to some countries but not to others, even though both may be involved in substantially similar activities. Over the past thirty years, the U.S. has consistently come to the conclusion that it wishes to engage the People’s Republic of China. China is a declared nuclear power and has a market of well over a billion consumers. At the same time, Chinese policies defy U.S. preferences with regard to human rights, territorial claims (Taiwan and Tibet) and the proliferation of missile technology, all of which are considered unacceptable components of North Korea’s “rogue” behavior. The U.S. security elite has elected, however, to label China as a “strategic

competitor," a term with few ominous and in fact arguably positive connotations. Hence, which states get labeled deviant depends not on specific behaviors but rather on the varying needs and desires that underpin how social audiences define deviance.

The Dynamics of Power Asymmetry

The realist school of international relations holds that the relative power of a state is the most meaningful determinant of its "position" in the international system and that the system itself is in fact constituted by relationships of relative power. Realists would presumably characterize the U.S.-D.P.R.K. relationship as essentially a power struggle between a hegemonic status quo power and a weak revisionist state. Gove proposes that "people are labeled as deviant primarily as a consequence of their social attributes, with the most important one being their lack of resources and power."⁸⁷ Labeling theory thereby acknowledges this asymmetry of power between deviants and those who so label them, though while so doing considers endogenously problematical the uses and effects of norms and values within and upon these power relationships. Summarizing Lemert's work in this area, Liska explains that "Norms and laws are conceived as temporary and emergent products of a social process whereby different interest groups compete and struggle for social power and dominance. In this continuing process some groups' norms become defined as society's norms and some as society's laws; consequently some people become defined as norm violators (deviants) and some as law violators (criminals)."⁸⁸ Sagarin and Kelley agree. "By examining the power and resources of those who create and impose deviant categories with those so labeled, we gain insight into how public perceptions of deviance evolve."⁸⁹ Relative power thus both supports the spread of the norms of the socially powerful, as has been the case with such U.S.-led regimes as the Bretton Woods institutions, the WTO, and APEC, as well as the shaping of what constitutes deviance in the eyes of society, e.g. "rogue" behavior.

This dynamic of the "powerful labeling the powerless" is particularly salient in the U.S.-D.P.R.K. relationship. Litwak writes that "...In contrast to the Cold War period,...countries on the current roster of rogue states are notable for their weak and marginalized status. This asymmetry of power is an important factor that conditions U.S. policy toward these regimes."⁹⁰ Power asymmetry also influences the weaker party's perceptions of what is at stake in bilateral interaction. Harrison argues that "Pyongyang's fears of a surprise attack focus on the technological superiority of U.S. and South Korean airpower over its aging force of MiGs....This air superiority is enhanced by U.S. intelligence, targeting, and command and control capabilities much more sophisticated than the Soviet-era systems used by the North."⁹¹ Ironically,

though perhaps unsurprisingly, the pursuit of projects that North Korea has undertaken to defend itself in this set of circumstances, such as the development of nuclear and missile capabilities, constitutes the very deviance that the U.S. unyieldingly assails.

Prospects for Resocialization

Viewed in terms of labeling theory, prospects for North Korea's "resocialization" into international society are problematic. As Milton Mankoff writes, "The rule breakers become entrenched in deviant roles because they are labeled 'deviant' by others and are consequently excluded from resuming normal roles in the community."⁹² Tanter describes this phenomenon as it applies to rogue states. "By not adhering to international norms, the rogue-elephant state separates itself from the herd of nations and roams alone. But once isolated from the herd, most rogues find that re-admission is a difficult task; because the United States chooses to ostracize them even further, they find themselves prey to a cumulative isolation."⁹³ Litwak emphasizes the political challenges that arise with the prospect of resocialization: "A related problem is the difficulty of moving a state out of the 'rogue state' category as the process of resocialization unfolds or events otherwise warrant. Such a change in policy toward a 'rogue state,' particularly after a prolonged period of castigation and the mobilization of public support...for a hard-line policy of containment and isolation...is likely to generate stiff...opposition."⁹⁴ He continues, "Once a country is branded 'outlaw' and placed in this category, it is very difficult politically to move that state out of it."⁹⁵ As a demonized deviant, North Korea will face extraordinary challenges if it wishes to reengage with international society on the hegemon's terms, even if it agrees in principle and practice to abide by those terms. Such a role transformation requires more than coming to terms; it requires cooperatively navigating through and moving beyond a firmly entrenched intersubjective structure in which current role definitions have become taken-for-granted by a substantial portion of society.

Continued labeling of North Korea as a state deviant thus appears to be an unpromising strategy for its "resocialization." Are there alternative approaches to labeling that might be considered? Alexander George offers a menu consisting of coercion, containment, rewards and punishments to induce behavior modification, and "conditional reciprocity."⁹⁶ George weighs different strategies according to individual situations, which puts him on the right track. However, were he to use a model of social deviance to understand some of the salient behavioral patterns and overall dynamics in the hegemon-rogue relationship, he may find that he need look no further than the practical and sympathetic social policies to manage domestic human deviance that some Western

Pacific Rim

societies and communities have introduced. Examples include needle exchanges for addicts, condom distribution to prostitutes, gun buyback programs for at-risk gun-owners, and the decriminalization of marijuana. Creative security initiatives such as exchanging light water reactors for graphite reactors (a policy agreed to by both sides but delayed and overdue), distributing food and medicine for health security (already undertaken but sporadically and at an insufficient level), buying North Korea's weapons directly from them, and curtailing sanctions would constitute such positive intervention strategies in the international security sphere.

More generally, if we interpret the North Korean need to negotiate directly with the U.S. as in essence a "cry for help" face-savily dressed as a bargaining strategy, we may be able to examine the sources and causes of "pain" and address North Korea as a subject in need of appropriate assistance to overcome socially and self-imposed limitations. By seeking to engage North Korea on these terms, avoiding continued reprobation and gently encouraging alternative self-perspectives in non-threatening ways that start with the country's existing world view, we would give resocialization and the concomitant amelioration of perceived security issues the political and economic space they need to occur. As Victor Cha suggests, "The decades of Cold War animosity between Washington and Pyongyang will only be thawed if the engager, in a relative position of strength and confidence, is willing to forgo reciprocity, at least in the initial stages of the policy, to overcome the cognitive biases created by past enmity."⁹⁷

Before concluding, it should be stated that adherents to the realist and neo-realist schools will likely chortle that the preceding social-interactionist analysis of the behavioral patterns in and general dynamics of a relationship between a strong and weak state is both extraneous and superfluous in light of their paradigm's direct and purportedly parsimonious treatment of power-seeking states. They might in fact claim that the preceding is realist analysis dressed up in needlessly irrelevant sociological terms. Indeed, this paper has noted areas of overlap between the assumptions, observations and implications of realism and labeling theory, particularly with regard to the importance of the relative power possessed by societal actors. However, as Sigal pointedly states with regard to U.S. nuclear diplomacy with North Korea, "Neither realist nor liberal institutionalist theories can adequately account for that unwillingness [of Americans to deal], which was not rooted in the structure or institutions of international politics but in the shared images of American bureaucratic and domestic politics."⁹⁸ As a social theory, labeling theory embraces a range of causalities and employs conceptual tools that include but also extend well beyond realism's simple calculations of relative power. It treats as endogenous the origins and articulation of norms, values and morality; the meanings, acquisition and acting out of social roles, identities and statuses; the ubiquitous and

relentless presence of special interests; and above all, the unfolding of social processes that are often unconsciously set in motion by actors resulting from their positionality in society. These are considerations not directly addressed in the realist literature, yet their exclusion risks the overlooking of what we have seen to be identifiable and illuminating patterns and dynamics in the discourse, politics and execution of U.S. security policy in Northeast Asia.

This paper has shown how many critical developments in the U.S.-North Korean relationship follow patterns, cycles and principles articulated across a range of writings in the literature of labeling theory. The implications for U.S. policymakers are multifold, and I will articulate a few.

To begin with, U.S. security policymakers should be cognizant of the downstream self-fulfilling prophecies that can accompany the public labeling of a foreign state as "deviant." The labeling theory literature makes it clear that the very act of labeling deviance can lead to further deviant behavior. Second, American leaders should strive to achieve a level of analytical objectivity that allows them to examine their motivations for labeling North Korea "evil" and "rogue", etc., within the context of their desire that global society embrace not-so-universal U.S. norms. Such an analysis might reveal that an "imperialism of norms" in fact threatens the stability of hegemonic preponderance. Third, by drawing broad categories of deviance such as an "axis of evil," policymakers should be cognizant of the risk of loss of sensitivity to complexity in the search for causes of nonconformity. By labeling both Iran and North Korea as evil, for example, one risks treating both, and prompting others to treat both, in a similar manner, thereby discounting differentiation in the sources of their "primary deviation." Fourth, those claiming purity of intent in their engagement in moral crusades should be alert to the possibility that these crusades are susceptible to attracting parties to their cause who may believe less in the crusade and more in the possibility of financially benefiting from it. As we have seen, powerful such interests exist in this country, and their influence over policy is substantial. These interests may not, however, be necessarily coterminous with those of U.S. national security. Fifth, overreaction to and misperception of "threats" to America's "values" risks initiating a cascade of self-propelling events whose endpoint, in an era of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, is anything but certain to be consistent with American homeland security. Sixth, policymakers should be aware that survival-strategic choices by isolated and vilified state "deviants" are greatly constrained, risking their adoption of cooperative relationships with others labeled deviant as well as their concealment of key activities. Seventh, the oversimplified manner of viewing the world that leads to and stems from labeling states as deviant risks overlooking or inappropriately downplaying similar activities by other states that may not be so-labeled but whose behavior in fact may pose greater security risks.

Using labeling theory as a conceptual model to understand U.S.-North Korean security relations, we gain insight into behavioral causality and motivation, the significance of conscious or unconscious understandings of roles and identities, and the sources, enactment and outcomes of interactional practices and dynamics. Examining the labeling of deviance in human society is instructive for understanding how hegemonic powers do, and might better, manage their relationships with states which deviate from the hegemon's preferred set of norms, policies and practices in international society. If the hegemon wishes to "stay crisp" about its interests and how to protect them, promote a peaceful world and minimize threatening behavior by others, it will be well-served to explore ways of pursuing these goals that eschew the security perils that consistently accompany the practice of labeling state deviance. ■

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U.S. Army soldiers from the A Company 3rd Battalion 7th Infantry Regiment go to full chemical alert – referred to as MOPP 4 – in the Kuwaiti desert Thursday, March 20, 2003 as Iraqi missiles were fired into Kuwait. U.S. officials told NBC News that two missiles were intercepted by Patriot batteries and one fell within a mile of U.S. troops but caused no injuries. (photo by John Moore/AP)

Identity Crisis: Persian Iranian Versus Islamic Iranians Leading to the 1978 Social Movement in Iran

*Iran indeed is gone with all its Rose,
And Jamsbid's Sev'n-ring'd Cup where no one knows;
But still the Vine her ancient Ruby yields,
And still a Garden by the Water blows.¹*

Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam

Abstract

This article argues that the leading causal factor of Iran's 1978 Revolution was based on a conflict within the dialectical ethnic identity of the nation. Before Islamization, the Iranians (the Persians), practiced the principles of Zoroastrianism and its ancient philosophy as their cultural ideology. After the Arab conquest, although the country was ruled under Islamic ideology for centuries onward, Persians held on to countless aspects of their original cultural identity. Since their Islamization, several Iranian kings sought to change the national identity of the nation, but their attempts encountered oppositions from the Islamic Shi'a identity. The conflict, in turn, provided the essential framework in developing a dual-Iranian identity. This author argues the core cause of the movement was due to the conflict between what I would refer to as: the Islamic-Iranians (Islamists) and the Persian-Iranians (Persianists). To achieve their dominance and to reestablish their identity in 1978, the Islamists radically challenged the Persianists, and their secular State. Through sequences of actions, practices, and patterns of events set in motion during the 20th century by either group, this author will demonstrate the dialectical conflict between the two identities was the leading causal factor of 1978 Revolution of Iran, the collapse of the monarchy, and subsequently the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Introduction

The compelling factors of Iran's 1978 Revolution are the focus of this paper. As Khomeini established an Islamic regime in Iran its success contributed heavily to the global discourse and carried a statement of enormous import—a contemporary triumph of the Islamic identity. Guided by my Iranian ethnic background, I seek to examine and provide a deeper understanding of the causes of the Iranian Revolution. My argument is that two identities, one Persian and the other Islamic, have

interacted and clashed in Iran over the last century. These factions have given rise to different political regimes and foreign policies with divergent effects upon the development, political culture, and conflicts within Iran. Its significance lies in the paradigm of the internal conflict of ideologies in the Non-Western World. Iran's Islamic Revolution therefore can be used as a case study within the international arena since the country's internal identity conflict dictated Iran's position in the world, its alliances, and its impact on regional stability. The research will argue that little published literature elucidates the historical causes of Iran's Revolution. My argument is based on the sequence of events and practices taken by the agents, the Islamic-Iranians versus the Persian-Iranians, in order to achieve the dominant identity in the nation. It is imperative to understand the nature of actions taken by Islamic-Iranians as antagonists in their attempts to transform the country's national identity. For my analysis, I consider constructivist and historicist methodologies examining the emergence, formation, and patterns of action taken by both groups in order to achieve their respective dominance.

In 1978 Khomeini toppled the entrenched power of the Shah and established an Islamic regime in Iran. I theorize that the Persians and Islamists have articulated differently within the world orders of their time—they have constructed divergent destinies. Differing destiny constructions therefore entailed different foreign alliances. Reza Shah Pahlavi founded his authority on his Aryan identity and its superiority over the Semitic people, and thus allied with Germany. His successor, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, understood the importance of a combined Perso-Western approach; hence he aligned Iran with the US. Ruhollah Khomeini chose to base his discourse and power on the Shari'a—Islamic laws, to reestablish their power and identity within the nation, and hence constructed an opposing destiny. In my research I intend to provide a deeper understanding of this opposition between the two identities that impacted Iranian's destinies.

Although Persians practiced Shi'a ideology for centuries, many kept on practicing countless aspects of their preceding cultural identity. Several Iranian kings had sought to divert the Islamist and the laws of Shari'a from the state and society, but their attempts repetitively had encountered Islamic resistance. The last century synopsis of Iran's history indicates that since Iran's 1906 Constitutional Revolution, the nation experienced further partition between the two spheres of Islamic-Iranians and Persian-Iranians. In 1979, Iran underwent an Islamic Revolution and established the Islamic Republic, which, symbolically, was a total denial of the Persianists' historical and cultural beliefs.

Background

For the past two decades, Iran and Iranians have been misrepresented, for the nation's great past has been replaced by the current regime's negative views and events. Examining Iranian history helps one better understand the recent changes and the social movement of Iran. The following are brief features of Iranian history: Iranians are the descendants of Indo-Europeans who called themselves Aryans—Irani, their homeland Irana—Iran. The name Iran means the land of Aryans.² Iran is known to the West as 'Persian' (a Greek term) and by its language 'Parsi' later known as 'Farsi.' Nikki Keddie wrote: "Iran had been the most common indigenous name for the whole area since pre-Islamic times, while 'Persia' was primarily a name for its southwest and 'Persian' the name of Iran's main language."³

For over 2,500 years, Iran has attracted many of the great empires of the East and the West. Throughout its turbulent history, the land served as an ideal ground for various settlers and invaders such as: Alexander the Great, as well as Arabs, Ottomans, Mongols, Turks and Tatars. Although the country had experienced several invasions, it has never been directly colonized and has struggled to preserve its identity because "the Persians' sly technique of turning their conquerors into Persians saw to that."⁴ Jamshid Amuzegar former Prime Minister of the late Shah wrote: "We were invaded by Greeks, Arabs, Mongols, and Turks, but we did not lose our originality,"⁵ because foreign invaders would find a richer culture among the Persians than that of their own.

The paradigm of 'Persian-Iranian' identity was revived by the Pahlavi dynasty. Reza Shah Pahlavi (originally known as Reza Khan) was the first king of a dynasty who favored his Aryan race and formed an indirect alliance with fellow Aryans, the Germans. This alliance infuriated England and Russia, the powers who had Iran under their sphere of influence in 1941, and forced the king to abdicate. During his rulings, Reza Khan took initiatives to transform Iran's national identity from Islamist to Persianist through reforms such as: changing the name of the country from Persia to Iran, the liberation of woman, enforcing a ban against women wearing the Hijab, and switching the turban to Pahlavi hats for men. The modifications rigorously challenged the established Shi'a values and belief system of the Islamic-Iranians. Similarly, his son—the Shah, continued his father's goal in maintaining the identity by further averting the country's social and political system from the Islamic Shi'a identity. The Shah aimed to revive the ancient Persian identity through non-Islamic developments such as: women's suffrage, land reform, changing Iran's calendar from Arabic to Persian, Westernization, and commemorations of ancient Persia's dynasty. The Shah essentially associated himself with King Kourosh and intended to revitalize Iran's powerful ancient empire. Many Persian-Iranians identified with the Shah's deed and supported and followed his reforms and guiding

principles, leading the nation to further alienation from Islamic practices, principles, and ideology. All said, non-Islamic reforms antagonized the Islamic-Iranians as they witnessed their power and identity being eroded by the king.

As the Shah sought to reestablish the Persian tradition and promoted "Perso-Westernization"⁶ in Iran, he negated various practices of fundamental Shi'a Islamic traditions and sought to do away with communist activities. While negation of Islamic practices and the glorification of ancient Persian culture aggravated Shi'a Islamists and communist groups, they were welcomed by a select group of the educated class, the young, women, minorities, the newly developed working class, and some elites. Generally speaking, most Iranians who identify themselves as 'Persian' or 'Iranian' speak Farsi and may identify themselves as Muslims; however, there is a clear division within this general social identity. One group, whom I will call Persian-Iranians, identifies with ancient Persian traditions, and remains devoted to historic Persian ideals. This group is proud of their preceding identity, favors progress and development, and praises the revival of the Great Civilization Iran once had. To detach themselves from the Arab and fundamental Islamic ideologies, Persian-Iranians may be Muslim but avoid fundamental Islamic practices.

The other group, whom I will call Islamic-Iranians, identifies with the fundamental Islamic Shi'a identity and the laws of the Shari'a. They endeavor to safeguard and export the ideology and thus strongly oppose leaders who attempt to undermine or threaten their identity by means of non-Islamic values and practices. This group strongly protested the Pahlavi's actions as destabilizing to the Shi'a Clergy's identity and power within the state and society as the continuous estrangement of society from Islamic traditions and practices jeopardized the Shi'a ideology. "...this government represents a regime; whose leader and his father were illegal"⁷ stated Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who refuted the Pahlavi monarchy for its non-commitment to Shari'a laws. Keddie writes:

Several features of pre-Islamic Iran have become important for the trend of Iranian nationalism dominant under the Pahlavi shahs. To weaken the power of the clergy and to provide support for a centralized national state, these shahs and many intellectuals glorified pre-Islamic Iran and even Zoroastrianism, which had previously been despised. Hence this ancient history is not distant for many Iranians, especially of the educated middle classes, but is rather a model for a strong, independent Iran, while they see the Arab-Islamic conquest as a negative event which brought cultural and political decline. (This view is greatly exaggerated, as Iran's greatest scholarly, philosophical, and literary work took place after the Islamic conquests.) The views of those who stress Islam are quite different.⁸

Within Iran's social paradigm, these two ideologies had been interwoven in order to create a nearly unified Iranian identity. Nonetheless, the perseverance of the Persian-Iranian identity has created fractures in Iran's social and political ideals engendering a distinct social order. This fractured characteristic ultimately led to the 1978 social movement. The sequence of the historical events and patterns of action taken by the actors in: 1906, 1911, 1924, 1941, 1949, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1963, 1965, 1969, 1971, 1973, 1975, and 1978 will demonstrate the conflict between these two identities. The theoretical stances are based on the constructivist model of Sanjoy Banerjee and historical sociology of Pierre Bourdieu.

Identity and National Identity

Social forces and social movement lead to political change. Social forces therefore, are the heart of the mobilization, organization, the formation of political interests and identities, and the restructuring of state structures and policies.

I will illustrate in this section how the social forces of Iran formed a new national identity and changed the structure and policies of the nation. Historically, the Islamists and Persians have articulated differently with the global orders of their time. Their destiny constructions were different in origin. Their differed construction was based on a division of the world into maximal agents of civilization verses religion.

The dominant images of Iran among the Western scholars came to identify Iran as an Islamic state due to the Islamic Revolution, as Khomeini overthrew the Pahlavi dynasty in February 1979. But over time, Iran has gone through a series of great political, social, and religious upheavals between the secular and political Islamic ideology, changing the nation's national identity. Examining the diverse identities in Iran therefore helps us to understand the conflict between the Islamists and Persianists. Both groups are Muslim in a sense, but in fact follow different and distinct social orders. The Persianists sought to re-connect the present culture to ancient heritage. The Islamists sought not only to uphold their ideology and their power, but assure that the nation would remain Islamic. The Persians' and Muslims' ideologies adhere to two different religious philosophies with different cultures, traditions, and social practices, as they are part of two different civilizations. Although these two ideologies have been interwoven into a nearly single identity for several centuries, Persians preserved many of their distinct differences and practices. These differences dictated their belief system, social and cultural practices, and therefore their identity.

This article will examine the logic of hostility and supremacy

between the two identities brought about by the Islamists, and the reason for organizing the movements that led to their achievement of statehood.

Theoretical Background

To understand the logic of identity it is important to look at the concepts defined by several theorists. Alexander Wendt's social theory of identity is defined on the 'micro-level' of the structural system. Wendt breaks down identity into the 'Self' and the 'Other' where the Other helps to identify the Self. The Self, in this case, is distinguished from the Other.⁹ His subjective analysis deals with the individual level where interactions between the Self and the Other have no causal relations. Similar to Wendt's individual micro-level analysis, George Herbert Mead's analysis distinguishes the Other into two categories of 'significant Others' and 'generalized Others.' For Mead, the identity of Self is historically shaped by Others.¹⁰ The logical relationship between the Other and the Self in Mead's case is that they are interactive parts of each other, where Wendt suggests the act of Others is almost exogenous to the Self.¹¹


Banerjee defines identity through his process-tracing model, which employs two forms of meaning to describe national identity. First, the story or narrative framework, which explains people and leaders think and act within the framework of stories containing certain kind of plots providing categories and logic for its own verification. Second, national identity stories are expressed as oppositions in national discourses. Leaders do not define their actions, reveal through their actions of 'what to do,' 'how to do,' and 'why to do,' through public speeches. Thus, political actions of the leaders' rhetoric's contain numerous instructional discourses.¹²

The analytical framework of national identity is taken as the starting point of discourse analysis, thus all aspects of national identities are not defined here. The process-tracing model meets theoretical measures for identity and examines first; how Persianist identity gained its credibility and generated its course towards the state during the Pahlavi's regime, and second; the rise of opposing the Islamists identity generated its course towards achieving its dominance. Banerjee's model of national identities illustrates that identities are constructed as a story with a specific plot structure, where the narratives are told in parts according to appropriate situations. The structure of the story entails a 'heritage,' tracing the nation's cultural and ethnic background. The heritage underlines the nation's foundation, while its strength forms unity its weaknesses form vulnerability. National identity, therefore, plays an important role in developing unity and loyalty within the nation in spite of its diversity. This unity and devotion is required to mobilize the nation to its destiny and meet its future challenges.

National Identity Model

Here I draw attention to Banerjee’s model of national identity. He defines: in achieving destiny, friends will act as ‘Vanguards’ and rivals as ‘Laggards.’ Vanguards are a contemporary segment of national identity fully aware of their true heritage and have the strength to lead the nation to its destiny. For example, the event of Takht-e Jamshid, changing the calendar, and the promotion of names was the Shah’s projection to Civilisational recovery tracing back to ancient origins. Trajectory to the nation’s heritage meant leading the nation to its destiny while it declared the country’s national identity to the world holding it as a national achievement agency. Through these practices, a part of the society was aware of the nation’s true heritage forming a contemporary ‘vanguard’ to lead the nation to its destiny. The other group—the national rivals of the vanguard are ‘laggard’ ignorant of the nation’s true heritage and its strengths but aware of its weakness. Laggards are national rivals, the sector leading the nation to danger and a downward spiral once they get a chance.¹³ Islamists represented the laggard as they condemned the Shah’s practices.


Figure 1: Supra-National Identity Model



The apex of Self-Self opposition above is constructed in Persian ancient culture and civilization but is vulnerable to oppositions, which defines Destiny (Vanguard) and Danger (Laggard) within Identity. The Heritage, therefore, defines the Apex category of the Shah’s Self-Self opposition connecting him to ancient Persian civilization, its proud but vulnerable heritage. The following diagram illustrates the way in which the Laggard

and Vanguard leads to either Danger or Destiny. Thus the model of Iran’s oppositions and national identity will be as follows:

Figure 3: The Self-Self Opposition



The Self-Self opposition stands in contrast to the Self-Other as Self is to continue. These oppositions are internal to the Heritage as they point to the strength and weakness of the nation.¹⁴ Banerjee’s model below illustrates the forces of oppositions in the paradigm of national identity of a nation. For the Shah, a Self-Self opposition in his Persian heritage was the way of returning to the Great Civilization, as he noted:

We strengthened Iran’s independence and unity in 1945; we pulled the country out of chaos in 1953. We next put our economy and finances in order; we wrested our oil resources from foreign ownership; and from 1963 we set our people, with their overwhelming approval, upon the road of common sense and progress, toward the Great Civilization. For 37 years all my political activities were carried out with the aim of placing my people upon the path leading to this Great Civilization.¹⁵

The elements of the Persianists’ heritage narrative can be detected here. The Shah’s quote expresses the ideal that evolved among Persianists as a way of integrating numerous forms of the ancient ideal, the ‘Great Civilization’. For the Shah in 1978, the Self-Self opposition for Persian heritage was between his modern kingdom and the ancient Persian civilization, on one hand, and pro-Islamists, communists, the Mojahedin, freedom fighters and mobs on the other, whom he did not understand. He writes:

I dreamed of making my country's peasants happy and having every man judged by just laws. These were dreams that never left me and which to a large degree I managed to realize in later life.¹⁶

"Counter-hegemonic" oppositional practices tend to de-legitimize the nation's true heritage. To understand national identity, it is essential to understand oppositions. Several elements of National identity are constructed in oppositions; the heritage of the 'self' leading to destiny and its opposition, the 'other,' leading to danger; both are aspects of the vanguard and laggard agents. The two kinds of oppositions, the "self - self" and the "self-other." are illustrated in the model. The self-other consists of a positive nature attributed to 'self' and negative nature attributed to the 'other.' Banerjee writes:

Self-other oppositions help subjects divide the social world into discrete agents. In national identities, these semantic formations acknowledge and partition transnational communities; characterize, domesticate, yet alienate foreigners; and resist the infiltration of subversive identities. National identities formed in oppositions of this kind have a chance to reproduce themselves and thus to support national states in international and transnational society.¹⁷

Pahlavi's idea projected the nation's destiny as civilization recovery in cooperation with the West to produce new professional classes who become autonomous of the West. In this case, identity was imbedded in the nation's ancient Persian civilization, which subsequently integrated with the principles of Islamic Shi'a practices almost uniting the two identity communities. Thus, the national identity of the nation during Pahlavi era can be reconstructed as a story with a certain plot structure. The plots are invoked to understand circumstances and analyze the actions taken.

To demonstrate the above discussion, we have to illustrate it through the nation's story tracing the nation's heritage—its cultural and ethnic origins—as it identifies the nation's strength and weakness. Within this trajectory, those who acknowledge and accept the heritage and help the nation to its destiny are 'friends' and those who don't are 'rivals.' Banerjee writes:

There is an achievable destiny for the nation which constitutes redemption of its heritage. Others who acknowledge its heritage and aid the nation's progress to its destiny are friends, and those who deny its heritage and obstruct it are rivals. Progress toward the destiny is not assured, the nation faces a distinct danger if it fails to take right action and degenerates along lines of weakness that figure in its heritage.¹⁸

We can see changes in heritage construction while referring to the past events. For instance, Reza Shah's heritage was Aryan, extending back to his ethnic origin. His son, Mohammad Reza Shah's heritage on the other hand, was a Persianist reaching beyond the Islamic era. In terms of the national identity plot, the relationship between heritage and destiny follow opposing tracks; heritage points to the past and destiny to the future while both move toward achieving national honor.¹⁹ Banerjee writes:

As the heritage captures the past of the nation, its destiny is the favored future track in the national identity plot. Destiny is a future that is on the fulcrum between the achievable and the inevitable, and is redemption of the nation's honor as well as a payment of what is owed to the nation. A destiny is not cast as inevitable; it is held as an achievement of the nation's agency. But that agency is the result of the nation's heritage and of contemporary repositories of excellence within it, and these combined bring the destiny to the verge of inevitability.²⁰

Reza Shah Pahlavi's Identity: Practices and Social Reforms

The new era in Iran's modern history began with Reza Shah, the first king of the Pahlavi dynasty, when he assumed power. As a commander of the army, Reza Shah, known as Reza Khan, became a Prime Minister and soon seized power over Iran. He was a nationalist who aimed to develop Iran's political and social infrastructure. Some scholars titled him as 'Iran's Napoleon' and some compared him to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who had achieved a vast referendum in Turkey. To reform Turkey, Atatürk put an end to the fundamental Islamic practices of the country and separated the Church from the State. He changed the traditional dress, replaced the Arabic script with Latin, established European political institutions, and replaced Islamic laws with European laws in Turkey. Reza Shah admired Atatürk and was inspired by some aspects of his reforms in Turkey. Although the two leaders share some similarities in their views on nationalism and religion, they also differed significantly. Unlike Atatürk, Reza Shah did not disconnect himself from his past; rather, he intentionally associated himself with his ancient heritage, the pre-Islamic Iran.²¹ Reza Shah has been heavily criticized for his adoption of a Western dress code and his ban of some traditional (Islamic) attire, but the Shah's motive, as he articulated to the people, was to unify the nation. He believed a revolution from within could only lead to chaos, and thus embarked on developing the country, which could only be achieved through a united nation. To accomplish this, he sought to abolish tribal titles, and made Farsi the national

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language of Iran.²²

When Reza Khan assumed power, Iran was under an absolute Shi'a Islamic identity. By and large, the clergies held high power within the state and society and Shari'a laws defined the identity of the nation. Although Reza Shah was Muslim and respected religious practices, he aimed to do away with Islamist influences through his reforms. He viewed the political practices of state and religion ought to be separate because he found religious practices disruptive to the nation's destiny and progress. He believed Iran's backwardness and ruin for over thirteen centuries was due to the rule of Islamic ideology and that religion and the state could not correspond with one another. He claimed:

Reform and the acceptance of the civilization of the world today mean the abandonment of the principles of the faith and of the religious law, or that there is any conflict between reform and modernization on the one hand and religion and faith on the other...those noble and lucid ideas have with the passing of time been miscued by cretin people, and in consequence our country has fallen into decline. For thirteen centuries, in each of which the country ought to have taken a great leap forward, it has remained motionless and backward. We are now faced with the consequences of this neglect, and must make amend for the torpor of the past.²³

Reza Shah placed constant emphasis on educating the young, as he believed the future and the development of the country rested on them. He directed the nation's attention to its ethnic origin by prizing ancient ideals through cultural practices and architecture buildings representative of Persian culture throughout the country. Lenczowski writes:

[T]o keep a constant reminder before the popular eye, many of the new buildings with which Tehran and other cities were enriched were designed or decorated in the style of these ancient times; the Police Headquarters and the National Bank reflected the architecture of Persepolis...²⁴

Other measures taken by Reza Shah to further distance national practices from the Islamic identity were: changing the names of cities and months from Arabic to Persian. For example, the city of Mohammara changed to Khorramshahr, Soltanabac to Arak, Aliabad to Shahi and the 't' in 'Tehran' from Arabic to Persian. He ended the mourning processions and annual Islamic practices in the month of Moharram,²⁵ as well as the practice of sacrificing sheep. The Shah opened the doors of some mosques to foreign tourists, which is against the systematic beliefs of Shi'a ideology. He changed the court systems from Islamic to a

Western model and replaced the Koranic madreseh and maktabes (traditional religious schools) with modern schools. The Shah held the Islamic group and their practices responsible for the stagnation of the country, for the poor education system, and the seclusion of women from public and social activities. These reforms set in motion by the Shah infuriated the Islamists.

To further establish his identity, in 1932, he changed the name of the country from 'Pars'²⁶ to Iran, claiming Persians are Aryans, and their land is Iran, thus, decreeing 'Iran' to be the nation's official name instead of Persia. He sought to improve the nation's infrastructure according to his own Persianist identity. Reza Shah constructed roads; built ports, established banks, build bridges, schools, universities and the Trans-Iranian Railway.²⁷ Nonetheless, the Islamists opposed many of his reforms for being Western and non-Islamic in nature. His son and successor wrote:


My father's reforms had reduced the clergy's authority in secular matters. Thus, from 1926 a certain section of the ecclesiastical hierarchy was openly opposed to the Shah's reforms and to Iran's metamorphosis into a modern nation. This opposition made itself felt again at the time of the 1952-1953 uprising, in 1963 and 1978-1979.²⁸

The Persianist identity made it clear what their distinction was. Based on his choice, the Shah, throughout his reign, maintained close relations with Germany. The discourses of that relationship relate to the analogous ethnic derivation—both origins being Aryan—the Shah identified with them intimately. He acquired most of his developmental plan's provisions from Germany as they helped him to build hospitals, bridges, and various institutions. This Aryan identification led to his removal. When the British demanded the Shah to expel the Germans from the country, the Shah refused.

Reza Shah's practices can be explained by both Banerjee's and Bourdieu's concept of national identity. Banerjee asserts identities are not fixed entities and are constantly evolving according to the practices of the actors. Bourdieu suggests culture is not a fixed entity and is constantly evolving—cultural reproduction. Cultural reproduction is a structured cultural habitué, or identities, which are constantly developing. Both Banerjee and Bourdieu view this evolution as entrenched in a grammar that generates new forms of expressions, which will alter the structure of the grammar itself.²⁹ Their analysis of the cultural language and grammar provides the theoretical basis for understanding Reza Shah's cultural reforms.

The narratives of Reza Shah are the plot structures in the national identity story. Reza Shah's acts of banning the street display of religious

practices that exhibited, promoted, and affirmed the Islamist identity. Renovating the Islamic school system, changing the names of the cities from Arabic to Persian and unveiling women are the narratives of his systematic revolutionary transformation from the Islamic identity to his Persianist identity. They were the trajectory of drawing upon the nation's ancient cultural and ethnic heritage to establish the Persianist identity. It was through these practices that Reza Shah constructed his cultural capital, for cultural capital is a product of a past trajectory reflecting the current position based on *habitués*. The *habitués* and cultural learning are especially important because they determine the disposition of taste.³⁰ It was through his reforms that Reza Shah continued to build on to his cultural capital. Bourdieu suggests the changes in the structure of statehood are related to the growth in income. An increase in income provides upward shifts in the structure of the nation, which, in turn, helps to increase the cultural capital of the nation—the national identity. But the practice as a dominant identity can also lead to conflict, as the *habitués* provide settings for strategic practices, and, in turn, changes in identity. For example, if one identity ignores the *habitué* or the status of the marginalized group's identity, then, indeed, reforms will give rise to oppositions. The marginalized group will then form a resistance towards the dominant identity creating a conflict in opposition to the goals and objectives of the dominant identity.³¹ The measures taken by the Shah thus infuriated the Islamists as he did not comply accordingly with the nation's Constitutional laws, which were based on the laws of Shari'a, and the Clergy's identity thus formed an oppositional group to protest against his actions.



Signed portrait of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi.

Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's *Aryamehr* Identity: Practices and Social Reforms

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Reza Shah's son assumed power when his father was abdicated. On the whole, both kings of the Pahlavi dynasty founded their practices based on their tastes separating them from the Islamist group. He adapted the title *Aryamehr*, due to its meaning of Arya (Aryans), and Mehr (the sun, Mitra, love, affection). The choice of this specific title demonstrates the Shah's connection to his own perceived and articulated ancient heritage.

To add to his cultural capital, the Shah implemented a vast reform program called 'The White Revolution' in the early 1960s. He saw the urgency in mobilizing the country's developmental plan to prevent the nation from falling into pieces. Some essentials of the program were: land reform, women's suffrage, secular education, the elimination of illiteracy, the nationalization of forests, and health care reform within the nation. Mohsen Milani claims that although the reform was to address the nation's social needs, in reality they were established to reduce the power of the landowner, who mainly was the Clergy. With the reforms, Iran absorbed a great deal of Western influence both in political and on social levels. These measures established further social and political distance from the Shari'a laws decreasing the Islamists' power and identity in the society. Islamists considered the Shah's reforms as a violation of the Constitution.³² In defining the 'White Revolution' the Shah writes:

When I began my White Revolution, a shock program which would allow Iran to overcome in 25 years its centuries of suppression, I understood that its realization would not be possible except through

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a mobilization of all forces within the country. A permanent state of urgency was necessary if we were to prevent hostile elements from becoming stumbling a block—elements such as reactionaries, large land-owners, communists, conservatives, and international agitators. To mobilize a country, one must win it over, push it, pull it and while it is engaged in work, defend it against those who want to prevent it from working.³³

The women's suffrage amendment was an essential step in Iran. The Shah believed that the country should not deprive half of the nation from engaging in healthy activities: public affairs, ministries, education, courts, deputies, the senates, and many others. Women in ancient Iran did not have an inferior position within society he writes:

We, who are the heirs of a culture and a civilization which had never considered women as inferior being, believe that in this area we are acting in accordance with the true spirit of our religion and our country's past.... Iran's great religious work of ancient times, the *Din Kard*, specifies that women have the right to manage their fortunes,...to become a judge or arbitrator...³⁴

The Shah's women's suffrage reform naturally added to the cultural capital of the Persianists. Bourdieu's theory of social and cultural reproduction suggests capital is subject to change from real capital to cultural capital, and then from cultural capital to social capital, and so forth. Cultural capital eventually can be invested in social capital, which is formed by integrating within a network of social connections. Also, social capital is invested for particular purposes.³⁵ For instance, women's suffrage provided a strong support to the Persianists' identity and therefore to the monarch. To preserve and to promote the Persianist identity, the Pahlavis used heritage and the promotion of ancient identity as their cultural capital.

According to Bourdieu, people make choices for the sake of different strategies, which are based on the distinctions of taste and class condition. He writes: "those whom we find to our taste put into their practices a taste which does not differ from the taste we put into operation in perceiving their practices,"³⁶ As Bourdieu argues, choices are symbolic representations of tastes. These choices are made based on the foundation of taste to define class—a symbolic struggle to gain objective social space for interactions and establishing the social position. The symbolic struggles in the form of practices are an indication of the intention to differentiate themselves through their legitimate cultural goods.³⁷ He writes:

'adapted' to a particular class of conditions of existence characterized by a particular degree of distance from necessity, class 'moral-

ities' and aesthetic' are necessarily situated with respect to one another...and that all the 'choices' they produce are automatically associated with a distinct position.³⁸

For the Pahlavis, the White Revolution provided a distinctive struggle to achieve their cultural heritage and destiny, which became their cultural goods.

Part of the White Revolution was to issue a land distribution, a decree that innovations in agricultural programs entailed distributing lands owned by the state and elites to the farmers and peasants. In 1963, the Shah implanted another phase of his reform. This reform imposed limitations on the landowner but provided liberty to farmers noting, "I am against the exploitation of man by man". Mossadegh, and his supporter in Tudeh party, and Islamists, however, strongly protested this reforms for not benefiting large landowners, and organized anti-government demonstrations on the streets of major cities. The Shah said that his reforms did not serve the landowners and the clergy's objectives:

At the inception of our land reforms that January, I had predicted that the forces of the clergy (the Black reaction) and the communists (the Red destruction) would attempt to sabotage this program: the former, because they wished the nation to remain submerged in abject poverty and injustice; the latter, because their aim was the complete disintegration of the country.³⁹

This was one of the major protests in the country and perhaps, was the most evident and conspicuous alliance of the clergy and the communist Tudeh group.

During Mohammad Reza Shah's reign, a stronger vision of Persian national identity emerged as he endorsed the idea of returning to the 'Great Persian Civilization.' Persian identity laid the foundation for historic unity, power, freedom, progress, and the continuity of Persian Civilization from ancient times. To globalize the new identity of the nation, in 1971 the Shah held a festival in Takht-e Jamshid (Persepolis) to commemorate 2,500th anniversary of the Persian Empire founded by Koroush-e Kabier (Cyrus the Great), 2,510 years after the Persian conquest of Babylon in 539 B.C. Kings, queens, prime ministers, diplomats, foreign ministers, and ambassadors from all of the world were invited to join his celebration to commemorate the ancient king of Iran. An extensive and elaborate economic and social preparation was implemented to the glory of the festivity. The celebrations began with a ceremony at the tomb of Kouroush at Pasargad in Shiraz. The Shah delivered a tribute to "his illustrious predecessor and vowed that Iranians today would continue to prove worthy heirs of their glorious past."⁴⁰ In his tribute to Koroush, the Shah stated:

O Koroush, great King, King of Kings, Hakhamaneshian King, King of the land of Iran. I, the Shahanshah of Iran, offer thee salutations from myself and from my nation. Rest in peace; for we are awake, and we will always stay awake.⁴¹

The Shah delivered another message that praised the great kings and noble Iranian people. His rhetoric clearly was addressed to the world and his opponent:

On this historic day when the whole country renews its allegiance to its glorious past, I, Shahanshah of Iran, call history to witness...⁴²

After honoring Koroush at his tomb, the celebration was carried out at Takht-e Jamshid Palace with the exhibition of both modern and ancient images of Iran, a symbolic representation of 'Perso-Westernization.' One group of marchers represented Iran's modern military with Western-style uniforms, slightly modified, and another with the military and social dress code—a replica of those in Hakhamaneshian era with a leading group carrying traditional trumpets. Each was a symbolic representation of the ancient Persian era.

In response to the celebration, although exiled, Khomeini from Najaf in Iraq condemned the Shah's practices and the commemoration celebration, calling it the 'Devil's Festival.' He warned the Shah by stating: "I say these things because, an even darker future, God forbid, lies ahead of you."⁴³ The Shah's national identity plot, throughout his reign, was to achieve the nation's heritage and principled destiny. The association with the West was a means to accomplish his task of reinstituting the Persian identity as stated:

The concept that all things belonging to the past were reactionary, anti-progressive and *dépassé* was widespread among Iran's bourgeois city dwellers. The attitude tended to denigrate Iranian culture and caused our people to neglect the works of art bequeathed by the past.⁴⁴

In association to the ancient heritage, the Shah titled a group of his senior officers after an ancient title of King Koroush called Sepah-e Javidan (Immortal Guards). He also created a division that was named after King Koroush's division called 'the eyes and ears of the king.' The name 'Pahlavi' itself is also a representation of ancient Persian as it is related to Iran's ancient language and writing script. The Shah himself writes:

The name Pahlavi has deep roots in our country's history: it is the name of the official language and writings of the emperors during the Sassanid era. It is the patronym which he left me and which I

bequeath to my children.⁴⁵

Parson writes:

In the Shah's mind, Iran was part of Western civilization, separated by an accident of geography from its natural partners and equals. The Iranians in his view were Aryans, not Semitic, and their innate talents and abilities had been suffocated by the blanket of the Arabs' invasion 1,200 years previously and its spiritual concomitant, Islam. He saw it as his mission to lift this blanket and to restore Iran to its former grandeur among the Great Powers. Hence the Great Civilization was not simply a question of raising the material standard of living of the Iranian people, although this was its most obvious manifestation.⁴⁶

The Shah's actions of employing the historical heritage exemplifies the concept of the nation's destiny defining the Persianists' identity. Persians have always regarded their heritage as the world's first great Empire and Civilization. The emphasis on the Persianist identity symbolized their autonomy from Arabs and the Islamists, suggestive of the reestablishment of a Persianist national identity and their position in the world. For Reza Shah, the ancient designs on buildings, his association with Aryans, changing Islamic attire and other non-Islamic reforms were his trajectory to ethnic recovery. His taste was a symbolic representation of his identity, which was signified by reestablishing the nation's national identity. These narratives and plot structures tell the Persianists' stories, and in part, correspond to specific situations. The structure of Reza Shah's story entails a 'heritage' that traces the nation's cultural and ethnic background.⁴⁷

In their critique, some scholars attribute the Pahlavis practices and Iran's Revolution to the 'Westernization' of the nation. It has to be noted, however, both Reza Shah and his successor Mohammad Reza Shah were highly selective in the adaptation of inclusive Western ideology. Their choices were made according to the Iranian cultural milieu, ensuring the preservation of Iranian culture and tradition. Their overture was merely due to the improvement and progress of the nation, thus it would be fair to suggest that the appropriate term to be used is 'Perso-Westernization.' Lenczowski writes that he was "very conscious of Iran's capacity for absorbing and converting to her use, without losing her own identity, the external and alien cultures with which she came into contact".⁴⁸

Oppositional Identity

The diverse Iranian identity was not defined in the monarchical rhetoric,

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but through the oppositional action taken by the Islamists. Oppositional practices intend to de-legitimize discourses belonging to the nation's true heritage. The Shah saw the red-black alliance as dragging Iran from its return to destiny—the Great Civilization. Fear of opposition for the Shah are recapitulated in 'Black—the clergy,' and the 'Red—the communist,' predominantly through their alliances. The Shah writes:

The BLACK AND RED alliance that would prove so destructive goes back far in time and is deeply rooted in Iran's consciousness. The black—the clergy—had opposed my father, and supported my rule only sporadically. Religious fanatics who did not understand the true nature of Islam had allied with the Tudeh back in the 1940s ...Mossadegh's government demonstrated how such a red-black alliances could thrive without a clear understanding by the noncommunist members of its consequences.⁴⁹

In terms of how the Shah felt about the Islamists and communists, Parson the British ambassador in Tehran writes in 1973:

He disliked the religious classes – 'black reaction' – as much as he disliked the communists – 'red revolution' – or even more. Nevertheless he had not declared open war on them.⁵⁰

Parson writes that the Shah held a Zoroastrian congress in the middle of Ramadan concluding it with a champagne reception. That "kind of thing was liable to have a greater impact on the deeply religious Muslim masses and their dissident religious leaders."⁵¹ It is believed that he pursued these kind of actions to encourage Iranians away from their Islamic ideologies.

Islamic practices and its divinity co-existed within the nation's cultural symbols but the Shah's practices were not embedded merely in the state practices. This ideal was the core objective of the Shah's

rhetoric, which provided the foundations to diverge Iranian heritage construction. The ideal, however, created a problem as the Islamists' group perceived themselves being presented as the opposite and alleged it as an insult to their identity, thus provoking anger and taking actions against the Shah.

As Banerjee stated earlier, once groups perceive themselves as the 'other' or as marginalized group due to their identity, they become angry and hostile. Hence, the group members get angry when they see themselves as the opposite of how they characterize their own identity. It is evident that this anger is apparent in Khomeini's rhetoric and dispositions. Khomeini sees the Shah selling out the nation to the US, and keeping Iran from its Islamic destiny. In speech number thirty-eight given from Neauphlee-Chateau, Paris, France he stated:

When one looks at the culture of Iran, one sees that it is an imperialist culture, that is, a culture imposed on us by the imperialists. The Shah chose an apt title for his book Mission For My Country, for he indeed had a "mission", a mission that the Americans had given him! He had a mission to destroy the country and ruin the Iranian youth, to keep the country in a state of


backwardness so it could not progress, so the youth could not develop into people who would stand up to America and ask them: "What do you want from us?"⁵²

In legitimizing his identity and the Islamic position, Khomeini noted:

The Iranian people have risen today to revive Islam and Islamic laws. Their uprising is unique in the history of Islam and Iran, for it is so deep-rooted and fundamental...⁵³

The speech here is to support the uprising and further appeal to his audience. Khomeini's self-other opposition is 'deep-rooted' and fundamental Islam. In support of its heritage narrative and in framing

Figure 4: Illustrating Oppositional Identity leading to Destiny or Danger



opposition, Khomeini further claimed:

Our call is that we want a government which is sympathetic towards the nation, we want a regime which is just. However, if we examine the nature of all regimes we see that, apart from that time when the government was a truly Islamic one, none of them has been just; they have all served their own interests....Our country is amongst those which are ruled by extremists who want to destroy their homelands very fast and aggressively!⁵⁴

The discourses promote the nature of Islamic regime and its intention in saving the nation from a destructive government. The Islamists, therefore, were vulnerable as they had lost their power. Thus, they form oppositions acting as laggards—a danger to the identity and an obstruction to the Persianist destiny. For the Shah, the communists and the clergy were the two strong opponents posing a danger to the national identity.

Islamic cultural capital reproduction was gained through the practice of Shi'a ideology and the laws of Shari'a, which provided them with power and status in the nation. To preserve and to promote their identity, Islamists conveyed their cultural capital converting it to social capital through networks of Mosques, Tekyh's (temporary religious gathering centers), and Tazyah's (common religious ceremonial gatherings where they talk about the Imams and their acts of sacrifice in the ideology), which provided them the social contacts through the religious leaders, speeches, mullahs, and practices. These practices maintained and promoted the ideology. Khomeini used these institutions effectively in communicating his ideologies and in building stronger unity.

In 1978, it was through these institutions where Khomeini called for the unification of all other oppositions to become united in forming a mass protest against the Shah, as in his speech forty-eight he stated:

Do not listen to what they have to say. Unite and cry out with one voice. Join the Muslims in their cries. If you were to cry out in unison, then it would be all over for him (the Shah). Do not sow discord. A house divided against itself cannot stand. Today, the presence of differences means suicide for the Muslims. Everyone must unite. Everyone must cry out in unison. Everyone must cry out for the same thing, they must all cry: "Death to this Shah and to this monarchy; death to those who support him, such as Carter and others like him." This is what we are crying out and this is what will make the people succeed. Do not be afraid of these things that they say and all this commotion that they make. Can a nation which has risen up to make a legitimate claim carry on living under oppression?⁵⁵

And as the mass protesters were forming, Khomeini added:

This cause for which our nation is now fighting demands that this monarchy be destroyed, that this form of rule be done away with, for it is corrupt. The terms 'monarchical regime' and 'imperial regime' are meaningless terms, they are intrinsically corrupt. This nation says that this regime must go.⁵⁶

Khomeini succeeded in building this coalition. Some of the clergy, however, criticized Khomeini's actions in support of the nation. This angered Khomeini and his supporters. In response, he strongly critiqued those who did not join his opposition philosophy as in his speech forty-nine he argued:

Of course there are those who wear turbans on their heads and have joined the service of the court, but they number only three or four and the people know who they are. They are not true members of the ulama, they are people whom SAVAK has issued with a turban and describe as mullahs! When have the ulama ever been affiliated to the court?! This idea has been created by imperialist propaganda to distance you from the ulama, for when the power of the ulama has been separated from the power of the people, then the ulama can do nothing. This is all part of the imperialists' plans to distance the youth, through different forms of propaganda, from Islam and the ulama of Islam, for once this has been achieved they will be able to do whatever they want (in the country).⁵⁷

Eventually, although Khomeini had allied with all oppositional groups staging demonstration against the Shah, once certain of his victory, Khomeini became highly critical of them and of the Persianists labeling them capitalist. The unification of the oppositions set the stage for transforming the nation's identity. Once succeeded, Khomeini saw the promotion of Islam as the only viable identity. In speech thirty-eight he claims:

When our youth hear of these spurious ideologies they don't stop to consider, they don't pay enough attention to what those promoting them are saying and why they speak so highly of such an ideology as communism. They don't look to see what the aim behind this action is. The aim is to present the Muslims and Islam in such a way as to cause our youth to turn away from Islam. Islam is portrayed as being a means to allow the aristocrats and the noblemen to gain dominance over the people and to prevent them from objecting....Islam has declared war on these capitalists, on these shahs, these monarchs, it does not help them to plunder the people. The ulama of Islam, the Prophet of Islam, the Imams of Islam, all of them opposed the kings of their day.⁵⁸

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Islamist identity: Practices and social reforms

In framing the self-other opposition, Khomeini's rhetoric supports the premises of the Islamists and their respective religious communities. The monarchy, therefore, is synonymous with oppression, brutality and dictatorship. After gaining power in 1921, Reza Shah negated the laws of the constitutional government, moving the nation away from the laws of Shari'a, which, in turn, hindered the Islamist power and prestige. His action consequently lessened the Islamic identity. The article on the history of Islamic government stated:

The antagonism of the Islamic Iranian was due to the decrease in the power of Shi'a in the country's political and social laws and regulations. For example, as the Shah sought for prosperity of the country through industrialization and modernization, he ignored the traditional influence exerted by the Islamic clergy, who eventually rose in protest to his actions. The Shah's intolerance of opposition produced increasing political tension in the country, which was the ultimate cause of his downfall.⁵⁹

For the Islamist the Pahlavi dynasty was illegal because its practices were not based on the laws of Shari'a. In his first speech after gaining power, Khomeini stated:

This government represents a regime, whose leader and his father were illegally in power. This government is therefore illegal. The deputies appointed to work in the Majlis are there illegally. The Majlis itself and the Senate are illegal. How can anyone appointed by the Shah be legal? We are telling all of them that they are illegal and they should go. We hereby announce that this government, which has presented itself as a legal government is in fact illegal. Even the members of this government before accepting to be ministers, were considering the whole establishment to be illegal.⁶⁰

Khomeini was outraged by the way in which the Pahlavis defined Islam and how the Islamists have been treated by the Pahlavis. He stated:

An Islamic government is like that which was in effect at the time of the Prophet and Imam Ali, its leaders act as they did and in the eyes of the law they are on a par with the lowliest in the land...they belittle the Islamic ulama in their eyes. At the time of Riza Shah, the Islamic ulama were disparaged to such a great extent that when a clergyman wished to ride in a taxi, the wretch of a driver would not allow him into his car ...this is what it was like at the time of Riza Shah.⁶¹



A portrait of Ayatollah Khomeini is nestled among pasdaran bullets during the revolt against the Shah in 1978. (photo by Abbas/Magnum)

The definition of government for Khomeini is narrated only in Islamic ideology and it goes beyond the nation of Iran as he describes:

Not one of these existing forms of government, be it republican, monarchical, constitutional or dictatorial, can be said to be a form of government which is just, a government which really improves people's lives, which truly governs for the sake of the people and not for the superpowers or for themselves. No indeed, no such government presently exists... the government sought by us is an Islamic government. If ...an Islamic government in these countries or in our own country of Iran, then everyone would see just what form a government should in fact take...qualifications which have carefully been specified in Islam. Should a ruler not fulfill these requirements then he will inevitably fall from power.⁶²

The speech is an appeal to Iranians to trust Islamic government and its Islamic administration for the country. What emerges from Khomeini's speeches is the construction of a super-national category, that is, if Islamists lead Iran, everyone would receive justice promised in Islam. He specifies that any other ruling elite but an Islamic one will inevitably fall from power. In this case, the self-other oppositions control both the self and the other. Khomeini's rhetoric constructed a super-national category of Islam which, characterized through religious control of social relations, attempted to undermine the monarchical regime. The Shah adhered to his Aryan ethnicity and strove to revive Iran's ancient tradition, hence he found the Shi'a ideology to be an impediment in reaching his goal. Reza Shah therefore, changed the clergy's dispositions and identity in Iran both politically and socially.

We can define Khomeini's Islamic identity narrative from his perception of the Shah. In terms of how Khomeini perceived the Shah, Mottahedeh writes:

He associated the raid with Reza Shah's attack on the shrine in Mashhad in 1935. He did not blame the shah's agents or his minister; ...He said that the shah himself should be held responsible ...the speech went on to explain that the actions of the regime were the result of its friendship with Jews and non-Moslem Iranians.⁶³

Khomeini perceived Iran's historical monarchy as evil and oppressive and as an enemy of the Islamists identity whose aim was to destroy Islam. He states:

O Lord! I told them—I told the gentlemen (of the clergy) all I know...It concerns a nation which throughout history has suffered under the rule of kings. Throughout a two-thousand-five-hundred-year history it has been under the rule of kings, kings who have brought it nothing but suffering and misery. Even those supposedly just rulers were also evil...Yes, throughout history this nation has lived under the rule and oppression of these evil kings.⁶⁴

Khomeini was aware of the Shah's destiny of reviving the ancient identity, which is why he brought antagonism to the Shah's practices. Khomeini knew that the promotion and establishment of the Persianist identity would ultimately obliterate the Islamist identity. He stated:

"Pan Iranianism" is the belief that Iran must preserve its Iranian identity! But do the ancient kings mean everything to you? Are the ancient kings all that you can claim to have had in the past? Just look at what these kings did to the people...just look at how they treated the people of Iran ⁶⁵

The commemoration of the ancient heritage of Iran by the Shah infuriated Khomeini as the action was an insult to the Islamist identity. He attacks the ancient ideology by stating:

...and the flames of dualism, polytheism and fire-worship were extinguished because the Prophet came into the world . . . the foundations of both of the powerful forces which prevailed at that time were destroyed because of him. The following two basic principles then became widespread: via the Holy Prophet, monotheism grew world-wide, and, God willing, still continues to grow; and the essential purpose of prophethood was actually realized, for the real purpose of prophethood is a prophet's mission to wipe out the roots of power held by those in authority who treat the people unfairly.⁶⁶

Khomeini further adds:

Basically, they had intended to return things to the way they were before the Holy Prophet of Islam, to the time of those tyrannical kings, those vicious murderers; and they had intentions of behaving as the latter had done and of bringing about the same state of affairs that had existed at the time of these kings.⁶⁷

The Shah was very close to achieving his destiny. Recognizing it, Khomeini concludes that the Shah, just like Israel (Jews were considered by Khomeini to be enemies of Islam), is the enemy of Islam and the Islamists, therefore the Shah must be eliminated. Khomeini states:

We come to the conclusion that this regime also has a more basic aim: they are fundamentally opposed to Islam itself and to the existence of the religious class. They do not wish this institution to exist; they do not wish any of us to exit, the great and the small alike. Israel does not wish the mullahs to exist in this country. ...It was Israel that assaulted the Faiziyeh madreseh by means of its sinister agents. It is still assaulting us, and assaulting you, the nation; it wishes to seize your economy...the religious scholars are blocking [Israel's] path; they must be eliminated...⁶⁸

And in his speech thirty-eight, Khomeini addresses the nation to revive Iran's Islamic identity:

The Iranian people have risen today to revive Islam and Islamic laws. Their uprising is unique in the history of Islam and Iran, for it is so deep-rooted and fundamental. The dimensions of this uprising embrace all classes of society; it is not an uprising which belongs exclusively to one particular class.⁶⁹

The Islamists perceived the Shah's practices and reforms as destructive practices imposed on the nation. They believed the Shah sought to destroy the country through his secular practices and his alliances with the West. Khomeini's rhetoric clearly defines these outlooks, stating:

Wherever you look, you see that there is something wrong. The economy is in ruins. According to experts, agricultural production in Iran now is only sufficient to meet the needs of the nation for thirty-three days of the year, ...The result of the gentleman's "Land Reform Program" was to turn Iran into a consumer market for America, so that the Americans could sell us all the things that they usually throw away! They are taking our oil now in such a way that in thirty years' time, according to the Shah, reserves will have...⁷⁰

This statement highlights the calls for unity of oppositional groups, even if they are not homogenous in their ideologies, but the ideal, at this point, is the unity of all opposition groups. Khomeini constructed this commonality of 'anti Shah' and 'anti-West' in contraction to 'West' and 'Western Values.' And he acknowledges the supporting groups of this narrative by stating:

If the merchants of the bazaar made demands, other groups were indifferent. Today however, by the will of God the Blessed and Exalted, all groups have come together: political groups, the clergy, the merchants of the bazaar, school-children and students of the high-schools and universities, all have risen and have set off in one direction. They have one aim. This is an unprecedented event in history. They all ask for one thing, they all shout for freedom and independence and call for the abolition of this wicked dynasty, which from its inception has done nothing but harm to Islam and Iran.⁷¹

The speech number thirty-seven represents Khomeini's 'Self' trying to look humble, a leader who cares for the nation's destiny, he states:

I look upon those human faces, words fail me and a great sense of humility overwhelms me. I feel that I have not performed any service for the Iranian nation which is now sacrificing everything it has in the way of Islam, or for those fathers who have lost their children. I have not been able to pay my debt to those people who have risen for God and I can only ask forgiveness for my shortcomings from God the Exalted⁷²

The above quotes demonstrates the clergy's (self-other) positive nature contributed to their success and their negative nature contributed to monarchy. The outcome of self-self oppositions that points to the strength and weakness of the nation was a loss of historical monarchical power and the establishment of Islam within the nation.

The hostile elements at large are the Islamist and Communist groups that the Shah felt the urgency to block. These are the laggards leading to danger that the Shah perceived them as an obstacle to his Persians heritage. The Shah sees the path to Great Civilization as a national spirit. He states:

Indeed, the road to this Great Civilization was not an easy one...I believe each nation has the right, the duty to faithful to its ancestral, universalist tradition. This tradition in fact always combined certain values and a certain purely national Iranian spirit with the best available in other civilizations.⁷³

Contradictory Life Style

Contradictions in life style during the Pahlavi era are apparent through both social and political icons such as: modern factories, markets, buildings, and colorful clothes for men and women, women's freedom; modern shopping and centers markets, along with all forms of art both commercial and leisure. Industries of leisure permitted were: theater, acting, music, dance, singing, cinema, bars and clubs. The Pahlavi era also promoted a variety of sports both for men and women, and he commissioned magnificent stadiums for the 1974 Olympic Games in Tehran. Persianists lived in the modern neighborhoods of town in new buildings. Persianists embraced the Shah's reforms, which led to the temporary domination of the Persianist identity.

The Islamists and the traditional bazaar merchants (Bazaaries) on the other hand, opposed the new identity, modernization and the life style it entailed. They favored women in the 'chador' (Hijab) who were not socially active. Men wore simpler dark colors. The Islamic clergy preferred to wear turbans and the 'Gaba,' (an over garment for religious men). Islamists lived in the older bazaar neighborhoods, avoided modern parts of the cities, went to religious schools, shopped at bazaar, and avoided all art-related activities. The introduction of the new Persianist identity led to the downfall of the traditional market and therefore to their financial infrastructure. All in all, modernization led to the demise of the Islamists' social power and prestige, marginalizing their identity within the nation.

Women's Identity

One of the distinct differences between the two of identities was the Persianists' connection to women's suffrage and ancient Persia, which espoused women's progress and equality. This was contrary to Islamist ideologies. The Islamists had placed women in the same category as the powerless, incapable, and the insane. The Shari'a laws read:

The following are barred from voting: women; those who are not legally able and are under guardianship; the bankrupt; the insane; beggars, and those who earn their living by dishonorable means; criminals; thieves and other wrong-doers who have violated Islamic laws.⁷⁴

Both Pahlavis however, believed that women should be able to enjoy the same rights as men. The Shah reformed previous laws and made universal women's suffrage possible in Iran. Women's suffrage was one of the Shah's main reform principles. He writes:

This is the mentality of the so-called revolutionaries who usurped power in Iran. But we who wanted to place the nation on the path to progress could not relegate our mothers, sisters, wives and daughter to the same category as the insane and the criminal.⁷⁵

The Pahlavis offered women's suffrage, and opened schools, higher education, and professions to encourage women. Under the new regime, Iranian women are to be covered from head to toe and have lost most of their social and political freedom they once had. But Iranian women resisted the enforcement and have been fighting for their rights for the past two decades. They succeeded maintaining some aspects of their social activities within the context of Islamic laws. The Islamic government was not able to impose the entire Islamic restriction since many Iranian women were socially and politically active once the new identity was established.

Bazaaries (Merchants of the Bazaar)

Of all the oppositional groups, the bazaaries historically have been the most significant, as they have always allied with the Islamists. Since the conquest of Arabs, the bazaar was the center of socio-economic activity in Iran, when they had formed close alliances with the Islamists. The ideology of Islam is also the practice of the bazaaries and their religious idiom. Hence, the bazaaries and the clergy utilized a theo-centric mode of production in Iran.⁷⁶

Despite the numerous challenges to the Shah's shifting economic and political condition, the bazaar, an ancient economic institution, survived during the Pahlavi dynasty. During the revolution of 1977-79, the bazaar acted as a crucial component of the social movement as they not only maintained their close alliances with the Islamists, but also provided both economic and mobilizing resources. Benjamin Smith writes:

"The bazaar's close cooperation during the revolution with the ulama (Shi'a Islamic leadership) engendered scholarly claims of an historical 'bazaar and mosque' alliance."⁷⁷

There is a religious-cultural and institutional tie between the two groups. The historical writings trace the bazaar-mosque relationship back to the 1800's. According to Keddie, the 'traditionalist' bazaar's attribution of financial and cultural ties with the Ulama alliance traces back to the revolutionary activity in Iran since 1891.⁷⁸

Traditionally, the bazaar was the nation's economic center. They held a strong sense of community in the economic, ideological, and cultural identity of Iran. The fracture in the bazaar's status occurred during the

Pahlavi dynasty through implementation of new political ideology and reforms such as: introducing modern economic institutions altering the bazaar: shopping centers, import and export centers, foreign banks, trade centers, as well as centralization of the nation's economy, which all led to the decline of power and status of the bazaar. Thus, they challenged the regime, exclusively based on religious ideology and economic concerns. The Shah's developmental projects in Iran and the gradual integration of the Western economic system weakened the bazaar's economic viability, commercial interests, and social reputation. It no longer was the center of the nation's socioeconomic status since the government became the center of authority and held control of the socioeconomic power, marginalizing the bazaar's status and reputation.

The political set-backs began in 1975 due to inflation and a drop in oil revenues. The Shah created the political party named Rastakhiz (Resurgence) to extend control of the economic situation and price inflation. One of the tasks for the members of Rastakhiz party was to oversee nationwide price controls, as the bazaar, due to inflation, had increased the price of goods throughout the country dramatically. Strong resentment and tension was building as a result of the crackdowns on the bazaar and the shopkeepers. The crisis sparked, forming further underground activities in concert with Islamists, who planted the seeds of future alliances with other opposition groups.

The bazaaries' identity corresponds with the Islamists' agenda and all the evidence suggests they provided ideological and financial support for Khomeini during and after the revolution. As it has been discussed earlier in this essay, one of the crucial aspects leading to the movement was the importance of networking. While the Islamists successfully utilized the well-established formal organizational structures of Iran's religious centers, the bazaaries provided the informal resources to the success of the movement. During the protests, the bazaaries joined with the Islamists, and together, they allied with the National Front and the communist Tudeh party, forming a mass movement.⁷⁹

Conclusion

As the historical analysis indicated, the conflict between the two identities is summed in Wendt's notion of the Self—Persianists, and the Other—the Islamists. According to him, the Other helped to identify the Self where the Self was distinguished from the Other.⁸⁰ Likewise, Banerjee argued, the oppositional identity emerged not during the Islamists' era, but during the Pahlavi era. Analysis of the narratives and the events concerning the two opposing identities illustrates there are two forms of meaning describing the national identity. The first is the narrative framework, describing how leaders think and act within the framework of stories containing certain kinds of plots, each providing

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categories and logic for their own verification. Second, the story tells us that national identity is defined through oppositions in the national discourse. The method demonstrated the theoretical measures for identity and examined first; how the Persianist identity gained credibility and generated its own course towards the state's destiny during the Pahlavi regime and second; the rise of the opposing Islamist identity on its own course towards achieving dominance in Iran. I also defined 'heritage,' the tracing of a nation's cultural and ethnic background, which prevails as the nation's foundation and manifests its dispositions. I demonstrated the models of national identities entail vanguards. The Islamic Shi'a identity projected the Clergy, Bazaaries, and co-alliances with the Tudeh and the National Front Party as their vanguard, whereas the Persian identity projected the monarch, Persianists and the Army as their vanguard. The vanguards' proclamations are found in the identity rhetoric stated by the actors.

The broad environmental conditions that led to production and growth of the Shi'a identity and Islamist Iranians as the dominant discourse was characterized by: the unity of the Islamists and the bazaar, later joined by other opposition groups. The Islamic group successfully utilized the nation's religious sentiments, vocabulary, and familiar symbols to retransform the nation from a once secular state. The hostage crisis situation further contributed to the revolutionary mobilization to encourage the people against the state, which provided an effective channel of communication among the participants in the revolution. Thus, it further unified the groups protesting against the Shah and his foreign supporters.

The Persianists' ideology of a glorified pre-Islamic kingship—and their pursuit of modernization—defined the identity of their opposition, the Islamists. The suppression of competing oppositional ideologies, such as the National Front and the Tudeh party helped the growth of the Shi'a oppositional discourse as they joined forces in the movement and helped bring about the establishment of the Islamic regime. The spread of symbolic Islamic notions by Islamic Iranians occurred as Islamic groups employed the nation's adoption of their ideologies to while protesting the Shah's monarchy. ■

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A portrait of Ayatollah Khomeini

is held aloft in a crowd at Tehran

University in the early stage of

the revolt against the

Shah in 1978.

(photo by Abbas/Magnum)

Democratic Transition in Post-War Iraq

by Tim Haas



The current Executive Administration of the United States has repeatedly stated that the objective of the impending US operation in Iraq is to sow the seed of democracy. The expectation of this seed, as the Christian Science Monitor notes in its September 16, 2002 issue, is to create a ripple effect where democracy will take root in the region. Is this a realistic expectation? An examination of the current political culture in Iraq will provide some insight to the feasibility of democratic transition in postwar Iraq.

A U.S. marine doctor holds an Iraqi girl in central Iraq Saturday, March 29, 2003 after confused front line crossfire ripped apart an Iraqi family on Saturday. (photo by Damir Sagolj/Reuters)

To begin this discussion let us define what Iraq is not. Samuel P. Huntington defines democracy in terms of its procedures rather than its source or purpose, which he argues, would lead to ambiguity that impedes the analytical process. He maintains that the central procedure characterizing a democracy is its ability to select leaders through contested elections that involve the representation of the will of the people being governed.¹ With this definition it is possible to identify not only a point at which a regime ceases to be an authoritarian regime and becomes democratic but also the degree to which a regime is democratic. Furthermore, the extent that a democracy is able to consolidate—strengthen its democratic institutions—is largely dependant on the presence of a plethora of social, economic, and political institutions within the nation of the newly formed regime. These institutions define the political culture of a nation—the culture from which and within which the political actors of the nation operate. As Martin Lipset described in 1959, there are certain social factors which support the transition to democracy and, to a lesser degree, the maintenance of democracy.²

These social factors include the existence of a civil society that is distinct from the regime. Examples of this organization include groups that disseminate information about political candidates and proposed measures to be taken by legislative bodies. In addition, there needs to be a system of bound-

aries within which actors can move. Authors like Huntington refer to this as the political arena. There should be general agreement of these boundaries and some degree of respect of them. From both Huntington and Lipset we can conclude that democracy is a procedural phenomenon that requires certain social, political, and economic institutions to develop in a nation if it is to take root. With this in mind, there are four important factors that exist within the current structure of the Iraqi state that define the essential properties of the current regime. These factors are obstacles to democratic transition and will determine the extent to which further consolidation is possible. These factors are the dual state, communal politics, the role of security politics, and oil as a main source of revenue and are not dependant only on Saddam Hussein and thus his removal will not necessarily remove them.³ We can see that these factors, while they have been exacerbated by Hussein's regime, are a result of a more deeply rooted political culture—a culture that is not likely to be removed in a forcible dismantling of the current regime.

The question will become whether the forced regime change via US intervention will bring about fundamental change to these four structural features of the Iraqi political system. These fundamental changes, as we will see, are going to be resisted in two ways. The elite within Iraq—predominantly members of Sunni Ba'ath Party—will resist because an attack on the current regime will decrease their position. Neighboring states, anxious about the prospect of their own decrease of legitimacy, which would follow the transplanting of democracy into Iraq, will also be hesitant to allow for a complete overhaul of the Iraqi system.

The first factor that characterizes the Iraqi political culture is the “Shadow State,” which is a situation that is neither unique to Iraq nor to its current regime. There is a sharp contrast between the formal, public apparatus of the state and the very exclusive body of actors that control the flow of power in the political arena, known as the shadow state.⁴ The Majlis al-Watani, the Iraqi National Assembly, is comprised of 220 seats that are “popularly” elected and 30 that are appointed by the president. This body mostly represents the official legislative body of the state. It serves to provide the basis of legitimacy for decisions executed by the president and his private council.

The Revolutionary Command Council, on the other hand, is comprised of eight individuals appointed by the president, and it is within this body that the power of the state rests—including the election of the president and vice presidents. It is, however, within the so-called “shadow state” that the real political power within the country flows and justification of

Iraqi policy is derived. This is known as the *Ahl al thiqa*, or the “people of trust”, which are attached to the president through a network of power, prestige, and family obligations. The head of this network culminates with the predominantly Sunni Ba'ath party under the control of its president, Saddam Hussein. This network contains a loose unification of many groups including smaller Shia tribes, large Sunni clans, military elite of the Republican Guard and the Special Republican Guard, the Iraqi intelligence community, and a host of regional warlords and tribal elders. These groups are united under President Hussein because of their perception that this is in their best interest.⁵

A direct assault on the current regime may neutralize President Saddam and his immediate family, but not the Iraqi political culture from which President Hussein developed. In addition, the dual state organization would continue to exist because those not directly connected to the president would most likely attach themselves to whatever power arose in Iraq—and perhaps even with aid from whatever foreign power facilitates the restructuring.⁶

Secondly, the nature of communal politics, a system of communal reward and punishment, has been enforced by Iraq's long tradition as a personal military dictatorship. Dispensation of power in Iraq has been by a highly centralized government which conceives of power as discipline and a collective set of rewards and punishments which reinforce tribal, sectarian, and ethnic rivalries and views of politics.⁷ This conception of power leads to a highly fractured society in which ethnic, religious sect, and community identity politics become an obstacle to any form of mass representation. In turn, this causes a restriction of available space, based on affiliation with the network of trusted people, within the arena of Iraqi politics.

This restricted system of patronage and its inherent discrimination has reduced the scope of national Iraqi politics. Aside from the central

Mushin Hasan, deputy director of the Iraqi National Museum, holds his head in his hands as he sits on artifacts destroyed by looters Sunday, April 15, 2003 in Baghdad.
(photo by Mario Tama/Getty Images)



Middle East



Iraqi civilians are stopped at a checkpoint set up by U.S. Marines on a road southeast of Baghdad on Friday, April 4, 2003. Tensions have increased at such checkpoints after suicide attacks that have claimed the lives of coalition soldiers.

(Photo by Oleg Popov/Reuters)



Local Iraqis negotiate with British soldiers outside Basra on March 28, 2003 in an attempt to get their tomatoes through military checkpoints so they may be sold in the embattled southern Iraq city. (photo by Anja Niedringhaus/AP)



Capt. Kevin Jackson of the Engineer's Brigade, Army's 3rd Infantry Division, is seen guarding a convoy through the cracked windshield of the brigade's command vehicle on Thursday, April 3, 2003 somewhere south of Baghdad. The vehicle was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade earlier, but no one was injured. (photo by Kai Pfaffenbach/Reuters)

role performed by the president and his network of trusted people, there is little role, other than as a spectacle, for the National Assembly of Iraq. The first ruler of Iraq, King Faysal I, described the people of Iraq as “unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic ideal.”⁸ As we can clearly see, this lack of national unity—a requisite for any western democratic system, like the one that has been attempted in Afghanistan, would have a serious negative impact on democratic transition in postwar Iraq.

In addition, recognition of the traditional ethnic, sectarian, and tribal entities as effective social actors would perpetuate forms of power networking associated with the current regime, and in part blamed for the authoritarian government that has developed in Iraq.⁹ Iraqi politics as they are currently being practiced is authoritarian and communal—an environment that is antithetical to the establishment of a sustainable democratic regime. The solution to this quandary is a catch-22. Recognition of this system would alienate those among the opposition who truly want to see reform, but changing the current system would be met with harsh resistance by those in power. Either option would see the political system in a chaotic array during the formative years of democracy in Iraq.

The next situation to contend with in the postwar Iraqi environment is the problem of internal security. The toppling of the Regime of President Hussein will require the near decimation of Iraqi military units. Despite the Pentagon's optimistic projection—similar in scope to Kaiser Wilhelm's prediction that his troops would be home for Christmas—that the bulk of the Iraqi forces will give up during the first two weeks of saturation bombing, there is no evidence to suggest that US operations to gather defectors among the



U.S. Marine Lance Cpl. Marcco Ware of Los Angeles carries an Iraqi soldier who was shot three times during an attempted ambush of the 3rd Battalion, Fifth Regiment convoy on March 25, 2003 in central Iraq. One Marine was killed and one injured during the attack, which left about 40 Iraqi soldiers dead and 30 others in prison compounds. (Photo by John Makely/ The Baltimore Sun)

Republican Guard or the Special Republican Guard have been successful enough to count on such a lack of resistance.¹⁰ A more realistic vision would require that most of the elite forces be defeated and disbanded before occupation could begin. Undoubtedly, this period of time would be apt for those that have been disenfranchised during the reign of President Saddam—of which there is no lack—to carry out retributive actions against those they feel may have benefited unfairly. In addition, due to the lack of cohesion within the ranks of the regime's opposition and opportunism, security would be a problem that must be dealt with.¹¹

This leaves the occupation force three options. Security could be maintained for a short time by the occupation force, most likely composed of a combination of US military and its allies. But this is a short term plan, and one that would require a security force with some local expertise, therefore, one would be recruited from with local opposition and defectors. This presents the possibility of the local military elite under the regime to survive as a coherent force during the transition process. Given the nature of the power networking political atmosphere that exists, postwar Iraq has not fundamentally changed.

Finally, the political economy of Iraq is based on the sale and smuggling of oil. Revenue produced from the oil industry in Iraq, which became nationalized in the late 1970's, is much greater than any other source of revenue in the region.¹² This translates into massive fiscal power that is the source upon which the power structure of the state rests. During the process of restructuring, the US and/or the UN will undoubtedly take control of the income generated through oil revenue, and allocate it to facilitate the fiscal aspects of restructuring. But equally undoubted is that the new government that replaces the Hussein regime will work to have this returned to their discretion.

Allied troops destroy weapons on March 22, 2003 near Safwan, Iraq.

(Photo by Peter Turnley/ Corbis)

Weak political and social institutions arising from a loosely organized new regime however, would mean an inequitable distribution of resources and as the new regime regains control over income from oil, leading to the same economic component of the power base not unlike that which supported Saddam Hussein's regime. As long as stability is maintained, and the new government cooperates with the UN and the US, there will be no incentive to fundamentally change the nature of the post-war regime. The development of a power base similar in function and composition to that of the prewar regime will inevitably lead to the development of a new shadow state which rebuilds under the guise of national restructuring facilitated by the new regime.

To gain legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, and in the eyes of its own citizens, the new regime would have to conduct minimal reform. This would lead to what Larry Diamond describes as liberalization rather than directly to democratic transition.¹³ This is when liberalizing steps are taken—such as in market reforms—that do not necessarily lead to further participation of the population in the political process. In addition to a political culture conducive to democracy, Phillippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl suggest that democracy does not consist simply of a set of institutions. They in fact note that the degree to which a democracy is sustainable is tied to its socio-economic conditions, its state structures, and its policy practices.¹⁴ This is to say that there are certain factors within a nation that will determine its ability to consolidate democracy. These factors must be identified and examined in Iraq to progress into an analytical discussion of democratic transition in post-war Iraq.



Middle East


Through past studies of democratic transition by scholars such as Samuel Huntington, Terry Lynn Karl, and Philippe Schmitter, we see that the mode of democratic transition has an important impact on the type and sustainability of the democracy which follows. Previous work on democratic transition, found in Huntington's *The Third Wave*, has placed Iraq into a category of a standard military dictatorship that has resisted attempts at democratization.¹⁵ We should now examine the opposition to Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath party in Iraq and its relationship with the US as an external actor in the transition process. By doing so, we can evaluate the potential postwar democracy that could result from present factors in the political culture of Iraq such as opposition forces, political economy, and domestic socioeconomic indicators.

We will concentrate on the importance of opposition forces, political economy, and domestic socioeconomic indicators to the political culture of Iraq. The political culture is important because it lays the foundation upon which democracy will be built. Consequentially, if the transition process leads to a political culture—built upon the power base and coalition developed during the transition process—that is similar in function and composition to that found prior to transition, it will not likely lead to democracy taking root in post-war Iraq.

The development of the coalition in opposition to Saddam Hussein does not inspire any great hope of significant change to the Iraqi political culture. On December 14, 2002 the US headed the Iraqi Open Opposition Conference in London in which some three-hundred-and-thirty delegates that supposedly represented Iraq's opposition to Saddam Hussein met to discuss plans to topple the current regime in Iraq.¹⁶ Representation is the first problem with this opposition coalition. The

U.S. Army combat engineers arrest Iraqis who claim to be members of the Republican Guard after the engineers secured a bridge Friday, April. 4, 2003 over the Euphrates River.

(Photo by Kal Pfaffenbach/Reuters)



opposition council includes only one Sunni, despite the fact that the Sunni sect of Islam comprises a third of Iraq's population. Neither can this one representative be said to represent democratic interests as he is also the founder of the Movement to Restore the Constitutional Monarchy.¹⁷

It would be accurate to suggest that the Sunnis currently in power in Iraq will not willingly hand over the reigns of power to their opposition. That leaves two options to facilitate this transformation. First, they can simply be ousted—power taken from them and given to the opposition coalition; second, they can be induced to support the new coalition that will come to power. Certainly, many of them may be induced to abandon support for the current regime and join the opposition, but if the new regime consists of the same individuals as the old, what sort of significant change to the political system will have taken place? As for simply ousting them, they would presumably fight to keep not only their position but their very lives—what would happen to them if they simply backed down?

The transfer of power from Sunni to a predominately Shia opposition brings up the second problem with the lack of Sunni representation in the opposition council. Political repression of those deemed to have benefited from the rule of Saddam Hussein will need to be controlled lest the breakdown of democratic institutions occur. This will require internal security capable of insuring that the actors within the new political system adhere to the structure of democratic institutions. With such forces decimated or disbanded with the forcible removal of Saddam Hussein, it will be the responsibility of the US or the UN to maintain internal security in the form of occupation forces. If the idea of democratic changes so close to their borders, American cultural hegemony, or an

U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Chad Touchett relaxes with comrades from A Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, on April 7, 2003 after searching a damaged presidential palace in Baghdad.

(Photo by John Moore/ AP)



assault of one of their neighbors does not bother them, Iraq's neighboring countries will most likely object to continuous occupation of Iraq by a sizable force of US troops.

Unity is the second problem with the opposition coalition. When the leaders of the opposition are not specifically meeting to discuss their foremost enemy, Mr. Hussein, they are fighting amongst themselves. There exists no mechanism to foster unity within this group after they replace the current regime—except for the democratic institutions found within the current Iraqi political culture or ones that are put into place during transition. The “Shadow State,” lack of security, communal politics, and a power base concentrated on the export of oil have so far succeeded in inhibiting development of such democratic institutions as an independent civil society.

Aside from the lack of so-called requisites of democracy and evident problems with the opposition to President Hussein, the final complication in effecting democratic transition in the region of Iraq is the commitment of US forces and the desirability of the American public to make the commitment to this long and drawn out process. The need for maintaining a political culture conducive to democracy, a political power base upon which democracy would flourish, and the internal security with which to maintain a democracy would require a significant presence that is capable of maintaining such order remain in Iraq. Those that would have the means to do this would have been those decimated by the war and the US-lead troops.

One might be tempted to point to Japan as a nation which has successfully made a transition to democracy due to outside—US—pressure. The differences between the current situation and that of

A small child sitting on his fathers shoulders fights for a box of food as people crush to grab food packages handed out by British Tactical Supply Wing from the back of a truck in the southern Iraqi town of Safwan on March 31, 2003. The British forces are helping the local people with humanitarian aid.

(photo by

Russell Boyce/Reuters)



A U.S. Marine of the 24th Expeditionary Unit asks a man to back up on Monday, April 7, 2003 in Qal'at Sukkar, 62 miles north of Nasariyah, Iraq.

(Photo by Wally Santana)



Razzaq Kazem al-Khafaj grieves over the body of his mother in Hilla in the southern province of Babylon April 1, 2003. Khafaj lost 15 members, including six children, of his family as his car was bombed by coalition helicopters while fleeing al-Haidariyah towards Babylon. Thirty-three civilians were killed and 310 wounded in a US-British coalition bombing of the residential area of Nader south of the city of Hilla, 50 miles south of Baghdad. (Photo by Karim Sahib/AP)



Middle East



Medics Kyle Norris of San Clemente, Calif., center, and Rashon Kyle of Oceanside, Calif., both from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit's Echo Company, treat an Iraqi boy in Nasiriyah, southern Iraq, on Thursday, April 3, 2003. Two months ago, the boy had kitchen oil spilled over him and he is still suffering from burns. (photo by Itsuo Inouye/AP)

World War II notwithstanding, there are several key issues the new regime would have to face distinguishing it from Japan in 1945. Weapons of mass destruction are the largest of these issues. The new regime would definitely be at a disadvantage in regional politics because neighbors such as Iran and Pakistan have developed these weapons. It would be costly—politically and economically—to produce these, but it may well be deemed worth the cost. The new regime will also face territory issues with the Kurds and Kuwait and could also gain popularity both domestically and with other Arab nations for threats against Israel—as Iraq has done in the past—or within the Iran-Iraq rivalry.

Based on the existence of these factors in the political, social, and economic institutions of the Iraqi political culture, which predate the current regime, the simple removal of the current regime alone will not effect democratic transition. These institutions must change to allow for democracy to grow. The likelihood of this depends on the mode in which Iraq makes a transition to democracy. Samuel P. Huntington describes these as transformation and transplantation.¹⁸ There is a third, replacement, which does not seem likely given the focus of the current US administration on the complete removal of President Hussein.

Therefore, there are two scenarios that are probable in postwar Iraq. In the first, we will see that the current regime under Saddam Hussein will loose its strength and hence its ability to maintain control over the Shadow State, an opposition will coalesce from the privileged class, and as the current regime erodes, with or without help from external factors, the new will replace the old. This could happen as a result of the military action taken by the US. Indeed, the Pentagon released its optimistic scenario in which the fighting



Iraqi Hafid Katham waits to be treated for severe burns to his face and hands at an open-air military clinic set up by the U.S. 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit in the town of Nasiriya in central Iraq on Saturday. Katham,

a civilian, 39, said he was burned in his home in U.S. airstrikes 13 days before that killed 11 of his relatives. He decided to show up at the clinic for treatment of his burns on Saturday, April 5, 2003. (photo by Desmond Boylan/Reuters)

lasts about two weeks and most of the Iraqi forces simply give up. This could also happen as a result of President Hussein resigning or being removed from his position as the central head of the current Iraqi regime. In that case, some elements of the current regime—either because they have been overlooked or because they support the new regime—will assist the reformers in conducting liberalization policies that will serve to strengthen the new regime.

In either case, one essential step to transitioning into a democracy will be the removal of the Shadow State which will require large local knowledge, consistent penetration of society at all levels, and substantial military and economic commitment by the US. Without such a commitment, the current administration—and those who attempt to carry out the regime change in Iraq—would negate, to some extent, the effects of liberalization and possibly any of the goals of toppling the current regime.

While one cannot guarantee a successful transition to and consolidation of democracy in any country, there are certain criteria to look for in order to predict, as accurately as possible, the outcome of a transition process. There are seven areas that the US must examine, and in some cases be willing to concede, to help assist with the transition process. First, the social order within which Iraq currently operates must be modified. However, the decision to democratize must come from within the nation and be recognized as a gradual process—one which could take a significant amount of time. There can ultimately be no decision simply imposed on Iraq that will lead to democracy. This includes the type of democracy that will follow the transition process. The US must concede that its model of democracy is not the only available model.

Second, the issue of the so-called dual transition must be addressed. According to Omar Encarnacion, economic liberalization has not in the past lead to democratic transition without first being accompanied by

Iraqi policemen hold their AK-47 rifles in front of the Palestine Hotel Saturday, April 5, 2003 in Baghdad, in celebration of an alleged victory against coalition forces. Iraq's information minister said Baghdad was firmly under Iraqi control and denied U.S. reports that troops had reached the center of the capital. (Photo by Goran Tomasevic/ Reuters



significant modification to existing civil and legal institutions that free them from the centralized control exercised by the pre-transition regime.¹⁹ However, the reality of the situation often does not allow for such modification to take place without economic liberalization. In the case of Iraq, the economic power base which exists primarily on the foundation of the exportation of oil must be adjusted so that it will influence such civic and legal modifications. The barriers to this are the willingness of the post transition regime to make such changes, the willingness of the U.N. to enforce such changes, and the ambiguity of exactly what changes are to be made.

In addition to addressing the process of dual transition and social change in Iraq, the coalition of opposition to President Hussein's regime must be reevaluated. A significant conundrum exists with this coalition. In order to ensure fair representation of ethnic, racial, and religious groups in the post-transition government, the coalition must reflect, to some degree, the ethnic, racial, and religious composition of Iraq. Currently, as we have seen, this is not the case. However, if the current opposition coalition—comprised of reformers that range from extreme left radicals to more moderate centrists—includes hardliners from the current regime it runs the risk of not carrying out the changes needed to expedite democratic transition. If the coalition does not, on the other hand, seek to include hardliners, it will show the current regime that it is unwilling to compromise—thus limiting the non-violent options of those within the regime.

This puts the next issue on the table, that of transplacement. Huntington describes this as a process of compromises that are made in an effort for the opposition to work with the hardliners of the regime to bring about democratic transition. In addition, boundaries within which political maneuvering can take place must be established. Currently, the existence of the Shadow State



Iraqi Republican Guardsmen head to the front south of Baghdad on Sunday, April 6, 2003. U.S. forces were closing in on the Iraqi capital from opposite directions, U.S. officials said.

(Photo by Patric Baz/ AFP)

Middle East



A U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit yields the right of way as it heads from Umm Qasr in southern Iraq to a port facility south of Basra on Monday, March 24, 2003. (photo by Desmond Boylan/Reuters)

makes much of the political happenings of Iraq clandestine and inaccessible to the people of Iraq. This is clearly a boundary to democratic transition in the most fundamental of ways. Iraq must be able to work with its neighbors and vice versa during this process. The strategic interests of many of the world's powers—including the US—in the region depend on the relative stability of the region. The process of democratic transition must not be presented as a threat to Iraq's neighbors and must also not provide an opportunity for Iraq's neighbors to exploit Iraq.

By extension, this means the process cannot be solely driven by the US. Many neighboring states see democratization as Americanization, which is a threat to their power base and way of life—one which will not be tolerated. In addition, a coalition which is installed by the US does not originate from a democratic source. For these reasons, a democratic transition led by the US will be met with resistance in the region which will compromise the effects of democratic transition.

In essence, there are several factors which, according to the leading scholars of democratic transition, must be present, to some degree, in a nation that intends to undergo the process of democratic transition. Upon examination of the current political culture of Iraq, we can see that these factors do not exist. Furthermore, we can see by the present attempts to form an opposition coalition to replace the current regime in Iraq, that these factors are not clearly addressed. This means that without a clear path to democratic transition in mind, without addressing key issues in the post-war political culture of Iraq and without addressing the issue of a long term commitment by outside forces during the transition process, the stated goal of the current administration—to bring democracy to the Middle East—cannot be achieved.

Finally, the question becomes “if not democracy, then what?” To answer this, we can look to a brief history of American foreign policy towards the Middle-East. The Eisenhower Doctrine, simply stated,

placed an emphasis on cultivation of regimes that were sympathetic to the interests of the US. We can see this, as Salim Yuqub points out, beginning in the era of cold war politics.²⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower petitioned Congress for increased powers to dispense military and economic aid to countries in the Middle East in an effort to direct their allegiance away from the Soviet Union. “Stand and be counted” was the mantra of the cold war which has become characteristic of the current War on Terrorism.

The US has a very long history of opposing—and attempting to topple—regimes in the Middle East that have been deemed undesirable in accordance with US policy objectives. In the late 1970's the US had intelligence suggesting the government of Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, was pursuing the technical means to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.²¹ This was not opposed because the US sought the aid of Iraq to oppose other governments seen as dangerous to the US. In addition, in 1957, the US government elicited the assistance of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan in overthrowing the regime in Syria.²²

Prior to September 11th the Taliban was no stranger to the US government. In 1979, Zbigniew Brzezinski, then National Security Advisor, presented a draft proposal to President Carter two weeks after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The proposal suggested that weapons, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to be precise, be covertly provided to the Afghan Mujahedin to help oppose the pro-Soviet regime.²³ Both the Afghan Mujahedin and the Taliban supporters in neighboring Pakistan had ties to the US in this covert action to topple a regime opposing the interests of the US.²⁴ Indeed, working with regimes and organizations who share many of the same characteristics the US has designated to be characteristics of the opposition is an equally longstanding tradition in US foreign policy as forcible regime change. As one reporter of the Gulf Crisis, Morton Kondracke, commented, as Arab nations went against the desires of their own people and

supported operation Desert Storm in 1991, "It's too bad that these countries aren't democratic but in this instance it's a good thing."²⁵

To conclude, applying these models of democratic transition would suggest the post war political culture will not provide an adequate environment for the seeds of democratic transition to grow in Iraq. There are few benefits to the removal of Saddam Hussein. These benefits are limited because we can see that this political culture stems from something much more deep-rooted in the internal foundations of Iraq than simply its current ruler. The real danger will be when the US supports the rise to power of a political leader who finds their roots within the current powerbase of the current regime in Iraq. This will lead to similar conditions the US is currently using to support its claim that Saddam Hussein must be removed from power. ■

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A postcard of Saddam Hussein is taped to the window of a bus used by the press as it drives Sunday, March 30, 2003 past smoke from burning oil after an overnight missile attack in Baghdad. (photo by Jerome Delay/AP)

Kurdish Autonomy

"It is widely feared that the end of Saddam Hussein's regime will precipitate the violent breakup of Iraq itself. There is something to this worry. Decades of Arab nationalism and state repression of Kurds, Assyrians, Turkomans and others have indeed polarized communities and weakened the country's unity. Behind the shield of UN-sanctioned US and British airpower, the Kurds in the north of Iraq have already set up de facto mini-states. Soon Iraqis will face the challenge of convincing their fellow citizens in the north to come back under the umbrella of a new government in Baghdad in zero-sum terms. They prefer to divide rather than share power and land."¹

Referring to the Iraqi Kurds, Laith Kubba, former Iraqi National Congress spokesman and senior associate at the National Endowment for Democracy, sums up a major United States strategic planning question: with special attention to the Kurdish desire for autonomy, how should the US manage a power vacuum in Iraq post-Saddam Hussein?

Micro-managing the future of Iraq is closely tied to the military approach the US must take to overthrow Saddam and his Baath Party regime. Like the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, in order to achieve the Bush administration's goal for regime change in Iraq, the US is compelled to curry support of the Kurdish warlords, who, on October 4, 2002,² after six years of civil war, agreed to a truce and formed a parliament in northern Iraq. Any military or logistical support will be in exchange for future power sharing guarantees, without which, the Kurds have stated, they will use the opportunity to press on as far as Baghdad, only two hours south of Kurdish-controlled towns of Kalar and Kifri.³ The Kurdish question is thus inseparable from the problem of a post-Saddam Iraq.

Whether the Kurds press on as far as attempting to occupy Baghdad is yet to be seen; they have the military capabilities to simplify or complicate a US invasion of Iraq. "Kurdish officials claim they can

in Northern Iraq Post-Saddam Hussein

by Frederico van Houtruyve

muster between 60,000 and 70,000 ready-to-fight peshmerga to confront Iraq's 400,00 troops."⁴ Numbers aside, Saddam's forces are armored divisions while the "lightly armed" Kurds, unlike the Northern Alliance, have few armored vehicles.⁵ Unofficial reports say US Special Forces and the CIA are in northern Iraq training and arming Kurds, but no one can say what will happen until it does. US air support would be a major factor to even the odds in the Kurds favor, but the US is counting on the Kurds to demonstrate far more morale than have Iraqi forces.⁶

The Kurds have the desire and capabilities to take some advantage of the power vacuum.

"There is another reason why the Kurds will probably join battle. It hangs in every government party and office in the enclave: the Kurds' official map of Iraqi Kurdistan. The map covers almost double the territory that the Kurds control today. And bang in the middle of the land they want is Kirkurk, an oil-rich city now well within Baghdad's control....this means that if the Iraqi regime were to collapse, the Kurds, who have up to 100,000 fighters, would hope to seize as much land as possible, as quickly as possible. They would then be able to negotiate future borders from a position of strength. For Kurdish leaders, federation is a means to an end. The end they look to is independence and, in the even more distant future, the unification of all Kurdish lands in Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey. So it is all-important for them to set and get the borders they want. But the Kurdish lands that are now controlled by Mr. Hussein have been heavily Arabized. Kurds have been progressively cleansed, especially from Kirkurk, and Arab settlers have been brought in to replace them. Even so the Kurds are confident. They do not expect property conflicts: the Arabs they say will flee before them."⁷

Fedile dries off Serhat with a cotton towel after a bath in their village near Mt. Ararat in southeast Turkey. (photo by Pico van Houtruyve © 1996)



Saddam Hussein has not satisfied his UN obligations to the US to declare and disarm all Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs, so the Bush administration has already commenced its endgame for Hussein vis-à-vis invasion and regime change. But President Bush has yet to announce his vision



for any future Iraqi government.

According to Kubba, there can be only one political solution to governing post-Saddam Iraq, the immediate establishment of a constitution guaranteeing equal rights for all citizens,⁸ to which I add the immediate establishment of a secular federal republic with a parliamentary system based on free elections monitored by the UN, international NGOs and the press.

Last December in London, more than 300 delegates from the various groups of the Iraqi opposition forces met to discuss their concept of a future Iraq.⁹ “The point of the meeting was to present a new image of unity for the fractious and ever-bickering collection of anti-Saddam organizations. But ironically one of the few things that everyone at the US-sponsored meeting could agree on was that they did not want the US running Baghdad after Saddam....Though all parties supported the notion of a federal Iraq they tabled the decision over the type of federalism.”¹⁰ The US is strongly opposed to recognizing any government-in-exile ahead of time for fear of alienating Iraqi generals serving Saddam who might mutiny once a war begins,¹¹ especially factions without any military support within Iraq itself, such as the Iraqi National Congress (INC), “headed by Ahmad Chalabi, who draws strong backing from Washington.”¹² Therefore, it is urgent and necessary for the US to begin framing guarantees of Kurdish autonomy in advance.

Whether or not the US should be at war with Iraq was a discussion better suited for United Nations arms inspectors who have since left Iraq. However, in order to overthrow Saddam and the Baath regime, the US must remain true to the Iraqi Kurds. Indeed, the US case for finding and disarming the Baath regime of its WMD is historically intertwined with Hussein’s use of WMD to gas Kurds in attempts to wipe them out during the Anfal campaign.

A shepherd reaches into his pocket for tobacco and cigarette paper near Mt. Ararat in southeast Turkey. (photo by Pico van Houtryve)

“On March 15, 1988, Iranian forces occupied the town of Halabja in northern Iraq. Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani, who is being courted by the current Bush administration, allied his faction with the fiercely anti-American Islamic Republic of Iran and provided armed Kurds to fight alongside the Iranian army. Saddam’s government used the Iranian-Kurdish alliance to label the Kurds as a fifth column fighting alongside Iraq’s enemy during a time of war. The next morning, Iraqi Migs and Mirages dropped chemical weapons on Halabja, killing five thousand innocent Kurds. The bombing marked the beginning of the Anfal campaign, during which one hundred

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thousand Kurds were 'disappeared' as four thousand Kurdish villages were razed to the ground."¹³

Decades of treacherous changing alliances have made the Kurds famous for saying only the mountains are their friends. Today the US is in a unique position to help the Kurds autonomously govern an internationally-recognized Kurdistan in northern Iraq under the proposed future Iraqi federal structure, and for moral reasons, the US has never been under more pressure to foster a liberal democracy in the Middle East. "The Kurds of Iraq appear at first glance to have attained an outstanding achievement: autonomy under international auspices, something that neither the Iraqi Kurds themselves nor Kurds and ethnic groups in other Middle East countries have achieved since the late 1940s."¹⁴

Kurdish children gather at spring

to fetch water in their village near

Mt. Ararat in southeast Turkey.

(photo by Pico van Houtryve © 1996)

To understand the uniqueness of this opportunity, it is necessary understand a bit more about the history of the Iraqi Kurds and their treatment under the Baath regime.

"The idea of autonomy for the Kurds of Iraq is as old as the state itself. Only in 1970, however, some fifty years after the British-mandated Iraq was first established, was the idea put into practice, when the Ba'athi government agreed to grant the Kurds autonomy. The maturation of the idea in 1970 was the result of two important coinciding factors: a high degree of politicization among the Kurds, resulting in the crystallization of ethnonationalism among them, and the relative weakness of a new regime that sought to consolidate its grip on power and buy much-needed time via a tactical solution to the endemic Kurdish problem. Once the Ba'ath managed to alter the balance of power in its favor, it moved to crush the autonomy through a combination of military force and political overtures toward the Kurds' main backer at the time, Iran. As the Kurds lacked any international recognition, let alone support, the government could crack down on them harshly without the protest of the international community, because the matter, the government argued, was an internal Iraqi affair. Although the first experiment with Kurdish autonomy was short-lived, lasting only four years, it was nonetheless an important one for a number of reasons: it gave the Kurds a model to which to aspire in the future; it forced the



regime into a commitment that found it difficult to negate altogether; and... it further enhanced the separate identity of the Kurds."¹⁵

The apex of this constant oppression of Kurds was the above mentioned Anfal campaign.


"The second experiment in Kurdish autonomy came some twenty years after the first one against the backdrop of entirely different domestic, regional, and international conditions. For the Kurds, their autonomous entity was established, quite paradoxically, at one of the weakest points in their history, namely, in the wake of Saddam Husayn's crushing of their uprising in April 1991 and the panicked temporary flight of some two million Kurds to Turkey and Iran....This time, autonomy was imposed on Baghdad, leaving it with a very narrow margin of maneuverability and little ability to undermine it."¹⁶

Since 1991, the autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan has become a Kurdish Renaissance.

"The murky, noisy bazaar in the northern Iraqi city of Erbil commercial center dates back to the beginnings of Western civilization. From the 1960s to 1991, life and commerce wilted here under the rule of the Baath party and Saddam Hussein. But just as the U.S. ponders a war to oust Saddam, the world has discovered in Northern Iraq—or Kurdistan, as the locals call it—a Switzerland-size free-market democracy of 3.5 million people that flowered under his nose. The region was laid ruin in 1991, when Saddam crushed the Kurdish rebellion after the Gulf War. But the U.S. and British-imposed no-fly zone has mostly prevented soldiers from returning, while the U.N.'s food-for-oil program has funneled 13% of Iraq's oil revenue to the region. The results are striking. Erbil now has competing cell-phone providers, Internet cafes and brightly lit supermarkets. Mercedes and BMWs zip by on freshly paved roads. Construction goes on everywhere....Ordinary Kurds as well as entrepreneurs are benefiting: the average salary here is \$50 a month vs. \$3 in the rest of Iraq."¹⁷

While Iraqi Kurdistan is already enjoying the fruits of an autonomous free-market democracy, a path that should be protected and allowed to grow, the rest of Iraq is not. Historically, geographically and strategically, Iraq is either the best or the last nation in the Middle East to encourage a liberal democracy by establishing a federal republic, as it is the land traditionally separating the Sunni Arab West from the Shi'a Persian East. To its southwest is the Sunni Muslim Persian Gulf, a collection of non-democratic regimes, such as Saudi Arabia. To its east is the anti-US and theocratic Shi'a nation of Iran.

According to Ira Lapidus in *A History of Islamic Societies*, Iraq has been



A Kurdish farmer smiles near Mt. Ararat in southeast Turkey.

(photo by Pico van Houtryve © 1996)



A boy smokes in the street in Diyarbakir, Turkey near the border with northern Iraq.

(photo by Pico van Houtryve © 1996)



Kurdish men unload hay from a truck near Mt. Ararat in southeast Turkey.

(photo by Pico van Houtryve © 1996)

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the wedge dividing the Sunni and Shi'a Islamic worlds since 656 A.D.¹⁸ Iraq is also the site of Islam's oldest dispute, Karbala.¹⁹ "Today Husayn's shrine at Karbala is one of the great pilgrimage sites of the Muslim world. As much as the defeat of his father, Husayn's death at the hands of the Umayyads divides Muslims more than any other dispute over law or theology or any antipathy between tribes, races, and linguistic groups. 'Ali is the ancestor of Shi'ism; Husayn is its martyr'."²⁰ Indeed, Saddam Hussein often cited the Battle of Karbala and this classic struggle as the moral justification for Iraq's eight-year war with Iran in the 1980s. A professor of history at the University of California, Berkeley, Lapidus believes "Iraq lacks a history of national unity and the present regime represents the dominance of a minority. The regime clings all the more to military power, to oil wealth, and to a highly centralized economy, while it resists integration of the Kurdish and Shi'i

populations."²¹ Saddam Hussein's regime was in power since 1968,²² but the idea of an autonomous Kurdistan for the entire region has much deeper roots.

"Kurdish nationalism had developed in the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century. After World War I the Treaty of Sèvres promised an independent Kurdistan; but this never materialized, largely because Britain wanted the oilfields under its mandate for Iraq."²³

Since 1922, there have been intermittent Kurdish revolts in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran.²⁴

In "The Lessons of Empire," Michael Elliott explores the notion that President Bush ought to examine past attempts to colonize Iraq to set up a liberal democracy.

"In the carve-up of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, London thought that the best way to secure routes to India, the jewel in its imperial crown, was to dominate Mesopotamia. To that end, the treaty at the close of the war cobbled together Iraq from three Ottoman provinces, one Kurdish, one Sunni Muslim and another Shi'ite Muslim. The British moved in under a League of Nations mandate. They didn't have a clue. In 1920 a full-scale revolt broke out. By one account, Britain lost 450 in the rebellion; other sources put the figure higher. Very quickly the British public, weary of endless war and shocked by reports that the R.A.F. routinely bombed women and children in Kurdish villages, turned against the intervention in Iraq."²⁵

Elliott argues imperialism of Iraq today is the same as it always was, no matter how good the intentions, and no matter how accurate the precision-guided bombs.

"But just as beauty is in the eye of the beholder, so imperialism is in the mind of the imperialized. The motive of imperialists is irrelevant....What matters is that imperialism means rule by others. In the end, as the old colonial powers came to understand, that breeds resentment and costs both money and young lives. Today's neoimperialists claim that if the U.S. could rebuild West Germany and Japan after World War II, it can rebuild Iraq. But the cases could hardly be more different. Both West Germany and Japan had fixed national identities; Iraq does not. Both nations—Germany especially—had memories of democratic institutions; Iraq does not. Neither Japan nor Germany had bitter memories of prior attempts to impose colonial rule; Iraq does....The lesson of history is that reforms succeed best when they well up from inside a nation, not when they are thrust upon it from the outside."²⁶

Young men hang out together at a Kurdish wedding in the village of Aspava near Mt. Ararat in southeast Turkey. (photo by Pico van Houtrryve © 1996)



Kurdish boys play at a wedding in the village of Aspava in southeast Turkey. (photo by Pico van Houtrryve © 1996)

Kurdish boys tend a flock of sheep near Mt. Ararat in southeast Turkey. (photo by Pico van Houtryve © 1996)



While not representative of all of Iraq, an idea of the kind of government Iraqis want has emerged from northern Iraq in the form of a Kurdish model for a future Iraq. Dr. Barham Salih, the prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Sulaymania, Iraq and former spokesman for the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in the United Kingdom and North America, argues the model for Iraq's future unity already exists in its semi-autonomous liberal democratic Kurdish north.

"Peace and stability in the strategically vital gulf area will come only from fundamental political change in Iraq and by building on the democratic experiment that has taken root in Iraqi Kurdistan.... The mainstream Kurdish movements realize that there is more to aspire to in a democratic, prosperous Iraq that can flourish with international support. The new Iraq can be a model of tolerance and diversity in a region where both are rare. The Kurds can for the first time be full Iraqi citizens, catalysts for democratic transformation. Most Iraqi opposition movements have endorsed a vision of a federal democratic Iraq. Federalism is vital. Devolving political and economic power, sharing Iraq's vast potential fairly among its people,

will preclude the possibility of another centralized tyranny gripping the Iraqi state and its oil revenues."²⁷

Dr. Salih asserts Iraqi Kurds have achieved and become used to a prosperous and growing free market democratic society since 1991, one they are not ready to sacrifice to become a tiny landlocked Kurdish nation state while they could still reap the benefits of citizenship in the united secular democratic federal republic of a future Iraq.²⁸

Turkey, on the other hand, fears the Iraqi Kurds will not keep their promises.

Turkish media reports Turkey has deployed ten to fifteen thousand troops to prevent refugees crossing the border in the event of war in Iraq, but it reported the deployment is also sufficient to counter any offensive by Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq.²⁹

"The Government in Ankara fears a war in Iraq could inflame Kurdish nationalist sentiments and spark a campaign to create an independent Kurdish state."³⁰ Apparently, the US shares Turkey's fears. "The United States has extended financial sanctions against a Kurdish rebel group in Turkey to include the assets and transactions of its

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A Kurdish villager cuts meat for his family near Mt. Ararat in southeast Turkey. (photo by Pico van Houtryve © 1996)



aliases, according to the Federal Register...The sanctions now apply to KADEK, the Kurdistan Freedom Democracy Congress, also known as the Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan. KADEK is the new name for the Kurdistan Workers Party, the PKK, which fought Turkish security forces in southeastern Turkey from 1984.³¹ Clearly, this is part of a US campaign to curtail Turkish military and logistical support for wartime. The US wants Turkey to serve as a staging base for a reported 100,000 US troops and to allow US use of its air bases.³² The deal, while only partially resolved, is sending mixed signals to the Iraqi Kurds.

“But Iraqi Kurds worry they are being forced out of the strategic equation by reported Turkish demands that the US promise to limit the role of Kurdish forces during and after any conflict... Turkey has repeatedly threatened to send forces across the border to prevent Kurds from declaring an independent state in northern Iraq—a state the Kurds say they also reject. It has also warned Kurds against taking over the oil-rich areas of Kirkuk, historically a Kurdish city. Though US-Turkey horse trading makes the Kurds uneasy, US reasons for

deploying ground forces in northern Iraq include fighting off any attack from Baghdad and preventing a Turkish incursion... Still, it is Turkish concerns being addressed at the highest US levels. The US is offering \$5 billion in aid, say Turkish reports, help in solving the Cyprus problem, and, to pressure on the European Union to admit the Islamic nation.”³³

What has yet to be reported and must now be addressed are US promises to the Iraqi Kurds. The unanswered 112 billion barrel question is how to divide Iraq’s oil wealth: Iraq has more than double Russia’s 49 billion barrel reserve which is topped only by Saudi Arabia’s 261 billion barrels.³⁴ The key to this debate may be economic.

“Ironic as it may appear, Kurdistan is one of the richest regions in Iraq, with an abundance of water, oil, and minerals. But the Kurds themselves were not able to reap the fruits of these riches. Although Western powers allowed them to build an autonomous administration, they never let them exploit the oil in their soil so as to enable the

autonomous entity to achieve economic self-sufficiency. Worse still, the area suffered the impact of a double embargo, both the Iraqi regime's embargo against it and international sanctions against Iraq as a whole. In addition to further impoverishing the region, this situation turned the control of what little income there was in the area into the main bone of contention between the two warring parties, the KDP and the PUK."³⁵

Iraqi Kurds may have the desire and capabilities to complicate life during the power vacuum of the US invasion of Iraq, however they have repeatedly stated they have no intention of making a violent power grab if their conditions are met. The Iraqi Kurds are not asking for a nation state, but to be partners in a federal Iraqi republic post-Saddam Hussein. Their unified demands so far have been practical and reasonable. The Iraqi Kurds have demonstrated their prosperous de facto autonomous democracy and free-market economy is both feasible and a desirable model for governing post-Saddam Iraq. It is in the best interests of the US to make appropriate concessions to the Iraqi Kurds now that the occupation of Iraq has begun. The Kurds are used to fighting on—with or without allies. The last thing the US needs is to repeat the imperialist mistakes of Great Britain in Iraq during the 1920s. Indeed, with the Arab world closely watching the invasion of Iraq, it behooves the US to act nobly. Even if the US is not prepared to reward the Iraqi Kurds for their military support in the war to overthrow Saddam Hussein and the Baath regime in order to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, Iraqi Kurds should be given special consideration for atrocities they suffered from the Baath regime's use of chemical weapons during Anfal. After all, it was the US who allegedly supplied Iraq with these WMDs in the first place. It remains to be seen whether compensation will be political, economic or both. Ideally, the US will allow the Iraqi Kurds to continue to thrive autonomously in their oasis—a rare experiment in free-market democracy among the shifting political, religious and ethnic sands of Iraq and the Middle East—with an infrastructure improved by access to oil income and given a viable chance to succeed. ■

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Kurdish fighters carry rocket-propelled grenades as they reach the front line near the village of Badrik, south of the Kurdish-controlled town of Dohuk, on Wednesday, April 9, 2003. U.S. special operations troops and Kurdish "peshmerga" fighters seized a strategic hilltop near the major city of Mosul in northern Iraq on Wednesday. (photo by Kamran Jebreiti/AP)



An Iraqi Kurd chants "George Bush we love you" during celebrations in the streets of Sulamaniyah, in northern Iraq on Wednesday, April 9, 2003. (photo by Kevin Frayer/AP)



A Kurdish boy runs after a taxi in southeast Turkey. Behind him are his village, his burned-out school and Mt. Ararat. (photo by Pico van Houtryve © 1996)

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Kurdish men spend an afternoon in a teahouse in the city of Diyarbakir in southeast Turkey near the border with northern Iraq. (photo by Pico van Houtrryve © 1996)

India, Pakistan, and Kashmir

Understanding “the most dangerous place in the world”¹

by Gilbert Gonzalez

Fifty Years at the Brink and Beyond

In December of 2001, just three months after the world's attention had been gripped by the events of September 11th, the near-exclusive focus of the international community on terrorism, Osama Bin Ladin, and Afghanistan was interrupted. American newspapers, still primarily concentrating on the events emanating out of 9/11, suddenly had a news story worthy of America's immediate consideration. Not far from where war had recently culminated in the overthrow of the Taliban by US and allied forces, a conflict over 50 years old once again came within a breath of spiraling out of control and culminating in war, as it had done three times before. This time, however, the circumstances involved in the conflict were different.

India and Pakistan have fought three wars: in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971, with the latter resulting in the bifurcation of Pakistan and the creation of the new state of Bangladesh. Since then, numerous crises have occurred between the two archenemies, most recently in 1990 and 1999.² The most recent crisis resulted in a mini-war, as Pakistani soldiers were caught infiltrating the Indian-occupied Kargil mountains of Kashmir.³ In 1998, India, followed shortly thereafter by Pakistan, detonated nuclear weapons in a round of tests that ended with both countries formally declaring their nuclear status.⁴ Even before 1998, however, it was understood that both states could quickly finalize the development of their nuclear programs and possess nuclear capability.⁵ Though the threat of nuclear warfare was a factor in the 1999 incident, and even before then, the conflict beginning in mid-December 2001 with a terrorist attack on India's Parliament in New Delhi reached a new level of

escalation toward a nuclear war. India accused Pakistan of not only harboring, but also directly aiding the militants who had carried out the attack.⁶ Pakistan denied this, and, amidst a furious volley of invectives and accusations, the armies of both countries were put on high alert and amassed at the Indo-Pak border. Nuclear-capable missiles were prepared and brought to the front lines, and thinly veiled nuclear threats were exchanged.⁷ Not since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1961 had two known nuclear weapons states been so close to direct war, or the world so close to catastrophe.

If the pressure and intervention of the international community had not succeeded in deescalating the crisis, it is entirely possible that it would have ended in war and destruction. What issue could be of such significance to these two countries that such calamitous consequences were risked? Little is commonly known or understood of the dynamics and complexity of interests and desires in this conflict. South Asia is one of the world's most overlooked regions by the capitals of global powers and their media. International powers such as the United States are loath to get involved because of the complexities and seemingly inextricable nature of the dispute. Yet few issues today carry more importance in the realm of international relations as the Indo-Pak conflict. The forces behind this conflict and the direction they take promise to have an impact on the world felt far beyond South Asia.

At the heart of this conflict is an area that lies on the northern border of both India and Pakistan, known as Kashmir. Yet it is much more than a territorial dispute over a picturesque land in the Himalayas. India and Pakistan fought their first two wars over Kashmir, and over the last decade and a half have nearly gone to war again on three separate occasions because of it.

South Asia

With the two states having devoted such attention and resources, and demonstrated such willingness to risk the unthinkable consequences of nuclear war, undeniably this disputed territory is precious to them both. Yet why? What are the interests and desires found in Kashmir that make it so invaluable?

Kashmir as constant, Kashmir as microcosm

Kashmir, a beautifully scenic land in the midst of the Himalayan mountains, lies to the north of India and Pakistan and presently provides the northern-most border for the two countries. Kashmir has a predominantly Muslim population with generally segregated regions. The India-controlled south (Jammu) is primarily Hindu. The northern section administered by China is primarily Buddhist. The Pakistan-controlled north, referred to by Pakistan as Azad Kashmir, or Free Kashmir, is primarily Muslim, as is the most contentious region, the Indian-controlled Kashmir Valley.⁸ Prior to 1947, Kashmir, known formally as Jammu and Kashmir, was a princely state, not directly a part of India but still a territory ruled under the British Raj.⁹ In 1947, at

independence and the partition of India into India and Pakistan, the princely states were given the option of joining Pakistan or India.¹⁰ Those with predominantly Muslim populations joined with Pakistan; those with Hindu majorities, India.¹¹ However, Kashmir, a princely state with a preponderance of Muslims, yet ruled by a Hindu Maharaja, declined to side with either country, hoping to remain independent.¹² It was not until Pakistan undertook a plan to force Kashmir to accede to Pakistani rule that the Maharaja, out of desperation and fear that his own rule was threatened, agreed to join with India in exchange for aid against Pakistani and local tribal aggression.¹³ India and Pakistan were soon at war, initiating a conflict over the disputed territory that has lasted for half a century. The war ended with a UN-imposed ceasefire, but not before Pakistan had captured about one-third of Kashmiri territory.¹⁴ The UN passed resolutions stating that Pakistan must withdraw its occupation of this area, followed by India pulling out its troops from Indian-controlled Kashmir, and then calling for a plebiscite to be held so as to ascertain the will of the Kashmiri people.¹⁵ These resolutions were never put into action, as the two sides were in disagreement over the order of procedure. Another war was fought over the territory in 1965, ending in the Tashkent Agreement that called for a return to the pre-war status

quo.¹⁶ This war, like the first one, was instigated by Pakistani infiltration into Indian-controlled Kashmir.¹⁷ The third Indo-Pak war did not involve Kashmir directly, and it wasn't until the anti-Indian uprising in Kashmir in 1989 that the issue again escalated tensions between the two countries, based primarily on Pakistan's unwillingness to cease aiding and harboring Kashmiri and Islamic militants attempting to extract Kashmir from India's control.¹⁸ Since then, however, tensions have been extremely high, escalating into near-war in 1990 and 2001-2002, and a limited one in 1999.

Yet this account of Indo-Pak relations and the role of Kashmir hardly explain what is at stake in this conflict. While both sides do consider Kashmir's location to be strategically important—for Pakistan because of its close proximity to Islamabad and for India as a buffer along the Himalayas¹⁹—the question of Kashmir is not one that can be understood solely through practical or physical state and security interests. Kashmir has represented an issue that reaches into the very core of India's and Pakistan's identity. It has been a



Kashmiri vegetable sellers gather at a floating market on Dal Lake in Srinagar, the summer capital of Jammu and Kashmir state, on Aug. 11. Srinagar was once a popular destination for international and domestic tourists, attracting 720,000 tourists a year to the "Switzerland of the East." These days, a 13-year revolt against Indian rule by Muslim militants has turned Kashmir into one of the world's most heavily militarized zones. (photo by Kamal Kishore/Reuters)



Indian Border Security Force soldiers patrol picturesque Dal Lake in Srinagar, the summer capital of the Indian-held state of Kashmir, Feb. 19, 2002. The only visitors these days to this magnificent landscape, once a tourist hot spot, are Indian soldiers. (photo by Ami Vitale/Getty Images)

microcosm of an irreconcilable conflict between the very foundations of the two countries.²⁰

India's interests and desires

During the movement for independence from the British, the main vehicle for Indian independence was the Congress Party, whose most prominent members – among them Gandhi and Nehru – hoped to create a secular, inclusive state that included all the territory held under the British Raj.²¹ They rejected the two-nation theory put forth by the Muslim League, the major alternative party fighting for India's independence from the British, that India must be partitioned into two countries – one predominantly Hindu and the other composed of Muslims.²² Instead they adhered to the one-nation theory, that India's identity should be represented by a civic nationalism that would not be in conflict with religious or ethnic minorities regardless of its Hindu-majority population.²³ The partition and creation of Pakistan in 1947, therefore, was not only contrary to the desires of India's nationalist leaders for Indian unity. India perceived the creation of Pakistan—and by extension, its existence—as an attack on the foundation of Indian identity and inherently opposed to the integrity of the Indian nation.²⁴

As a consequence, India's sensitivity regarding its unity as a secular, inclusive country was aggravated. The question of Kashmir's inclusion into India, because of its predominantly Muslim population, became an affirmation of India's identity as a secular, inclusive state held together by civic nationalism.²⁵ Moreover, the inability to include Kashmir, solely because of its Muslim majority, would be a further assault against its national integrity. Kashmir's exclusion from India based on its Muslim majority would vindicate Pakistan's two-nation theory, while undermining India's efforts to build its state in adherence to the one-nation theory.²⁶

Moreover, India feared that the loss of Kashmir would legitimate the idea of religious or ethnic separatism and inspire secessionist movements elsewhere in India.²⁷ As various secessionist movements evolved over the decades, India's retention of Kashmir conveyed the message that it would not accept secession based on religious or ethnic differences.²⁸ Compounding this was India's inherent concern for the unity of its diverse population, as fissures within the Indian populace had historically been exploited by foreign powers seeking to weaken India.²⁹

India originally called for the dispute to be handled by the United Nations, bringing it before the body in January of 1948 in the midst of the first war.³⁰ A UN-imposed ceasefire ended the war, though not before Pakistan had captured about one-third of Kashmiri territory.³¹ The UN passed a series of resolutions concerning the Kashmir issue, calling for both sides to remove troops from their respective areas of

occupation (starting with Pakistan) and then for a plebiscite to be held so as to ascertain the will of the Kashmiri people.³² However, these resolutions proved inconclusive, as India demanded that Pakistan withdraw first and Pakistan demanded that a plebiscite be held first.³³ India perceived its treatment by the United Nations as unfair, feeling that the UN had overlooked its position as the aggrieved party.³⁴ When the US signed a military pact with Pakistan in 1954, India believed that the West's position would be even more biased against India in UN debate,³⁵ and this led it to reject further discussion of the Kashmir issue in the UN. It sought and received assurance of this through its friendship with the Soviet Union, which provided a veto in the UN Security Council against unfavorable resolutions on Kashmir.³⁶

India had also called for a partition of Kashmir along the cease-fire line of the 1948 war.³⁷ India felt the region that it administered would be sufficient to meet its interests, as the territory still had a Muslim majority and would therefore satisfy its affirming role of the one-nation theory. Besides this, it realized that the Pakistani-controlled northern areas would never accede to inclusion with India anyway.³⁸ The Simla agreement that followed India's victory in the 1971 war was felt to be a milestone, with India's leaders arguing that it supplanted the UN resolutions as the most relevant documentation in the Kashmir dispute.³⁹ In this agreement, the term "cease-fire line" for the split of Kashmir after 1948 was dropped and substituted with "line of control," a term that India felt validated its position that the cease-fire line should be transformed into a permanent border and that no plebiscite should be held.⁴⁰ Secondly, India and Pakistan agreed to "settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed between the two."⁴¹ India has used this to argue against outside mediation or intervention in the Kashmir dispute.⁴² India's advantage in bilateral negotiations, coupled with the perceived bias of the international community, makes it averse to outside mediation. While India still attempts to influence the international community's opinion, especially the U.S., it rejects direct mediation from any third party.⁴³

India also argues that Pakistan instigated and continues to fuel the Kashmiri separatist movement.⁴⁴ Since its beginning in 1989, Pakistan claims to support the cause of the Kashmiri people, yet denies sponsoring the militant and terrorist activity carried out by some of the separatist groups.⁴⁵ India continues to claim otherwise, pointing to Pakistan's harboring of militant groups suspected of terrorist activity and accusing Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI, of directly aiding and training these groups.⁴⁶ This issue has been central to the escalation of tensions over the last 15 years.

Changes to India's foundational claim as a secular, inclusive state have made its interests and desires in the Kashmir conflict less clear. In the mid-1980s, the popularity of the Congress Party, which had dominated Indian politics since independence and has cultivated India's secular and

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inclusive identity, began to fade.⁴⁷ It has since been challenged by the emergence of Hindu-nationalist parties, most notably the Bharatiya Janata Party, or the BJP, that reject secularism and inclusiveness, instead attempting to create an India based on Hindu dominance.⁴⁸ The BJP has led a coalition government since 1998, and, as it gains in popularity and significance, India's interest in Kashmir as an affirmation of its secular, inclusive identity loses validity and relevance.⁴⁹ That this Hindu-nationalist movement places exceptional importance on maintaining control of predominantly Muslim Kashmir is ironic, yet the importance of prevailing in the dispute against India's archenemy serves as its rallying cry.⁵⁰ Having invested so many resources, and placed such emotive significance on maintaining Kashmir, the issue remains extremely sensitive and potentially explosive in India, making compromise very difficult. In addition, India's leaders continue to be strongly motivated to retain control of Kashmir because of the fear that its loss would inspire other separatist movements.⁵¹

Pakistan's interests and desires

During India's independence movement, the Muslim League, led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, called for the partition of India into two countries—one Hindu and the other Muslim.⁵² This position was a consequence of the two-nation theory, which held that two such large, significantly different populations would be incompatible in a single country, and that the Muslim minority would be oppressed.⁵³ The creation of a separate nation was necessary to provide a homeland for the Muslims of South Asia.⁵⁴ Their goal was realized with the partition of India in 1947 and the creation of Pakistan, a nation with a western wing (present-day Pakistan) and an eastern wing (present-day Bangladesh). Yet from the beginning, Pakistan's leaders felt threatened by India's adherence to the one-nation theory and its rejection of Pakistan as a Muslim homeland.⁵⁵ India's nationalist leaders argued against the creation of Pakistan, as they considered its claim to nationhood as fraudulent, and desired that Pakistan collapse and eventually be reclaimed by India.⁵⁶

Pakistan's nationalist sensitivities were heightened and aggravated by India's position. Its identity as a homeland for South Asia's Muslims would be affirmed and made complete, however, by the inclusion of Kashmir, a predominantly Muslim territory.⁵⁷ More importantly, Kashmir's exclusion represented to Pakistan's early leaders a further direct challenge to Pakistan's claim of nationhood. Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto once stated "If a Muslim majority can remain a part of India, then the *raison d'être* of Pakistan collapses...Pakistan is incomplete without Jammu and Kashmir both territorially and ideologically."⁵⁸ A separate Kashmir left Pakistan's foundational structure vulnerable. Bhutto went on to state "It would be fatal if, in sheer

exhaustion or out of intimidation, Pakistan were to abandon the struggle...which might, in turn, lead to the collapse of Pakistan."⁵⁹

The separatist movement of Eastern Pakistan dealt a blow to this interest, however, along with the war of 1971 that resulted in independence for Eastern Pakistan and the creation of a separate country, Bangladesh. The two-nation theory forming the basis of Pakistan's foundation as a homeland for South Asia's Muslims had failed, showing that Pakistani national unity could not be based on religion alone.⁶⁰ The argument that religion could justify the sole basis for the creation of a separate country was severely weakened, greatly invalidating the claim that Kashmir must be included into Pakistan because of its Muslim population.⁶¹ Pakistan could no longer claim that it was incomplete as a Muslim homeland without Kashmir, as this identity had already collapsed with the creation of Bangladesh. Pakistan did not lose its desire to attain Kashmir, yet the argument that Kashmir inherently belonged to Pakistan because of its Muslim population was no longer relevant.

Pakistan has continuously sought to internationalize the conflict, attempting to bring in outside mediation and to bring the Kashmir dispute before the United Nations.⁶² Because of its disadvantage in bilateral negotiation, Pakistan attempts to balance its power deficiency with outside intervention in support of its position.⁶³ This attempt, most notably with the United States and China, has often failed, however, as other countries are deterred from involvement by the seemingly intractable nature of the conflict, and as India rejects any outside mediation of the dispute, including from the UN, where India received protection during the Cold War by the Soviet Union's veto.⁶⁴ Consequently, Pakistan's efforts to put the matter before the UN have also failed.

Pakistan's desire to take the matter to the UN is largely due to the resolutions passed in 1948, calling for a plebiscite to decide the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan favors this because of the possibility that the predominantly Muslim territory would vote to join with it.⁶⁵ Pakistan rejects the Simla agreement of 1972 as supplanting the UN resolutions as the most relevant documentation on the dispute, and considers the call for a plebiscite still relevant.⁶⁶ It also strongly rejects the transformation of the cease-fire line, later termed the line of control, into a permanent international border between the two countries, as this would mean that Kashmir's possession was no longer in dispute, and would erase Pakistan's hopes of attaining all of Kashmir.⁶⁷

Pakistan has refused to accept the status quo, continually antagonizing India in hopes of somehow wresting Kashmir from its possession. Pakistan, by infiltrating Indian-controlled areas of Kashmir, was the cause of the 1948 and 1965 wars, as well as the Kargil conflict of 1999. Since the Kashmiri uprising in 1989, Pakistan has supported the separatists and allowed them to use bases in Pakistani-controlled

Indian soldiers take cover during a gunbattle with suspected militants outside a polling station in Srinagar on Sept. 23, 2002. Suspected Islamic militants attacked the polling station on the eve of state elections in Kashmir, lobbing several grenades before hundreds of soldiers surrounded the makeshift election center and fired at the rebels. (photo by Elizabeth Dalziel/AP)



Kashmir, though it denies directly aiding or training any militant groups.⁶⁸ Pakistan argues that it is not their support for separatists that motivates the Kashmiri uprising, but instead India's history of abusive and negligent rule in Indian-controlled Kashmir.⁶⁹ Despite India's continued demands, it was not until after the Parliament bombing in 2001, when Pakistan was accused of harboring and aiding the groups responsible, that its leadership finally moved to stop cross-border terrorist activity, an action taken primarily because of pressure from the international community, especially the United States, trying to prevent another war between the two countries.⁷⁰

Pakistan's interests and desires in Kashmir are also less clear now than they were 50 years ago. Though it no longer is able to claim legitimacy based on the two-nation theory, Pakistan still sees its accession of Kashmir as a necessity and retains strong emotional ties to this goal because of the religious connection, calling for support of fellow Muslim freedom fighters being oppressed by the Indian government.⁷¹ Nationalists and Islamic extremist groups in Pakistan use Kashmir to mobilize support, and victory over its archenemy serves as a rallying cry.⁷² In addition, because of its tremendous investment of treasure and blood, accepting a compromise based on the status quo is unacceptable, especially to the army, the most powerful institution in Pakistani government and society.⁷³ It is also argued that some influential elements of Pakistani society are interested in keeping the conflict from being resolved, for instance Pakistan's army, which would stand to lose influence as well funding if the conflict is finally settled.⁷⁴

Irreconcilable Differences Reconsidered

In certain ways, there is greater likelihood today of bringing together the interests and desires of India and Pakistan than at any time in the last 50 years. Kashmir no longer represents the extremely sensitive matter of national identity the way it did when the conflict began. Though this remains a factor, in large part, both India and Pakistan no longer see the inclusion of Kashmir as necessary to affirm their right to nationhood or validity as a country. They do, however, feel that upholding their national integrity necessitates victory in a conflict in which so many resources have been invested, and regard compromise as an unthinkable admission that all their efforts have been a waste.⁷⁵ The institutions most likely to advocate this position are presently in control on both sides. In India the Hindu-nationalist BJP has led a coalition government since 1998, and in Pakistan the military under General Musharraf has been

in control since 1999. It could be said that, with such hard-line elements in control, compromise would be impossible and escalation more likely. Both actually may be less true. While less hostile governments may naturally be less inclined to escalate tensions and more likely to seek compromise, stronger pressure may be placed on them because of their perceived weakness, compelling them to take stands just as hostile if not more so in order to avoid being perceived as capitulating.⁷⁶ However, hard-liners, because of their reputation, face less of this pressure and are given a wider degree of latitude in negotiating.

Shared Interests

With at least the partial removal of these impediments, the question then becomes what common interests India and Pakistan have in a final resolution to the Kashmir crisis. The nuclear armament of the region provides a clear common interest in resolving the crisis. Left unresolved, the Kashmir conflict can quickly escalate to the brink of war, as demonstrated numerous times over the last 15 years. The emotions involved for both sides are so strong and raw that even the threat of nuclear war has not been enough to stop the escalation of tensions, as was demonstrated in 1999 and again in 2001-2002. This casts doubt that the Mutual Assured Destruction deterrent argument is relevant in the Indo-Pak conflict, leaving a strong possibility that nuclear war could take place.⁷⁷ If this is the case, it becomes urgently necessary that such an emotionally charged conflict be resolved before a nuclear conflict ensues, a scenario that would result in tremendous casualties in the crowded cities of New Delhi, Islamabad, Mumbai (Bombay), and Karachi.

The removal of a serious impediment that has greatly deterred the economic growth and development of both countries for over 50 years is another common interest in resolving the conflict. The Kashmir issue has compelled Pakistan to engage in a military build-up in an attempt to keep pace with India. It has exhausted its preciously limited resources in importing conventional arms and developing nuclear weapons, instead of using them to educate its population and provide it with jobs.⁷⁸ In addition, efforts to attract foreign investment have been greatly

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Relatives become hysterical after several youths are arrested for demonstrating after Friday prayers at Jamiat Masjid Mosque on Sept. 27, 2002 in the center of Srinagar, Kashmir, India. Sermons included calls for independence and an all-Islamic Kashmir. Boycotts and pre-election violence marred campaigns and elections in Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir. (photo by Roger Lemoyne/Getty Images)



hampered, as investors are apprehensive of instability in the region.⁷⁹ It has been much the same scenario for India, holding back not only is its economic development but also its emergence as one of the major powers in the international community.⁸⁰ By diverting those resources used for war and military spending into economic growth and development, and by providing a stable and thus more attractive environment for foreign investment, India and Pakistan would be able to achieve far higher levels of development than has been the case, and India would be able to enhance its claim as one of the world's elite nations.

Still Vexing Issues

Though these common interests provide a tremendous impetus to resolve the Kashmir crisis, there are still influential interests and forces at work against this. For both countries, Kashmir has served as a rallying cry for nationalistic mobilization for over 50 years. Each side has vilified the other and invalidated its claims. With such a history, trust between the two countries would be difficult to build up, especially as the small extensions of trust offered in the past have more often than not been violated, leading both countries to feel that offers of trust will be taken as a sign of weakness. It is felt that this will undoubtedly lead to attempts to take advantage of this perceived weakness, which could have serious negative security as well as political consequences.⁸¹ In light of this, the proximity of the two countries as well as the nuclear consideration makes trust a severely risky proposition. The offer of trust is not only understood as something that is likely to be taken advantage of, but also as something that could prove fatal to the trusting side.⁸² There is also the matter of extremists on both sides who not only wish to gain Kashmir by force, but also see war as an opportunity to destroy the opposing side, a position strengthened by the growing extremist elements of both populations: Islamic fanaticism is quickly being matched by Hindu fanaticism in South Asia.⁸³ Indian Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani, a

leader of the BJP and the likely successor to the current prime minister, recently commented "Let us fight it out face to face. We have fought thrice, let there be a fourth war."⁸⁴ And as mentioned earlier, there are some powerful actors in the conflict who do not wish to sacrifice their positions of influence by reaching a resolution, as is likely the case with certain elements of the Pakistani military.⁸⁵

Along with this are differences in opinion on the practical matters of the conflict. While India is not willing to allow outside mediation or UN handling of the Kashmir dispute, Pakistan still claims to desire settlement by the UN and has continued to attempt to procure other countries' involvement in mediating the conflict. Where India no longer recognizes the relevance of the UN resolutions of 1948 calling for a plebiscite to decide Kashmir's fate, referring instead to the Simla Agreement of 1972, Pakistan still considers the UN resolutions as the most authoritative word on Kashmir, and demands that a plebiscite be held. Finally, where India has been willing to consider the line of control currently dividing Kashmir between the two countries as a permanent border, Pakistan is unwilling to accept it as such and continues attempting to realize its desire of attaining all of Kashmir.

Finally, the interests and desires of the Kashmiri people must be considered. The relevance of this consideration lies not only in the Kashmiri's stake in the conflict, but also in the political and security considerations it demands of India and Pakistan. The secessionist movement in Kashmir that has consumed Delhi for over a decade attests to this. Yet it is unknown whether the majority desires inclusion into India, into Pakistan, or independence.⁸⁶ The largest secessionist group, the JKLF, seeks independence, yet many others are inspired by Islamic extremism and seek inclusion into Pakistan.⁸⁷ Certainly the Hindu minority in Kashmir seeks to remain associated with India,⁸⁸ and many perhaps would accept any outcome so long as it ended over a decade of constant repression and violence. The fragmented nature of Kashmir's religious demography presents another complication. The Muslims of Indian-controlled Kashmir are a religious minority within India, yet the


Hindus of Jammu are a religious minority within Kashmir, as are the Buddhists in Leh and Kargil.⁸⁹ With inclusion into Pakistan, or the gaining of independence, another minority conundrum would be created.⁹⁰ Yet in the sense of a final outcome to the Kashmir dispute, the interests and desires of Kashmiris are less relevant. India and Pakistan both agree that independence for Kashmir is not an option.⁹¹ Further, it is unlikely that any actor of significance, internal or external to the conflict, would champion their position. Unfortunately, India and Pakistan will reach a resolution on Kashmir, or not, based on their state interests, and not the interests of the people of Kashmir.

A New Factor

It would seem that too much is at stake for India and Pakistan not to reach a resolution. With the nuclear threat formalized, and with Kashmir largely losing its relevance as a question of identity, the necessity to find a solution, as well as the ability to reach one, have not been greater. Yet this has still not been enough to end the conflict, or even prevent the escalation of tensions, as demonstrated in 1999 and again in 2001-2002. Perhaps the most promising development toward a solution has

been the involvement of the international community after the nuclearization of South Asia in 1998, and the US in particular after September 11th, 2001. India and Pakistan put great emphasis on the opinion of the international community, and a major consideration for both sides in the conflict is how this opinion is affected.⁹² At the same time, the potential for nuclear war and the repercussions from this that would be felt far beyond South Asia, give the international community a significant stake in seeing a resolution to the conflict. The U.S. especially, because of the distraction to its ongoing war on terrorism that the Indo-Pak conflict creates, as well as the possibility that nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of Islamic extremists in Pakistan if it becomes too unstable, has a great interest in a resolution. Though India and Pakistan have both shown that their security interests are of primary consideration, the pressure of the international community, especially considering both countries' desire to gain its favor, is a significant development. Whether it will be enough, however, to compel India and Pakistan to finally resolve the conflict over Kashmir, remains to be seen. ■

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Mourning relatives comfort one another Sept. 21, 2002 during the funeral for a woman killed during an attack on leading

politician Sakina Yatoo in the northern Kashmir town of Mirhama, India. At least 11 people were killed and a second abortive bid was made to assassinate a leading woman politician, just days before a crucial second round of voting in the strife-torn northern Indian state of Jammu-Kashmir. (photo by Ami Vitale/Getty Images)

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The Paradox of Cuban Health Care

by Elizabeth Brittle



Cubans wait for a taxi in December 2002. (photo by Tomas van Houtryve)

Just ninety miles south of the Florida coast lies an island with a hidden jewel: free national health care for all citizens, from cradle to grave. From a bird's eye view, Fidel Castro's Cuba has achieved the impossible: first-world health statistics in a third-world country. However, if a spectator takes a closer look into the heart of Cuba—a land saturated by the warm sun, Ché Guevara icons and vintage Chevys—one will notice that Cuba's reputation as a pristine health care model is fading into the sunset.

On October 2, 2002, Castro's voice rose loud and clear, celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Victoria de Giron Medical Science Institute. He applauded the increase in Cuba's number of doctors and nurses, decrease in the infant mortality rate, increase in the population's life expectancy, training Cuban and foreign students to be doctors, and Cuba's medical assistance program abroad.¹ In addition to providing universal health care, Cuba also has been able to create an innovative and

resourceful pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry that is admired throughout the world. Cuba's sophisticated medical facilities attract about 3,500 foreign patients each year.²

By some commonly accepted standards such as life expectancy and infant mortality rates, Cuba's health statistics look exceptional. According to the Pan American Health Organization, the Cuban life expectancy of 76.3³ years barely trails behind the U.S. average of 77.4.⁴ Cuba also has the lowest infant mortality rate and the highest doctor-to-patient ratio in all of Latin America.⁵ In Communist Cuba, the average person earns only \$40 a month, but there are no bills and no complicated health forms to complete.⁶ Health care is completely paid for by the government. In fact, Cuba's system is so successful it has gained international recognition for its scientific advances and universal medical coverage system. In May 1998, Mr. Hiroshi Nakajima, director-general of the World Health Organization, said: "Cuba's

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national health system, with its emphasis on primary care managed by a 'health team,' is widely considered to be exemplary. Few developing countries have adopted such a comprehensive range of health policies, geared to priority needs and the capacity of health workers to meet them, on behalf of all Cuban people, particularly the most vulnerable and impoverished."⁷

However, Cuba is a country full of contradictions including its widespread use of the American dollar, Cubans proudly wearing shirts flaunting pictures of American icons and a plethora of 1950's American automobiles. Another paradox lies in the medical system where scientific advances and universal care are being undermined by extreme poverty, inadequate nutrition and poor housing.⁸

Health Care's Past

Prior to its socialist revolution, Cuba's health care system was not very different from its underdeveloped counterparts. Cuba had a health

ministry, but it was inefficient and corrupt. The more affluent white members of society turned to the use of Mutualistas, a self-financed system of health care. The Mutualistas controlled about 40% of the hospital beds and the majority of the medical system's resources.⁹ In addition to the Mutualistas system, a private health sector operated in Havana. Conversely, the poor Cubans who represented the majority of the population received little or no health care benefits. Poor hygiene, sanitation, and nutrition contributed to a maternal mortality rate of 125.3 per 100,000 live births.¹⁰ It also contributed to a life expectancy of 65.1 years and an infant mortality rate of 60 per 1,000 live births.¹¹

To put these statistics in perspective, today Cuba has a life expectancy rate of 76.3 and an infant mortality rate of 7.2 per 1,000 live births.¹² Comparatively, the Dominican Republic has a life expectancy rate of 73.68 years and an infant mortality rate of 33.41 per 1,000 live births.¹³ Haiti, one of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere, trails behind with a life expectancy rate of 49.55 years and an infant mortality rate of 93.35 per 1,000 live births.¹⁴

In 1959, Fidel Castro declared leadership of this small Caribbean island and overthrew the Fulgencio Batista regime, which had maintained



Cubans ride the bus in Havana in December 2002. (photo by Tomas van Houtryve)

its power through coercion, assassination, military action and racism against Afro-Cubans.¹⁵ Castro then made it his goal to provide government-funded health care and education for all of Cuba's citizens. Castro deemed health care as a quintessential right. In the 1960's, Cuba created a new Ministry of Public Health (MINSAP) to cover the needs of the entire country.¹⁶ Additionally, Castro launched a successful literacy campaign, made efforts to provide drinkable water to every household, cleaned the environment by lowering pollution and sent health care personnel to remote areas of the island. Furthermore Castro ultimately wanted to establish a comprehensive health care system for all citizens in their communities, homes, workplaces and schools. Medical clinics began to open up all over the country in 1961.¹⁷

The Embargo

In 1963, the United States passed the Trading with the Enemy Act, which prohibited trade with Cuba. Under Soviet sponsorship, Cubans became dependent on imports. When the Soviet bloc fell apart and its multi-billion-dollar support evaporated, Cuba lost its self-sufficiency in food and other critical products. As the Economist stated in 1999: "The reality is that a state mired in Marxist economics, with no big Soviet brother to aid it, can afford little of anything, homemade or imported, buildings or bandages."¹⁸

The U.S. strengthened its embargo laws in 1992 with the Cuban Democracy Act, which limits the sale of medical supplies. Additionally, the United States tried to exert greater control with the Helms-Burton Law of 1996, which threatens penalties against European and other companies that invest in Cuba.¹⁹ These laws have been heavily enforced, so that doing business with Cuba without a license can double or triple a company's products' and services' prices in order to pay for the cost of legal battles.²⁰

Previously, Cuba traded its plentiful sugar cane export for Russian food and oil. At that time, the Soviet Union represented an estimated 85 percent of Cuba's foreign trade.²¹ In 1989, Cuba's economy was cut by nearly 50 percent almost overnight due to the loss of trade. Afterwards, Cuba was forced to provide other means to sustain itself. The country responded in the 1990's by building a biotechnology industry that earned more than \$100 million in profits from exports in 1998.²² Tourism is also assuaging Cuba's sugar cane dependency, with over 1.7 million tourists visiting Cuba in 2000.²³

In September 1995, Merck—one of the U.S.' largest pharmaceutical companies—paid \$127,500 in fines after visiting a medical institute to obtain Hepatitis-B samples.²⁴ Following this incident, Merck publicly stated that it would not do business with Cuba anymore. U.S. Commerce officials also forbade the Argentine supplier Medix from shipping spare

parts to Cuban hospitals to maintain U.S.-made dialysis machines and ophthalmologic sonar equipment that was already in use throughout the island.²⁵

Due to U.S. embargo, goods cannot reach Cuba directly from the United States. Nonetheless, the U.S. is the only country in the Western Hemisphere with a trade ban on Cuba, and one of five countries that do not have formal relations with Cuba (the other four are Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic).²⁶

The World-Renowned System

Although Cuba has been cut off economically by the U.S. embargo due to the Trading with the Enemy Act, Cuba's health care system has been able to advance. The system's benefits are unprecedented in any third-world country. This success is largely the result of the considerable amount of money spent on the system. World Health Organization reports declare that Cuba uses about 6.8 percent of its GDP on health care—a rate that is almost double to what most developing nations spend.²⁷ Even with its weak economy, Cuba spends much of its attention diverting resources to the primary care infrastructure and preventative medicine efforts.

Furthermore, citizens are guaranteed unlimited access to health care and can use primary care as they wish. Care is given by need, rather than the amount of a patient's income. Cuba's health care infrastructure is the system's most impressive element. Therefore, Cuba spends a great portion of its gross domestic product (GDP) supporting this infrastructure. John Kavulich, president of the U.S.-Cuban Trade Economic Council in New York states: "The Cubans have some immensely capable production facilities. They spent tens of millions of dollars to develop [facilities] beyond their needs."²⁸

One of the ways Cuba has tried to earn revenue for medical and government programs is through health tourism. People from around the world are flocking to Cuba to get tummy-tucks, face lifts and treatments for chronic illness. The majority of these "health tourists" go to Cuba to receive surgery they cannot receive elsewhere or to cut the costs of expensive procedures. For example, the cost of a herniated disk repair in Cuba costs around \$4,570 for anesthesia and two-weeks stay.²⁹ The Cira Garcia Health Center in Cuba attracted over 1,300 foreign inpatients and thousands more outpatients.³⁰ In total, Cubanacan Tourism and Health estimates that over 3,500 health tourists come to the island each year, and this rate continues to grow annually at a rate of 20 percent.³¹ The majority of health tourists come from Europe, particularly Italy and Spain. Health tourists bring in over \$20 million annually into the economy, which is spent to bolster Cuba's finances and

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is redistributed into Cuba's overall health care system.³²

Throughout Cuba there are some 281 hospitals, 11 research institutes, 442 polyclinics and an abundance of family doctors working in communities, schools, and the workplace.³³ The top floor of each two-story medical complex serves as the physician's residence, while the bottom floor is the community clinic. The nation's 60,129 doctors—or 54.6 per 10,000 citizens—staff these clinics.³⁴ Most physicians work in the same town in which they grew up; because of this, there is a familiarity with their patients. Remarkably, as of 1994, no Cuban lived more than 600 yards away from a family physician or nurse.³⁵ This model, attained in the 1960's, has been replicated in almost every town.³⁶ Additionally, Cuba has placed emphasis on creating a strong and educated medical team. Before the revolution the doctor-patient ratio was 1:2,000.³⁷ Now the ratio is 1:180, which beats the United States' doctor-patient ratio of 1:360.³⁸ Cuba's physicians are also extremely qualified. Physicians must complete a nine-year medical program with formidable medical standards and an additional three years of study for specialization.³⁹

Cuba is also a leader in health technology. Because of Cuba's economic isolation, it only has access to a small percentage of the new medicines available on the world market. Consequently, Cubans have become extremely self-reliant. By being cut off from the international pharmaceutical trade, Cuba has developed one of the best pharmaceutical industries in the world.⁴⁰ Health breakthroughs in Cuba have also been impressive. Cuba can produce a wide variety of vaccines from its own resources. Researchers from the Centro de Ingenieria Genetica y Biotecnologia (CIGB) have developed a vaccine against Hepatitis B. They are also the first to discover a vaccine against the bacteria that causes meningitis-B. The Placental Histotherapy Center is successfully treating vitiligo, the loss of skin pigmentation, with newly developed substances. Havana's International Center for Neurological Restoration is also one of the world's leading centers for the treatment of Parkinson's disease.⁴¹

Cuba's health care system has placed emphasis on prevention rather than the cure. This is a key reason for the decrease in communicable illnesses. Polio, smallpox, malaria, tetanus, measles, whooping cough, and diphtheria have been virtually eradicated.⁴² However, cases are now beginning to reappear due to extreme poverty. Children are also immunized at a young age against a dozen diseases, including meningitis. At local clinics, family doctors supervise immunizations, prenatal care and cancer screenings.⁴³ The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) reports that 100 percent of all Cuban women who give birth in hospitals are attended by trained physicians.⁴⁴

AIDS

In addition, Cuba has thrived in the field of AIDS elimination. While most countries have a geometric progression of AIDS, Cuba has

succeeded in following an arithmetic progression.⁴⁵ Currently there are an estimated 2,800 HIV/AIDS cases for Cuba's 11 million citizens.⁴⁶ Cuba's AIDS prevalence rate of 0.03 percent⁴⁷ is better than the rates of its neighboring countries—particularly Haiti and Barbados—and has better or similar prevalence rates to first-world countries such as the United States.⁴⁸

Many factors have contributed to Cuba's remarkably low AIDS rate including the absence of intravenous drug use, easy access to abortion, a strong Catholic faith and its climate of sexual purity and hostility toward homosexuals.⁴⁹ Additionally Castro's regime has set up an effective screening and reporting system.⁵⁰ After a PAHO meeting in 1983, the first thing Cuba did was block blood importation from countries with known AIDS cases and from blood banks that were commercially owned.⁵¹ Starting in June 1986, the government began testing all blood donors as well as those who had done extensive travel outside of the country.⁵² Furthermore, a special group was established in 1985 to trace and test the sexual partners of seropositive individuals.⁵³ HIV screening in Cuba has achieved success by being comprehensive and routine. Cuba's system requires complete testing, reporting, and partner notification for the sexually active population. By the year 1993, more than 12 million HIV tests had been conducted.⁵⁴

However Cuba's AIDS policies do not go without speculation. These policies have been criticized for flying in the face of Western values and humanitarian rights. Most notably, Cuba's AIDS policy has received scrutiny from the international community for the isolation of infected individuals in sanitariums and for recommending abortion for any women infected with HIV or AIDS.⁵⁵ In 1986, Cuba began its most aggressive and controversial policy by quarantining HIV-positive individuals in the Santiago de las Vegas sanitarium for inspection, regulation, and treatment.⁵⁶ Seven years later, Cuba restructured its program and allowed both men and women to leave the sanitarium program on the condition of good hygiene and their vow to use condoms.⁵⁷ Today 48 percent of those with AIDS or HIV choose to live in the 16 sanitariums around Cuba.⁵⁸

Other Nations

When comparing Cuba's health care statistics to other countries, this little island does quite well for itself. The child mortality rate per thousand live births in Cuba is 6.5, compared to 6.7 in the United States; Mexico's is 24.9.⁵⁹ The number of medical doctors per 10,000 inhabitants in Cuba is 59, compared to 27.9 in the United States or 1.5 in Colombia.⁶⁰ The proportion of children under one year of age that are vaccinated against poliomyelitis in Cuba is 100 percent, followed by the United State at 91 percent and Mexico at 89 percent.⁶¹

With a population of almost nine million people and a similar history and demographic makeup, the Dominican Republic is an important guide in measuring Cuba's health.⁶² Occupying more than

two-thirds of the island of Hispaniola, the Dominican Republic has the same blend of African and European ancestry as Cuba. Both islands also share a common past of Spanish colonization, bloody wars, and brutal dictatorships. However, this country has taken a somewhat different path than Cuba. The Dominican Republic operates on the system of a representative democracy, with power divided among executive, legislative, and judicial branches.⁶³ While the economy has improved drastically over the last two decades by focusing on the production of exports and decentralization, reduced public spending on education and health has led to an increase in poverty.⁶⁴ In addition, public health regulation is very weak; most existing health care standards are 10 to 20 years old. The system, combining public and private efforts, relies heavily on outside resources. World Health Organization reports indicate that out of all of Latin America, the Dominican Republic has the highest rate—at 71 percent for private expenditure on health as a percent of total health expenditures. Cuba's rate is the lowest at 10.8 percent.⁶⁵ The Dominican Republic also has a problem with the increasing prevalence of AIDS. This rate is growing at 2.8 percent annually.⁶⁶ However, the Dominican Republic has a high life expectancy rate at 73.68 years.⁶⁷

Puerto Rico is another Caribbean country that can be compared to Cuba. After the Spanish-American War, Puerto Rico became a commonwealth of the United States. Although still linked to the United States, a constitution was created in 1952 to allow for internal self-government.⁶⁸ Unlike Cuba, Puerto Rico's medical system functions by a series of public, private, and privatized public institutions. However, Puerto Rico's health institutions prosper from the U.S. government contribution of net disbursements, accounting for 22.4 percent of Puerto Rico's GDP.⁶⁹ This island has similar health statistics to Cuba. Puerto Rico's life expectancy is 75.6 years and has an infant mortality rate of only 10.6 per 1,000 live births.⁷⁰ One hundred percent of Puerto Rico's population has access to drinking water services.⁷¹

Fall from Paradise

Although its health statistics appear to be convincing, Cuban's overall health is a far stretch from paradise. The U.S. embargo has had a dampening effect on the country's medical system; poor sanitation and housing conditions have weakened its success. Pacemakers, x-ray film

and incubators for premature infants are among some of the items the U.S. embargo has succeeded in making scarce. Reynaldo Garcia Sanchez, for example, is a 30-year-old doctor for a state-run preschool. He is so in need of supplies that when the school needs aspirin he has to knock on neighbors' doors. In an interview with Health and Hospital Networks, Sanchez claims: "We need everything: soap, pills, vitamins, first-aid kits, books to keep medical histories..."⁷² Throughout the past fourteen years, medicines, basic medical supplies and surgical equipment have also been scarce for the majority of Cubans. Ambulance services are limited, biomedical research has been restricted, and surgery is only performed on select cases.⁷³



A girl dressed as an angel walks in a procession for the Virgin of Charity, the patron saint of Cuba, in the streets of Havana on Sept. 8, 2002. The saint was canonized by Pope John Paul II during his visit to Cuba in 1998. (photo by Cristobal Herrera/AP)

The American Association for World Health (AAWH) conducted a study in 1999 on the effects of the embargo on Cubans' health. In this study, AAWH found that Cuban patients are deprived of many drugs that U.S. manufacturers have patented since 1980. This converts to about 50 percent of the new drugs on the market.⁷⁴ Cuban doctors also cannot get basic medicines and equipment. Currently, Cuban doctors only have access to about 889 out of the 1,297 medications that were available in 1991.⁷⁵

Cuba's water quality is also affected by the embargo. Cuba has restricted access to water treatment chemicals and replacement parts for its water supply system. Due to poor water quality, the mortality rate is rising. Occurrences of waterborne diseases such as typhoid fever, dysentery and viral hepatitis are also on the rise due to the lack of a clean water supply. For example, acute diarrheal disease incidences rose from 2.7 persons per 100,000 in 1989 to 6.7 in 1994.⁷⁶ There is also a severe shortage of food, especially cooking oil, red meat, chicken, eggs, cheese, butter and milk.⁷⁷ Reports show Cuba ranks last in Latin America for per capita food consumption. Malnutrition is a severe health effect due to this lack of access to food products. Reduced access to food has led to nutritional deficiencies, especially among pregnant women.⁷⁸ In the 1990's, reduced nutrient intake and excessive smoking caused over 50,000 cases of optical and peripheral neuropathies.⁷⁹

AAWH found other devastating effects. Cuban doctors are in short supply of pediatric-size needles used for intravenous chemotherapy and glucose injections. Therefore, adult-size needles must be used, which often damage the children's veins.⁸⁰ Also, Cuban children with the life-threatening disease lymphoblastic leukemia are denied access to life-prolonging drugs such as oncaspar, and are left untreated to die within two to three months as U.S.-patented drugs like oncaspar are banned by the embargo. Surgeries have also dropped from 885,790 in

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1990 to 536,547 in 1995, signifying a decline in the resources needed to perform operations.⁸¹

The most devastating factors for Cuba's health care system have been the ban on subsidiary trade and the discouragement of licensing and shipping. Under the 1992 Cuba Democracy Act (CDA), Cuba's ability to import medical supplies and medicines from a third party was severely restricted. Before the CDA, Cuba performed over \$700,000 worth of trade with U.S. subsidiaries annually. From this figure, 90 percent was used for food and medicines.⁸² In addition, licensing for individual sales of medicines and medical supplies—lawful under the CDA—is now such a laborious task that it discourages sales. In fact, since 1992 hardly any licenses have been granted. The CDA also prevents ships in U.S. ports from loading or unloading for 180 days. This policy is extremely costly and further discourages the transport of medical supplies between Cuba and the U.S.⁸³

Castro's October 2002 speech also acknowledged the destructive reality of the embargo. In this speech, Castro read excerpts from his 1962 speech, which celebrated the creation of the new medical institution. He stated, "Health care is one of the most sensitive areas through which our enemies tried to hurt our people. It is very logical that we Cubans should aspire to reducing infant mortality; to extending the average life expectancy of every citizen; to combating diseases and combating death...Unscrupulous individuals tried to hurt us in this way. They tried to deprive our country of the resources needed to fight for life, to fight against disease, to save thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of lives, especially the lives of children."⁸⁴

Has Utopia Vanished?

Although the American embargo has been in place for over 44 years and posters of Castro and his Communist ideals are prevalent in the streets of Havana, there are still signs of American presence in Cuba. Starting in 1994, just three years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Castro introduced a variety of public-private sector initiatives. That year, the U.S. dollar was introduced as legal tender and its ownership by individuals was de-penalized. The government also encouraged private food production and reopened non-state food markets. However, these new adjustment policies have not provided enough solutions for Cuban society. Unemployment increases, labor productivity is low, general income is decreasing, and the gap between urban inequalities is spreading⁸⁵

As evidence that the times are changing, tourism now surpasses sugar as the major industry and revenue source. With Cuba's new dollar-generating economy, unforeseen inequalities are beginning to emerge. In 2001, 200,000 Americans traveled to Cuba. From this number, three-fifths were of Cuban descent and 50,000 were Americans who traveled illegally to Cuba via a third country.⁸⁶ This travel generates American dollars for the Cuban economy. In addition, because of a

loophole in the embargo act, Cubans receive \$800 million annually in remittances sent over from Cuban-American relatives living in Florida.⁸⁷

Although Cuba's medical system operates under the banner of universal health care, in reality it functions on two tiers: tourists, government officials and the Cuban elite receive top care while the general public has sub-par access for their medical needs. Cuba has begun reorienting its health care system toward the task of earning foreign exchange. Government-run pharmacies only accept pesos—the national currency most accessible to the poor—and are stocked with a limited selection of Cuban-made drugs.⁸⁸ Meanwhile, "dollar pharmacies," found in hotels, cater to tourists or those who work in the tourism industry; these pharmacies have an unlimited supply of aspirin, cough syrup, adhesive bandages, and other common medical products.⁸⁹ After most visits to the doctor, the average Cuban is forced to beg on the streets for the drugs that are not supplied by the government. Others turn to Cuban relatives living in America who can ship them. The rest of the population must resort to the black market or prostitution.⁹⁰

David Wald, co-founder of USA/Cuba Infomed, addressed the new challenges for health care in the 21st century in a recent interview. Wald, whose non-profit is responsible for providing Cuba's Ministry of Public Health (MINSAP) with computers and other materials needed to sustain and expand its medical information network, explains that only those Cubans who work in the tourism industry have access to the dollar. Professionals such as doctors, who earn their salary in pesos from the government, make considerably less. Wald says that the Communist government recognizes the inequalities, but the revenue earned by tourism is necessary to survive. He states: "It turns out that tourism is considered by the [Cuban] government a necessary evil and that they have to put up with it. The government explains to people that they don't have much choice."⁹¹

The Socialist Tight Rope

Now, in the 21st century, Cuba is walking a socialist tight rope. With the integration of the U.S. dollar and recent enthusiasm to end the embargo brought about by Jimmy Carter's 2002 visit, capitalism could soon be approaching Cuban waters. Cuba's youth, nearly 60 percent of the population, are among the healthiest and most educated in Latin America.⁹² They are vibrant and full of questions. If and when the embargo ends, Cuban pharmacy shelves could be filled with American medicines while Cubans wait in line to receive free and unlimited health care. ■

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	CUBA	UNITED STATES	DOMINICAN REP.	PUERTO RICO	HAITI	JAMAICA
Population:	11,224,321	280,562,489	8,721,594	3,957,988	7,063,722	2,680,029
GDP - per capita:	\$2,300	\$36,300	\$5,800	\$11,200	\$1,700	\$3,700
Literacy of Total Population:	95.70%	97%	82%	89%	45%	85%
Infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births:	7.27	6.69	33.41	9.3	93.35	13.71
Life expectancy at birth for total population:	76.6	77.4	73.68	75.96	49.55	75.64
HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate:	0.03%	0.61%	2.80%	N/A	5.17%	0.71%

Can Lula Provide Hope for a Weary MST?

by Jessica Varney



For long months, 2,800 families squatted on the Cuiabá

plantation in the Xingó sertão, along the São Francisco

River, until the property's expropriation was finally

approved on May 6, 1996. This was a great victory for

the peasants who gathered to celebrate.

State of Sergipe, northern Brazil. 1996.

(photo by Sebastião Salgado)

When newly elected Brazilian president, Luis Inacio "Lula" da Silva was a child, he and his family joined the rural exodus of families who could no longer combat the arid climate of Northeastern Brazil. The Northeast is one of Brazil's most poverty stricken regions. Over 60% of all Brazilian poor and 69% of Brazil's rural poor call the Northeast home. The annual per capita income of rural residents is one-tenth of the national average (US \$230).¹ Lula and his family, like many others, migrated to the metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in search for a better life. Instead, they found themselves living in the favelas (or shantytowns) on the outskirts of the cities, scraping by on a menial income.

A social movement arose from the common despair amongst these landless rural workers, some of whom are still trying to make ends meet

as itinerant workers, sharecroppers, and renters, whilst others have hung up the towel and moved to the cities. The Landless Workers' Movement, better known by the Portuguese abbreviation, MST, (or Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra), has embarked upon a revolutionary struggle that is long overdue. Its demand for agrarian reform isn't neoteric, but its tactics are. Through nationwide organized marches, occupations, and collectivity, the MST has caused a commotion throughout the Brazilian countryside in its attempts to set a precedent for acceptable agrarian reform.

MST's role in agrarian reform was severely undermined by Brazil's past president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. His administration privatized the agriculture sector and implemented a market-based model of agrarian reform. The model hurt the rural poor more than it

succeeded in helping them, contrary to its stated purpose. In the period of 1995-1999, four million people left the countryside for the cities.² They were unable to compete with the multinational oligopolization of agri-business, the monster created by President Cardoso's privatization. A study conducted by the government itself concluded that if this model of neoliberal policies in the agriculture sector continues, an estimated 8-13 million more people will leave for the cities in the next few years.³

However, they would find bleak options in cities that are already under-resourced and over-crowded. This continued exodus of small family farmers will be detrimental to the already outrageous numbers of malnourished, unemployed Brazilians, not to mention the whole of the Brazilian economy. According to the World Bank, the "1995 agrarian census [showed] that family farms are more efficient and labor-intensive than large farms [so the demise of them] limits agricultural productivity and employment."⁴

Brazil's new president brings hope. The Brazilian people have articulated their distaste with the policies of the past administration and their fervor for radical changes by electing not only a candidate from the Left, but one who knows firsthand the plight of his people. A recent article in *The Nation* stated that "Lula isn't just the first president to be for the Brazilian poor, but to actually be one of them."⁵ There is a lot of pressure on him because the people are "aware that this historic presidency and the entrance of the Brazilian Workers' Party (PT) into the government may be their last chance to make a humane country out of their grotesquely unfair society."⁶ The MST and PT have a history of sympathy towards one another, and although the MST makes it a point to be jealously autonomous from political parties, it has higher expectations of this one. The question remains: Will Lula be able to remain faithful to the expectations of those who elected him, while still adhering to monetary demands at home and abroad?

Colonization

As the largest Latin American country, with the ninth largest economy in the world, Brazil has the potential to be a role model for its neighboring countries. Yet, a huge problem remains: it "ranks fourth-worst on the globe in the gap between rich and poor—right behind Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic and Swaziland."⁷ This disparity can be directly related to the concentration of land in the hands of wealthy elite, due to colonization that occurred 500 years earlier that Brazil has yet to shake off: 1% of landowners own 44% of all Brazilian land,⁸ one of the highest concentrations worldwide.

In the sixteenth century, the Portuguese crown laid claim to the area that was later to be known as Brazil by, "[dividing the land up] into 12 giant provinces, called capitánias, and within these [the king] distributed great tracts of land, known as sesmarias, as gifts to loyal subjects, favorites and relatives."⁹ The slave trade began at the same time, lasting

350 years; it imported several million slaves who were to labor in the sesmarias. In 1850, the year the slave trade ended, the first land law was passed. The *Lei das Terras* stated that land could only be attained by purchase, not through occupation.¹⁰

Therefore, "control over the land law provided landowners with a sort of nineteenth-century version of 'decompression,' except that in this instance the transition envisaged was not so much a political one, from one model of political control to another, as a socio-economic one, from slave to 'free' labor,"¹¹ having no effect on their quality of life. With so few people with means to purchase land, there was a huge labor pool for those with land to pick from.

"During the entire colonial period, contrary to the case of the present developed countries, that highly unjust agrarian structure remained unchanged. Only the powerful had access to property, leading to the land falling into the hands of a few. There was no reformist movement, let alone any armed revolution, to change that situation."¹²

Change appeared to be on the brink during the administration of President João Goulart in the early 1960s. He hinted at the idea of expropriating some of the larger estates to the peasants who had begun to assemble. Alarmed, the large estate owners—with support of the United States government—enlisted the armed forces to carry out a coup in March 1964.¹³ The military government that replaced Goulart was suppressive towards the rural workers, yet ironically passed a progressive Land Statute (*Estatuto da Terra*) shortly after assuming control.

The Land Statute legalized the expropriation of unproductive or over-large landholdings for the purpose of land reform, and indemnified the owners with government bonds. However noteworthy the creation of the Land Statute was, it was never used as means to give land to the needy. Instead, the expropriated lands were given to those who could have afforded to buy them. The Land Statute has been the base from which MST has catapulted its action in demand for agrarian reform.

Historical Origins of MST

"Twenty years ago an unacknowledged war raged throughout Brazil's vast interior. It was an unequal conflict – on one-side illiterate peasant farmers and smallholders, on the other the powerful forces unleashed by the military regime's economic policy- ruthless cattle ranchers and landowners. In the 1970's this policy led directly to the displacement of almost five million people in the three southern states alone. They became 'sem terra' – or landless."¹⁴

While the military government was distributing land to colleagues and friends, they had "presented the landless families with bleak options:

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they could migrate to the Amazon, they could cross the border to neighboring Paraguay, (where land was cheap), or they could invade land in indigenous reservations.”¹⁵ Families went in all directions. Some fought the brutal climate of the Amazons, while others occupied the Indian reservations, where the government had suggested that they would turn a blind eye to their occupations. In addition, a community of *brasiguaios* (Brazilians who settled in Paraguay¹⁶) emerged.

Even still, a number of families remained in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul, and survived off the grace of the local Catholic Church. Father Arnildo Fritzen, a member of the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT), was especially sympathetic to their struggles.¹⁷ He began to encourage the landless to join together and discuss what actions could be taken to change their situation. It was here that they began to organize their first occupation.

After much organization and help from Father Arnildo and João Pedro Stedile, a young economist who worked for the State Department of Agriculture (and later became one of the MST’s permanent national board leaders), they had decided on a date and location. On September 7, 1979, Brazil’s Independence Day, they occupied the Macali farm on the Sarandí estate, just outside of Ronda Alta.¹⁸ It was leased to private owners, but Stedile discovered that the lease had expired, thereby providing grounds for expropriation. One hundred and ten families took part in that first occupation, which gained national and international attention. The families shared what little food and supplies they were able to bring along, sleeping in makeshift tents composed of black polythene. They planted rice, beans, maize, potatoes and soya. Planting by hand and using oxen to plough, they worked collectively, a first for many families who had accustomed themselves to the harsh life of independent farming. One woman who participated in the occupation noted, “I came from a German family and we’d been brought up to look out for ourselves, not to help others. I learnt that you live better when you share things. And that lesson has stayed with me ever since.”¹⁹

A few months into their stay, they experienced the first major encounter with gun-clad policemen, who were sent by the governor to have them evicted. They reacted in the calm, responsible determination of people with nothing to lose, but so much to gain. The women and children provided a barrier, encircling the camp and the men. In order for the police to get to their husbands they would have to go through them. Father Arnildo, who was present, commented: “It was one of the most beautiful things I’ve seen in my life. And it was a turning point. From then on, I knew they would win.”²⁰

It was there that they gained the strength in numbers as well as the importance of collectivity that allowed them to survive for a year, until September 1980. Out of his desperation to get the occupation out of the news, the governor told the families they could stay, assuming that this action would put out their fire, but it only succeeded in motivating other families to demonstrate that land was accessible with perseverance.

CPT, overwhelmed with the increasing numbers of families interested in occupations across the country, encouraged the creation of

a new movement devoted to agrarian reform through land occupations. In 1984, 1,500 representatives from more than half of Brazil’s 27 states met in Cascavel, Paraná; hence was the beginning of the *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra*.²¹ After days of deliberation, those present at the first meeting agreed on a few key aspects for the development of the movement: in order for it to be a mass movement, whole families would be welcome. The movement would be run by the *sem-terra* themselves, independent of the church, labor unions, and political parties.²² More important was the consensus, “to fight for agrarian reform; to fight for a just, fraternal society and for an end to capitalism; to include rural workers, tenant farmers, sharecroppers, smallholders and so on, in the category of landless worker; and to ensure that the land be used for those who work it and live from it.”²³

The movement sought to impact the agricultural arena, but affected the entire country. The MST’s “occupations have resulted in land titles for 250,000 families on some 1,600 settlements. Another 70,000 people squat and wait for government recognition.”²⁴ MST has a complex national structure reaching from the grassroots level in 23 Brazilian states to the national, and continues to pride itself on democratic practices. They have 96 small and medium-sized agro industries, which process fruits and vegetables, dairy, grain, coffee, meat, and sweets; these businesses aid 700 small municipalities in Brazil’s interior, by providing employment and producing income and revenues.²⁵

MST’s Successes

Initially, the landless were so eager to get titles to the lands they had been occupying, sometimes for as long as three years, that once they received these titles it was believed that the hardest times had passed and from here on out it was smooth sailing. They couldn’t have been more mistaken. They assumed that the same methods used for the large plantations would have the same success for small farmers. However, after a couple meager seasons using the “most modern hybrid seeds,” and the “most fertilizers,” “families found that, as their soils got exhausted, they were spending more and more on fertilizers and pesticides. Their purchases on these modern inputs started absorbing 60, 70 percent of the price they got for their crop.”²⁶ Many settlements sought other farming options, most notably *agro-ecologia*, or organic farming. The director of a farming cooperative in the state of Paraná articulated MST’s transition towards organic farming:

“In the beginning, when we were working with agrochemicals, those who worked the fields were getting sick. This is why we made the change to organic. There was no other way. The change was difficult technically, and expensive at first. But we saw an improvement in the health of the whole community—especially the children—as we began to consume foods produced without agrochemicals.”²⁷



Peasants returning from work to the settlement of Santa Clara. State of Sergipe, northern Brazil. 1996.

(photo by Sebastião Salgado)

A handful of settlements throughout Brazil are certified organic, and others are in the transition towards being certified as well. Yet there is still a large handful clinging to the methods of big business, “the propaganda in favor of chemical farming [is] so strong that people [don’t] believe that an alternative model [is] possible.”²⁸ But the settlements who have converted to organic are a promising example of its benefits.

Bionatur, MST’s organic seed company, is generating optimistic achievements. The seeds are sold to settlements all over Brazil and at the MST’s shop in São Paulo. This was a big step for the MST and with its growing production, shows its was a right step to have taken, “Bionatur now produces 20 varieties of organic seed, with an output of four tons in 2000. About 50 families are producing the seeds in various settlements.”²⁹ The potential is exciting and certainly feeding continual interests into the prospects of organic farming.

MST has also taken significant strides in education, realizing that “70% of the peasants in Brazil are illiterate;”³⁰ most of which reside in the rural areas. In a conscious action to eliminate such shocking percentages, MST has gone to great lengths to provide education at all levels in their camps and settlements. Now there are 150,000 children

attending elementary level classes at 1,200 public schools set up in the camps and settlements, where 3,800 teachers work. About 1,200 MST educators teach literacy classes to 25,000 adults and youths. In addition, MST has built and equipped 250 day

care centers, enabling the mothers of toddlers to go to work and to attend state and national MST activities³¹—an achievement in itself—considering Brazil’s legendary machismo is especially represented in the countryside. Luckily, this isn’t represented among the leadership in the MST. Of the 22 national leadership positions, women hold ten of them.³² Even at the local level, women are urged to volunteer for local positions within their settlements.

The MST has also created ITERRA, a middle level school, custom designed so that students are taught in an alternating fashion. Students stay in school for two months of “theory,” and then go back to their settlements to develop practical pedagogical activities. The school is run in the manner of a cooperative: not only do the students perform all maintenance work, but they also run all activities in full-fledged cooperation.³³ An 18-year-old MST activist articulated the improvement MST’s education has had on him: “When you’re illiterate, it’s the same as being blind. With its schools, books, and practice, the Movement teaches us to

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see the world.”³⁴

These achievements never came easily. As the next section will articulate, they were often undermined by the government of President Cardoso.

Market-based Agrarian Reform

“Currently our main problem is the neoliberal policies of a government that isn’t concerned with the social needs of the Brazilian people.”

Delwek Matheus, an elected MST member to the National Board.³⁵

In April, 1997, the World Bank (in cooperation with President Cardoso’s administration) approved a US\$90 million loan to finance a market-assisted land reform and poverty alleviation project, which according to the two collaborating parties, “(would) enable local communities to identify and negotiate the purchase of land from willing sellers.”³⁶ The

pilot project, which went by the name of *Cédula da Terra* (Land Bill), encompassed the creation of a separate Land Bank, which gave loans to landless families for the purchase of land. Raul Jungman, the Minister for Agrarian Development and the mastermind behind the project, believed that the expropriation of land was outdated, carrying on the legacy of Brazil’s authoritarian past, which had kept power in the hands of the federal government. He sought to modernize the whole system by decentralizing it, giving the power to local bodies. He argued, “Brazil had adopted a market economy, so it had to find modern market mechanisms for agrarian reform.”³⁷

The implementation of the pilot program caused an uproar amongst the civil society involved with agrarian reform, most notably the MST. The program not only undermined the MST’s efforts in agrarian reform, but it sought to attack the movement at its base: the local municipalities. When MST occupies an estate, its main power was and is its ability to pester the state and federal government bodies “through demonstrations,



This photograph shows the takeover by landless peasants of the 200,000-acre (70,000-hectare) Giacometti plantation, the largest private holding in the state of Paraná. This occupation climaxed a long struggle for land by the peasants. In the early 1980’s, the government of Brazil decreed the expropriation of the estate as a latifundio, or excessively large unproductive property. However, thanks to the political connections of the Giacometti group, which owned the land, the expropriation was never carried out. After repeated legal efforts went nowhere, the peasants began applying pressure on the authorities by encircling the disputed land with settlements. With 3,000 families entering the land, they have created a situation that forces the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INCRA) to reopen the case. If the expropriation takes place, with the owners compensated with National Treasury bonds, the area will suffice to settle 4,000 families and generate over 8,000 jobs. State of Paraná, Brazil. 1996. (photo by Sebastião Salgado)

marches and occupations of government offices to expropriate the area.”³⁸ Stephan Schwartzman, of the Environmental Defense Fund in Washington, concluded in his analysis of the World Bank project: “This in reality is not a ‘market-based’ land reform project at all, but a land reform project that devolves responsibility for land reform from federal governments to state governments—precisely those more susceptible to pressure and manipulation of local and regional elites.”³⁹

There were several other major flaws in the project that affected its potential landless beneficiaries. First, as João Pedro Stedile of the MST’s National Board pointed out, “Large landowners have always kept their land for speculative purposes. It’s also a way to exert control over the population in the countryside. So, whoever decides to sell will probably sell the worst land for high prices.”⁴⁰ The beneficiaries usually accepted the first offer, as they were so eager to get land; they were also afraid of losing the opportunity. The land was usually sold at above-market-price far too expensive for landless families to purchase. “A rural trade union body calculated that, even if everything went as well as anyone could reasonably hope, farmers would have to spend up to half of their income for 17 years to cover the repayments.”⁴¹ In the end, they would probably end up losing their land, since they guaranteed their loans with their land.

In addition, an independent study called the Preliminary Evaluation Report commissioned by the Ministry for Agrarian Reform came across some startling truths about the project. The team surveyed 50 percent of the projects and found that almost 30 percent of the beneficiaries were unaware they have taken out loans. Of the remainder, less than one percent accurately stated the interest rate on their loans, and less than ten percent knew that they had guaranteed their loans with their land.⁴²

The final factor was the erroneous assumption that poor landless workers—most of whom are uneducated and many of who are illiterate— would be able to equally negotiate with landed elites, “whom they had been brought up to fear and defer to.”⁴³

“While the [World Bank] staff may claim that MST [...] is ideologically opposed to ‘market-based’ land reform, the fact is that no effort was made to engage these groups in dialogue at the projects inception,” Schwartzman said.⁴⁴ Had there been collaboration with the MST and other civil society organizations and NGOs, there could have been hope for some type of ‘market-based’ agrarian reform. However, there wasn’t any communication; this was extremely evident in the one-sidedness of the process, which inevitably led to the demise of the program.

The World Bank and Jungman, regardless of the Preliminary Evaluation, still regarded the program as a successful, participatory, market-based alternative approach to land reform, and hence proposed a \$1 billion, 10-year expansion of the program. Subsequent to much upheaval nationally and internationally, the World Bank withdrew. Instead, a \$200 million Land Reform II project (ostensibly including some civil society proposals), was approved, allowing much greater transparency and review of the Bank board.

MST’s Hopes of Lula

As ecstatic as MST members were concerning Lula’s victory, they are postponing celebrations until action is taken. The organization has had its hopes for a sympathetic government crumbled before, as was the case of President Goulart in the early 1960s. “João Pedro Stedile, a leader of the MST, described Lula’s victory as a triumph for the Brazilian people but warned that ‘if he tries to deceive us, asking endlessly for our patience, then he will finish up like [Fernando] de la Rúa’—the Argentinean president who was deposed by a popular revolt in December 2001.”⁴⁵

The MST’s experience with the current Brazilian Workers’ Party (PT) government in Rio Grande do Sul in comparison to the Cardoso government is allegedly “as different as ‘night and day.’”⁴⁶ Yet since Lula’s inauguration, both have been conscious not to be taken advantage of: “The PT promises land reform but has said it will not tolerate ‘illegal’ land invasions. Stedile, meanwhile, has promised an upsurge of mobilizations whoever [whether PT or not] is in government, if they fail to introduce ‘a radical change in the economic and agricultural model.’”⁴⁷

When asked in 1997 what the main objectives of the PT in the short and in the long term were, Lula responded: “The PT’s main long-term objective is to build another model of society in which the people receive a fair share of the fruits of their work. The objective in the short run is to prevent the government of President Cardoso from destroying Brazil as a nation. We want to prove that Brazil can participate in the global economy without submission.”⁴⁸ These statements fall much in line with the objectives of the MST. But how much of that radicalism has he shed in his conscious move towards the Center-Left, which enabled him get approval (and votes) of middle class Brazilians? Possibly not too much, looking at Lula’s Ministry appointees—a revolutionary group:

“The environment minister, Marina Silva, who was born to a poor family of rubber-tappers deep in the Amazon forest and only learned to read and write when she was 16 years old; the education minister, Critovam Buarque, who, as mayor of Brasília, won international acclaim for his Bolsa Escola, a scheme in which poor families were paid a basic monthly wage for sending their children to school rather than out to work; the social welfare minister, Benedita da Silva, a black shanty-town dweller and feminist; and the agrarian reform minister, Miguel Rossetto, former vice-governor of the PT government in Rio Grande do Sul state and an ally of the militant Landless Rural Workers’ Movement.”⁴⁹

An article in *O Estado de São Paulo*, a Brazilian newspaper, reported that Miguel Rossetto’s appointment as Minister of Agrarian Development (Land Reform) was welcomed with enthusiasm by the MST. But the editorial voices concern, as Rossetto represents PT’s most radical wing, and is known for both his ideological intransigence and

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tolerance towards land invasions.⁵⁰ This makes Rossetto an ally of whom MST is very grateful to have in such an office. Rossetto explained that one of the main concerns of the department will be to seek lawful instruments to give agility to land reform. "Land reform for us is not problem, but solution," he said—repeating a phrase that MST leaders have coined.⁵¹

As *The Economist* put it, "The petistas, as members of Lula's Workers' Party (PT) are called, are struggling to master the machinery of government without being compromised by it. And they are trying to correct what they regard as Brazil's misguided course while having to rely on many of the people who plotted it."⁵² This will be Lula's biggest challenge. However, he has put his best foot forward, being very politically minded in his decision to accept an IMF loan that Cardoso had put into play. He realizes that in order to carry out his social agenda, he needs money. Meanwhile, he has also appointed a progressive minister for agrarian reform, one who has already dealt with the MST and is sympathetic towards its causes.

In closing, the MST will continue its occupations, as a form of pressure on the government. With Rossetto in a position of power, there very well could be an upsurge in land titles given, leading to a new wave of motivation and determination amongst the landless. President Cardoso's agrarian tactics have left them weary and succeeded in dismantling many of the MST's smaller municipal offshoots—precisely where a strong MST presence is needed most. A consistent and equal dialogue between the MST and the Ministry of Agrarian Development will produce the best results for both sides.

When asked what the biggest turning point in his life was in an interview with the *Washington Post*, Lula responded: "I ate bread for the first time in my life when I was seven years old. Until then, I drank black coffee and mixed flour in the coffee and porridge for breakfast. In those days, a lot of children starved before reaching the age of one. I managed to survive."⁵³ Hopefully he can recall those survival tactics and apply them to his presidency. As President Fernando Henrique Cardoso put it: "Brazil is not a poor country, it is an unjust one,"⁵⁴ and if Lula can take his own experiences with this notoriously unjust country and remember them while in office, he too will have much success. ■

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Opportunities and Threats of EU Enlargement

by Kimberly Mann

The end of WW II left Europe financially devastated and war torn.

The once great Europe was morally tired and the land and cities destroyed by the immeasurable bombings and battles. The year 1945 marked the beginning of the ideological division of Europe between the communist east and the capitalist west, which lasted for almost five decades.

Winston Churchill gave a speech at the University of Zurich, in which he proclaimed: [In order for Europe to rise up out of the devastation caused by the war,] “to re-create the European family, or as much of it as we can, and provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety, and in freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe. ...The first step is to form a Council of Europe. If at first all the states of Europe are not willing or able to join the Union, we must nevertheless proceed to assemble and combine those who will and those who can.”¹

The idea was put in place that a united Europe will be a strong Europe and the only way to guarantee peace and prosperity. The Schuman Declaration of 1950 was the first step towards what is today the European Union (EU). The Schuman Declaration called for the unification of Europe's strongest industries under a common authority. The Treaty of Paris established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) whose members were France, Germany and the BENELUX countries: Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. As the number of members grew and level of economic integration became deeper, the ECSC evolved into the European Economic Community (EEC) with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and later into the European Community in 1967. The agenda began to move towards political integration, and in 1992, the Maastricht Treaty was signed and the European Union formed.

The EU has a current membership of fifteen nation-states which are mainly from Western Europe. Since the last membership round in 1995 which admitted Austria, Finland and Sweden, the growth of its membership has been stagnant. The next enlargement, which is proposed for 2004, has both historic and symbolic significance for Europe. The admission of the Eastern European states is symbolic because it is reuniting Europe under one common ideology. Its historic significance is the near fulfillment of the original vision of the European Union, a union which was to include all the states of Europe. The 2004 enlargement is the largest in EU history; it will admit ten new countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.

Many of these countries are further behind developmentally than

most of the other EU members; they still have inefficient economic sectors,

high inflation or recent political instability. The EU is in the midst of proving it is a stable and efficient institution. The admission of ten new countries in 2004 will jeopardize the stability and success of not only the EU but of each individual nation-state. The EU will be at risk of becoming an inefficient and highly bureaucratized structure and the candidate countries will become an economic burden upon the EU members and continue to exist as peripheral or semi-peripheral states.

Countries wishing to join the EU must have attained, as decided on by the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. In addition, the candidate countries must have a functioning market economy, the capacity to cope with competitive pressures within the EU, the capability to absorb the obligations of membership or *acquis communautaire* (defined in the treaty establishing the EC), and they must be able to adhere to the aims of a political, economic and monetary union, which are addressed in Article 49 of the Maastricht Treaty.

The European Union acknowledged it had structural weaknesses and the changes needed to be made in order for it to accommodate 25 members. The Treaty of Nice, signed in February 2001, addressed the changes to be made within the institution and rules governing the EU.

Some of the key changes put into effect were adjustments made to the decision making process within the European Union. Within the European Council, which is the governing body where the governments of each member state are represented, two types of voting procedures are available: Unanimity and Qualified Majority Voting. The Qualified Majority votes are weighted on the basis of the population size of each member state and corrected in favor of less-populated countries as follows: France, Germany, Italy and United Kingdom 10 votes each; Spain 8 votes; Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal 5 votes each; Austria and Sweden 4 votes each; Denmark, Ireland and Finland 3 votes each; Luxembourg 2 votes.² There must be 62 votes out of 87 (71%) in favor for a decision to be made. This voting structure represents only 58% of the population of the Member States. If the present system of weighting votes were to continue with an enlarged EU, decisions would become less representative in terms of population.³ The changes addressed by the Treaty of Nice ensured the relative weight of the votes would not be out of proportion to the population size of member states. The restructuring of the weighting of votes has been changed to as follows:

Europe

Weighting of votes for Members of States and Candidate Countries

Member States		Candidate States	
Belgium	12	Bulgaria	10
Denmark	7	Cyprus	4
Germany	29	Czech Republic	12
Greece	12	Estonia	4
Spain	27	Hungary	12
France	29	Latvia	4
Ireland	7	Lithuania	7
Italy	29	Malta	3
Luxembourg	4	Poland	27
Netherlands	13	Romania	14
Austria	10	Slovakia	7
Portugal	12	Slovenia	4
Finland	7		
Sweden	10		
United Kingdom	29		

In addition, the number of issues upon which a member state can exercise their veto was reduced to avoid the danger of paralysis in the decision making process.⁴ The Treaty of Nice allowed for Qualitative Majority voting to preside on thirty issues which previously required unanimity; some of these issues include trade negotiations, asylum and immigration policies.⁵

Changes were also made to the structure of the Commission, which is the body responsible for the legislative process. The Commission is also responsible for implementing common policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy and administering the budget.⁶ Representation within the Commission prior to the Treaty of Nice consisted of two representatives for the most populated member states and one for the rest.⁷ If the current structure were maintained after the 2004 enlargement, the size of the Commission would be four times larger with 33 members. Representation within the Commission has been reduced to one representative per member state, however once membership within the EU reaches 27, member states will take turns serving on the Commission.⁸

Although the EU has made and recognized the need to make changes, these changes have not been enough. The structural changes only altered the functioning of the governing bodies but fundamental changes such as adjusting the size of the EU budget failed to be made. To guarantee security, solidarity and the freedom of movement of goods, services, persons and capital throughout the EU further modifications must be made particularly within the administration and judiciary aspects of the union.⁹

Enlarging the EU does have benefits. Europe has not forgotten its lengthy history of inter-state conflicts and world wars and its sensitivity

to economic depressions occurring in other parts of the world. An enlarged European Union is perceived to strengthen the stability and security of the European continent by having a common set of economic, political and security policies. The likelihood of peace amongst European states would be greater and there will be a clear border definition as to where Europe begins and ends.¹⁰

The Euro will also be present in a larger number of countries improving its competitiveness with the dollar. The EU would be able to further assert itself as a polarity of power in world affairs; there would no longer be the small individual voices of the countries but one big voice.

Although the enlargement process can be credited with initiating some of the necessary changes the EU would have had to make in the future; it is the expansion of the European market which is the main benefit of enlargement. A greater market size would provide greater competition, bringing about cheaper prices and an increase in the quality of goods, more consumers, greater access to resources, wider variety of available goods and an increase in production potential and employment availability. Enlargement towards Southern and Eastern Europe is claimed to create 300,000 jobs across the board.¹¹ An increase in the prosperity of the member states is expected with enlargement due to the withdrawal of investment barriers, the larger amount of investment opportunities available and the access to cheaper labor.

These benefits are the primary motivation behind the drive towards increasing EU membership. However there are risks to enlarging the European Union that have the potential of being very problematic. It will be threatened with an increased crime rate; the highest crime rates in Europe are amongst the Eastern and Southern countries.¹²

Not only is petty theft and burglary on the rise but so are drug trafficking and organised crime.¹³ The growing intensity of organised crime in countries such as Poland is becoming a particular concern.¹⁴ Absorbing the Eastern European countries also means absorbing the



Volunteers pass sandbags hand-to-hand to boost a dike they built at the Mulde River to protect the city of Bitterfeld, Germany. Heavy floods have devastated Central and Eastern Europe in 2002. (photo by Kai Pfaffenbach/Reuters)

high crime rates, because the mechanisms to deal with the spread of crime are either still under construction or in need of renovation; the free movement of people will only make the spread of crime easier amongst the other member states. Policing Eastern Europe's borders from crime coming in from further eastward will be a major security concern.


Enlargement will not only increase the EU population but it will also raise the level of poverty and inequality. The ratio between the 10% richest and the 10% poorest countries is expected to increase from 2:4 to 5:3 after enlargement.¹⁵ The candidate countries will also burden the EU with their own severe individual economic disparities. The increase in disparity between the weaker economies and stronger economies is a particular concern to Spain who is experiencing inflation rates comparable to those when it had higher growth rates in addition to a decline in growth.¹⁶ If these conditions persist there will be several repercussions. The one that inflicts the most unease is the likelihood of the conditions leading to higher wage settlements.¹⁷ Spanish economists are anxious that large wage increases, against a backdrop of slow economic growth will decrease Spain's competitiveness.¹⁸ The weaker economies of Spain, Portugal and Greece do not have the resource capacity to benefit from the immediate opportunities provided by enlargement and will continue to remain behind the stronger economies who will succeed in becoming richer.

A country like Portugal, whose manufacturing structure is still largely based on low labour costs, would need to undergo a major overhaul and a quality upgrade to remain competitive with the new members.¹⁹ Even if new entrants grew 2% per year faster than the rest of the EU every year up to 2015—which would be a remarkable achievement—poverty in those countries would still be two or three times as prevalent as in the current member states.²⁰ The commitment to lessen disparities between members will be a difficult undertaking for the future for many of the candidate countries have comparatively weak economies in comparison to those of the member states and candidate nations will need long-term support to remain on par with EU standards.

The large number of weak economies being admitted into the EU has the potential of imposing a risk of reducing the EU's economic performance on the whole. The largest criticism and risk of expansion lies with the strain on the EU budget. Even with the large number of countries being admitted into the EU, there has been no significant increase in the budget to support the applicants' transition and integration with EU standards on all issues ranging from the size of cages for laying hens to environmental standards.

Cohesion and Structural Funds designed to reduce inequality within the EU currently help poorer nations such as Greece, Portugal and Spain. These countries will lose heavily if the funds are re-allocated to those poorest in an enlarged EU.


Payments to the EU (euros)



Source: European Commission 1999

Givers and Takers

Net contributors and net receivers in euros



Source: EU 2000

The candidate countries, once members, would be among the net receivers from the EU budget, receiving more from the budget than that which is contributed. Funding would have to be removed from other sectors and put towards the continued structural reforms of these countries. The availability of aid for countries like Spain, Greece and Portugal, who are not yet at parity with the majority of the EU members, would be reduced.²¹ The EU will likely experience a population increase of 28% with only a GDP increase of 8%, which will

Europe

impose a strain on social conditions.²²

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) proves to be one of the thorniest issues of enlargement. The CAP is in desperate need of reform, for if no changes are made, the jeopardy of financial collapse becomes imminent.²³ The candidate countries, with vast inefficient agricultural sectors such as Poland and Hungary, would be entitled to the vast subsidies. Other countries, such as France, who rely heavily upon the CAP, would have to undergo a reduction in subsidies in order for the budget to accommodate the new members.

There is also the possibility of higher unemployment rates throughout the European Union. Germany alone has been experiencing unemployment levels that have not been seen since the 1930's.²⁴ This situation has the potential to become worse and is applicable to all member states; cheaper unemployed labor from Eastern Europe will flood the Western European economies and threaten the increase of job competition and push unemployment rates higher.

Enlargement poses the highest threat for the smaller and weaker economies of the European Union, they risk marginalization, loss of representation and being eclipsed by larger states. The EU as an institution will risk greater inefficiency and destabilization should the enlargement process continue without any reforms or considerations taken to the concerns of the individual member states.

What are the gains and motivations of the candidate countries behind the move to join the EU? After years of being blocked by the iron curtain, the upcoming enlargement wave is an opportunity to fill a historical desire to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community.²⁵ However one of the strongest attractions of the EU is the competitiveness and stability of the European currency, versus the respective currencies of the candidate countries. The volatility of their respective currencies has been a hindrance to their development.

The candidate countries would also gain solidarity from participation

in the EU's political and economic policies. The identification with a supranational body would increase the camaraderie amongst the Eastern European states and decrease the chances for future conflicts and enhance cooperation towards development. The EU also provides greater diplomatic means to resolve disputes among the candidate states. Membership within the European Union will give the applicants a stronger opportunity to deal with the rewards and shortcomings of globalization by creating more efficient institutions and infrastructure.

The main benefit is deeper penetration of the European market and through it greater access to the world market. Many of the applicant countries have been isolated and marginalized and access to the European market is a way for them to penetrate and take advantage of the world economy. The candidate countries will be able to benefit from trade agreements with the EU as well as their individual bilateral agreements. Membership within the EU will also open up avenues for creating new trading relationships with countries outside of the EU bloc.

The Eastern European nationals will benefit from the bi-directional movement of people. The freedom of movement of people will be an advantage to the citizens of Eastern Europe who will have the liberty to move anywhere in the EU in search of better homes and jobs. The spread of technology, ideas and skills will happen more readily with the increase in traffic of individuals across borders.

Membership within the EU has the promise of economic growth, through decentralization, privatization, economic aid and subsidies. Foreign direct investment has always been a reliable source of income and membership within the EU will facilitate investment. Therefore there is a strong likelihood that foreign corporations will invest in candidate countries and boost their economies.


Countries that have a large agricultural sector like Poland will profit from the access to agricultural subsidies and a larger market in which to sell its products and purchase cheaper goods. Once a member, the EU also provides financing for any further restructuring necessary to accommodate the obligations of the EU legislation. The desire to obtain EU membership has initiated numerous modernization reforms in the applicant countries that might not have happened for some time yet. The negotiation process and membership is a way of funding each country's modernization attempts; it provides a low cost means to ascend out of poverty and participate in world trade and world affairs.



Signals hang like red-eyed faces above empty rails March 6, 2003 at the main train station in Frankfurt, Germany. A railroad workers strike canceled about 1,000 trains across Germany and delayed others, stepping up pressure on rail operator Deutsche Bahn as it restarts pay talks with labor unions. (photo by Michael Probst/AP)

The decision to join the European Union in 2004 has precarious implications for the candidate countries; they have more at risk and more to lose than the current members of the EU. Candidate countries are faced with many risks. Many of the development programmes sponsored by the EU such as the Phare Program or those sponsored by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) are largely structural adjustment programs. The Phare Program was launched in 1989 following the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe; it was intended to help reconstruct the crippled economies of the region. The Phare Program became the main financial instrument of the pre-accession strategy to bring the candidate countries within EU standards


These development or structural adjustment programmes have lowered incomes and standards of living. The fiscal austerity encouraged by SAPs includes cuts in government spending, particularly government subsidies for infant industries and agriculture. The withdrawal of subsidies and the privatisation or closing down of state enterprises contributes to a higher rate of unemployment. When coupled with an increase in taxes these changes create challenges to the preservation of the quality of life. Many citizens have been displaced from their jobs as a result of privatisation and re-structuring, particularly within the agricultural sector, coal mining and steel industries. They have reduced the necessary government spending on healthcare and education. Unemployment has risen to as high as 25% in some Polish regions.



Many of the candidate countries would need to reform their industries to meet the standards established by the EU; it would be a costly process and place small and medium sized businesses at a disadvantage. Job cuts and the decline in real terms of the salaries of low-skilled workers have resulted in a considerable spread of poverty within the applicant countries.²⁶

There is no opt-out clause for the adoption of the Euro for the new members, as was available for the United Kingdom and Denmark. In order to smooth the transition to the Euro, petitioning countries must subscribe to the joint exchange rate mechanism for a period of two years before membership; this however places them at risk for speculation attacks.

Although inflation has stabilised in some countries it is still higher than most EU members. The economies of some candidate countries have become strained as a result of a decline in GDP growth coupled with high inflation rates.




Figures from: World Bank Development Indicators 2002

The agricultural subsidies that would be made available upon membership are criticised for only reaching large agribusinesses and not smaller farms, which are being pushed out by restructuring manoeuvres. Dependency on aid programs like those from Special Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD) and the Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) which finances major environmental and transport infrastructure projects will provoke domestic lethargy in further restructuring and development efforts. These aid programmes remove the domestic incentive towards restructuring and development. Once the aid declines or is withdrawn the efforts at increasing efficiency and promoting development will also decline. Agriculture and infrastructure development are two sectors of the economy largely in need of reform because they are under-productive and costly. Due to the heavy concentration on industrialisation and providing higher outputs, the rural areas of many new members are at risk of being neglected and the infrastructure, education and healthcare in these areas will deteriorate.

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European Farmers Percentage Employed on the Land



source EU

As the impatience for enlargement has increased, many of the obligations of membership have been overlooked. Many of the candidates have not established a sustainable development of economic activities, they are suffering high levels of unemployment and decreased social protection, and they are undergoing inflationary growth and continue to remain behind competitively. There have been no significant improvements or attempts at improvement in the quality of environment or standards of living amongst the ten countries negotiating for membership. There is a lapse in the protection of minority rights particularly amongst the Roma populations of the Czech Republic and Hungary.²⁷

The negotiation process has brought about good and necessary changes both within the European Union and the candidate countries. It has forced upon them the changes that have been needed. However, the appropriate strategy right now would not be to grant membership,

but to allow time for the changes to develop and allow more adjustments and reforms to be made. Admitting new members as early as 2004 will have more consequences than benefits for both sides. Many of the Eastern European countries are still fine-tuning the transition from communism to democracy, and therefore, take the time to continue to make the necessary adjustments to improve their competitiveness while reducing inflation, unemployment and the inefficiency of their major economic sectors.

The EU would be risking its stability, efficiency and economic success by admitting all 10 countries in the proposed time frame. The EU needs to continue to make changes to its structure before the completion of the accession process to protect and enforce its stability and efficiency. More time should be given to the candidate countries to develop their economies further so that the EU economy and budget is not burdened, and they can maintain EU standards and competitiveness. An increase in the disparity of economies within the European Union could jeopardise its economic strength and solidarity. ■

Kimberley Mann is an International Relations bachelor's degree candidate at San Francisco State University. Although her studies within the field have been diverse she has developed an interest in European and East European affairs.



Agriculture and industry meet in a surreal scene beneath a rainbow near the power plant at Grosskrotzenburg, Germany, on Nov. 25, 2002.

(photo by Kai Pfaffenbach/Reuters)

Notes:

- 1 <http://www.liv-coll.ac.uk/pa09/europetrip/brussels/churchill.htm>
 - 2 <http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cig/g4000q.htm#q1>
 - 3 Ibid.
 - 4 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/igc2000/dialogue/info/offdoc/guidecitoyen_en.pdf
 - 5 Ibid.
 - 6 Ibid
 - 7 Ibid
 - 8 Ibid
 - 9 Bidelux, Robert; Taylor, Richard. (ed.) European Integration and Disintegration. London and New York: Routledge, 1996.
 - 10 PSOE Proposal: The Future of Europe. Accessed through: http://www.europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/other/oth070601_en.pdf
 - 11 <http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/keythemehome.asp?19>
 - 12 http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/seventh_survey/7sc.pdf accessed on 26.03.03
 - 13 Economist Intelligence Unit. Poland Country Profile 2002. accessed through <http://www.eiu.com> on 02.10.03
 - 14 <http://www.warsawvoice.pl/view/1572> (13, March 2003) accessed on 26.03.03
 - 15 Bidelux, Robert; Taylor, Richard. (ed.) European Integration and Disintegration. London and New York: Routledge, 1996.
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 - 17 Ibid.
 - 18 Ibid.
 - 19 Pires, Iva Miranda. The Next EU Enlargement: Implications for Portugal. Departamento Sociologica, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Centro de Estudos Geograficos.
 - 20 Piachaud, David. EU Faces East-West Poverty Gap. 29.03.02 BBC News World Edition accessed on 19.03.03 through: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1901293.stm>
 - 21 [Http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e40001.htm](http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e40001.htm)
 - 22 PSOE Proposal: The Future of Europe. http://www.europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/other/oth070601_en.pdf
 - 23 Freudenstein, Roland. Poland, Germany and the EU. International Affairs, Jan 98 Vol. 74 Issue 1 p 41.
 - 24 Ibid.
 - 25 Ibid.
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 - 28 Ibid.
 - 29 Ibid.
 - 30 Blazycza, George. Polish Socio-economic Development in the 1990's and Scenarios for EU Accession. Europe Asia Studies. Vol 51 No. 5 1999 pp 799-819. University of Glasgow
 - 31 Ibid.
 - 32 Barrie, Janet. Europe Hiding Gypsies behind a Wall. BBC News: World. Accessed through <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/286704.stm> on 26.03.03
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JABBERWOCKY

by Lewis Carroll

'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.

“Beware the Jabberwock, my son!
The jaws that bite, the claws that catch!
Beware the Jubjub bird, and shun
The frumious Bandersnatch!”

He took his vorpal sword in hand:
Long time the manxome foe he sought—
So rested he by the Tumtum tree,
And stood awhile in thought.

And, as in uffish thought he stood,
The Jabberwock, with eyes of flame,
Came whiffing through the tulgey wood,
And burbled as it came!

One, two! One, two! And through and through
The vorpal blade went snicker-snack!
He left it dead, and with its head
He went galumphing back.

“And, hast thou slain the Jabberwock?
Come to my arms, my beamish boy!
O frabjous day! Callooh! Callay!”
He chortled in his joy.

'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.